Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/1–349: Airgram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, January 3, 1949.
[Received January 14—1:50 p. m.]

A–1. Following is the substance of the more interesting statements made, in the course of a recent general conversation with an officer of this Consulate General, by Yeh Tu-yi, close Democratic League⁸ associate of Lo Lung-chi:⁹

1. The Chinese Communists are firmly against any compromise involving the retention of Li Tsung-jen in a coalition government and the same applies to virtually all the top-ranking Nanking officials with the exception of Chang Chih-chung¹⁰ and Shao Li-tze.¹¹ The Communists would probably not ever accept Madame Sun Yat-sen¹² in the government, owing to her membership in the Soong family, though they would treat her with deference. (According to another local source, fairly close to Madame Sun, she herself wishes to avoid any political role and to devote herself to expanding her humanitarian world; and she has turned down several requests for her future patronage and assistance in connection with programs being planned for activation under a Communist dominated regime.)

2. The retirement or ousting of the Generalissimo, the complete breakup of his regime, and the establishment of a Communist and liberal coalition government are necessary and inevitable; and the United States would do well to make the best of it.

3. The Chinese Communists are pleased over America’s apparent rebuff of Madame Chiang Kai-shek.¹³ Any steps by the United States toward repudiating Chiang’s regime and hastening the advent of a coalition government would help strengthen the influence of the Democratic League and other anti-Nanking minor parties in the new setup and would better their prospects for winning over the Communists to a more friendly attitude toward the United States.

4. Ma Yin-ch’u, the noted liberal economist, is a likely candidate for Minister of Finance in the new government.

5. While the Democratic League leaders still at Shanghai (Lo Lung-chi, Chang Lan, Kuang Yen-pei, Yeh and one or two others) are closely watched, the reason that none of them has left for Manchuria or elsewhere is more concerned with the difficulty of travel than with their surveillance. In the case of Lo Lung-chi, also is the factor of Lo’s still unrecovered health, as well as the fact that he is in love with the female liberal leader, Pu Hsi-lu, who is under arrest at Nanking and whom Lo wishes to stay near. (Lo himself recently indicated with believed sincerity to another of this office’s staff that he fears a trip to Manchuria would nullify the partial recovery he has made.)

6. The Shanghai Democratic Leaguers have, however, appointed as their unofficial delegate to the pre-PCC¹⁴ meetings, Wu Nan, the well-known professor of Tsinghua University, Peiping (who, as reported in the Consulate General’s A–69, October 20,¹⁵ has already been serving as a liaison agent in transmitting Lo Lung-chi’s proposals to the Democratic League representatives sent from Hong Kong to the meetings.)

7. Lung Yun, the former governor of Yunnan who recently escaped to Hong Kong in the disguise of an old woman, is definitely working with the Communists. He told Yeh over six months ago that he had instructed his troops leaving for Manchuria under Nanking’s orders that they should go over to the Communist side at the first opportunity.

8. Shanghai Communists have been ordered not to see foreigners at present, especially Americans.

9. The Chinese Communists are all strongly behind Mao Tse-tung.¹⁶ They are different from other Communists, they do not owe their position to Moscow; they are Chinese first and Communists second. There is a real chance of Mao becoming another Tito.¹⁷

10. Yeh has just received a report that Chou En-lai¹⁸ recently left for Washington. (This rumor, which has also reached us from another source, is only reported to bring out the fact that, in imparting the story, Yeh displayed a patently eager interest revealing how much it would please him if the report were true.)

Yeh is believed to be a man of frank character and pro-American leanings, who has few illusions as to what his party would be up against as a minor group in a Communist dominated regime. However, his assertions should of course be taken with the thought in mind that, as a member of a party which seems to have committed its fortunes for better or worse to cooperation with the Communists in a coalition wherein the party would hope to maintain some influence as a moderating element potentially useful to the Communists in winning American economic assistance, he is presumably most anxious to see the complete collapse of the Generalissimo’s regime and the failure of any movement to replace it with a new anti-Communist front of Nanking progressive elements and other groups not yet committed to cooperation with the Communists. Agreement by the Communists to accept Li Tsung-jen and other Nanking leaders in the coalition would probably be regarded somewhat differently and with mixed feelings by Yeh and his party—their relief at having a stronger opposition to the Communist domination of the coalition being likely to be offset by fear that the Nanking elements would eclipse their own party in prestige and in usefulness for winning favors from the Western democracies.

Cabot

8. Organized in 1940 as a federation of Chinese “liberal parties” to serve as a “third force” between the Nationalists and Communists.
9. Leader of the Democratic League.
10. Military and Political Affairs Director for Northwest China and Government representative during the 1946 negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party.
11. Kuomintang member and Chinese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1939–42.
12. Widow of the founder of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Republic; sister of Madame H. H. Kung and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and of T. V. Soong.
13. For documentation regarding Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to the United States late in 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. viii, pp. 296 ff.
14. Political Consultative Conference.
15. Not found in Department of State files.
16. Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
17. Marshal Josip Broz Tito, head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and State, who defected from Moscow leadership in June 1948.
18. Member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and chief Communist representative during the 1946 negotiations.