893.00/7–2049: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State 23
[Received July 20—9:02 a. m.]
1195. [To Nanking:] ReContel 844, July 18.24 On invitation July 17 met with Lo Lung-chi, Chang Tung-sun, Chou Chin-wen and Joseph Chang.25 In addition to information communicated Conreftel, Lo had following to say:
Position Mao difficult: As leader Communist Party he must maintain proper position vis-à-vis USSR. Mao, however, as a Chinese leader may talk one way and act another, would act in accordance with practical requirements situation. This should be kept in mind in reading Communist propaganda. I noted specific practical matters presently before us, said Americans would reach judgments on basis Communist actions. Lo next said difficulties experienced re such matters probably respected preoccupation Communist leaders with matters primary importance to neglect such matters as future small number foreign businessmen. He said talk of Mao’s being potential Tito of course made [Page 444] it harder for such development to occur, that an adept American policy such as Japan or Britain would have adopted would incorporate more indirect approach and achieve greater degree success. Held that Communists had good reason feel begrieved [sic] re USA by reason past American actions. I observed Marshall mission had undertaken mediation at invitation both parties to dispute. Lo said many mistakes made by mission. If USA, for instance, had opposed Chiang Kai-shek’s dissolution of Democratic League, democratic groups would today be stronger. USA also should not have withdrawn ECA. I noted Communist action re ECA Tientsin, Peiping. Lo said Communists excuse those by saying they were confiscating Chinese Government food; that if USA had continued nevertheless send supplies there would have been no further Communist interference but of course USA would have had to send without conditions such as attached Nationals since Communists very sensitive re their high probity. Lo said at present there was Communist revival of anti-USA attitude due Generalissimo’s trip Philippines which USA could have prevented. I noted Philippines was sovereign state and invited attention Acheson statement26 in premises. Lo said first requisite for better relations was severance connections with Generalissimo and recognition Communist regime. I noted none existed. Lo said there would be but that then Communists would not sue for recognition, USA should come forward and offer. Joseph Chang observed that if USA offered recognition before USSR Communists would have to refuse, ruled down by Chang Tung-sun. Lo proposed support Democrats. Chou pointed out impracticability supporting under present circumstances (garble) would be done, Joseph Chang said support now would only irritate Communists. Chang Tung-sun said best chance for (garble) Chinese liberals was through discarding Generalissimo and enabling Li Tsung-jen continue on (garble) Lo held further course relations with Communist China depended upon policy USA. (Garble) traditional friendship USA for Chinese nation and opined that better relations would depend upon solution concrete problems at hand. As before cited outstanding cases. Lo stated that recent Chou speech re Chinese self-sufficiency was direct reply to Ambassador’s argument vis-à-vis Chen Min-shu27 to effect that USA not economically dependent on China, being designed show China likewise had no need rely on USA. Foreigners should remember Chinese people’s [Page 445] capacity for endurance. Admitting that capacity, I observed that if China which had been undergoing deterioration for 10 war years desired get on road to construction it could best do so by making use of help from any and all quarters available.
Names not in any circumstances to be mentioned. Lo said Mao told him CCP was in no way committed in event war between USA and USSR [to] “come out immediately” and join USSR against USA, that statement (presumably that of April 3) which had attracted so much attention was by (garble) personalities, not official statement CCP. (Note here that version published official Jen Min Jih Pao April 4 born (garble) nature Mao Tse-tung in capacity chairman CCP).
Lo asked my opinion present world situation. I replied it was generally considered position one so-called “camp” (garble) become more consolidated, better integrated, stronger. Results [of?] Paris meeting was marked improvement. I asked whether local Chinese considered as reported by Chinese like Soviet press that Paris was victory for USSR. Chang but not Lo said none considered such was case. Lo said there was talk of war in year or two, asked opinion. I said Americans considered war not inevitable but recognized possibility, that lots of things could happen to alter course of events but that in any (garble) be ready for peace or war.
I said it seemed to me that Communist side should note our own present attitude was one of noninterference Chinese affairs, one of letting dust settle, that Communist propaganda directed against “American imperialist plots” of which most were either exaggerated or made out of whole cloth hardly served useful purpose, and that I thought Communists themselves would perhaps be well-advised let propaganda dust settle if it was desired work things out on practical basis.
I did not know before arrival at house Joseph Chang I was to meet Lo Lung-chi, had not sought or suggested such meeting. Believe Lo’s attitude when discussing recent Sino-American and particularly such matters as Marshall Mission and ECA disclosed clearly close sympathy for Communist viewpoint. Believed probably meeting was held with foreknowledge Mao and that possibly Communists now have some feeling regret they refused accept Department’s message (Contel 746, June 2428) and desire in this indirect manner reopen door again, at least keep it ajar (see AstAMilAttel July 18).29 Recommend no response whatsoever.
Sent Nanking 848, repeated Department 1195, OffEmb Canton 222, Shanghai 808.
- Repeated July 20, 11 a. m., to the Department↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- Members of the Democratic League; Joseph Chang was a son of Chang Tuns-sun.↩
- At his press conference on July 13 the Secretary of State was asked whether the Ghiang–Quirino talks on a Pacific Pact had been brought to his attention. The Secretary replied that he had not yet read the “texts”, although they had been received in the Department. Asked whether the United States was “any more amenable to a Pacific Pact” than in May, Secretary Acheson replied, “I think the attitude as stated by me in May still stands” (see Department of State Bulletin, May 29, 1949, p. 696).↩
- Shanghai Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (KmtRC) leader; for further information on this Stuart-Chen conversation, see p. 771.↩
- Same as telegram No. 1073 from Peiping, p. 397.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩