893.00/6–1149: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 13—10 a. m.]
996. ReContels 917, June 1 and 969, June 9. Ex-Mayor Ho Ssu-yuan June 3 confirmed that there existed in CCP party leadership realization necessity veering toward USA and British for economic reasons particularly. Need trade with USA and other Pacific area countries for upkeep industrial plant and food supply. USSR unable supply with only one rail line from Europe, even if willing do so. Communist leaders were trying swing revolutionary thinking to right into nominal channels “new democracy” instead of Communism but were having difficulties due obduracy in lower Communist strata. No strain however now exists in party as consequence. Liu Shao-chi one of best thinkers in party and not radical in his approach economic matters. [Page 380] Liu at least previously opposed Li Li-san12 as shown in his brochure “report regarding party organization regulations” published 1945 (brief review will be sent by despatch). Ho attributed Communist delay in holding PCC to political and economic difficulties being experienced. (This conversation antedated report PCC scheduled for August, note Chang said decision advance date came suddenly.) He remarked Communist policies Shanghai were patently more liberal than even Peiping, Tientsin and constituted recognition necessity having relations with other countries than USSR.
Ho said party leaders were Nationalists instead of anti-Communists in their approach Chinese problems. Many of them appreciated significance Soviet political manipulations Manchuria and particularly Inner Mongolia [and] Sinkiang but it was impossible for them break with USSR present juncture. In event any split developed in party [either?] Chiang Kai-shek or Li Tsung-jen would stage come-back and revolution get setback. Leaders therefore felt under necessity continuing along present line at least until military control achieved over all China. Communists themselves however would be first to learn how profitless was dealing with USSR and one year hence would have much better appreciation hard facts than at present time. It was only necessary for USA to wait.
(I remarked Chinese trade was of relatively little consequence USA, that we could wait indefinitely on basis economic factors, but it seemed appear to me China itself was in position where waiting was impossible.)
Joseph Chang said June 9 that whereas it had previously been considered that split within Communist Party was possible present indications are that Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi were working together and had situation well in hand. Mentioning possibility Titoism, he said in response question Titoism China would possibly come about through shift to right of CCP apparatus as whole without split. ReContel 898, May 25,13 this may be theoretically possible but since Titoism by definition means split with USSR such general shift could be only in form general Communist agreement regarding advisability abandoning Soviet camp in favor camp western democracies, and at same time Communist reconciliation to abandonment Manchuria to USSR. Latter move would itself however be something in nature split since Communists Manchuria must be considered already more under Soviet thumb than Communists China proper, and would presumably be found in Soviet camp if Titoism developed inside Wall.
[Page 381]Per unconfirmed report, Tan Kah-kee14 at meeting several days ago indicated Communists should modify political-economic positions if they desired support overseas Chinese.
Repeated Nanking 71, OffEmb Canton 169, Shanghai 665.