893.00/1–349: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

7. May I give my following reflections on Generalissimo[‘s] New Year message: My first reaction was favorable. It was dignified and conciliatory. There was less abuse of Communists than usual. In assuming blame for national distress Generalissimo was in best tradition and in indicating his readiness either to continue or retire he was in accord with new democratic concepts.

But on further thought the fatal flaws reveal themselves. It was too much a literary composition in grand manner. It had the gracious tone of a powerful ruler dealing with troublesome rebels. In this it ignored unpleasant realities: The virtual collapse of military capacity, the failure of latest monetary measures, the almost universal desire for peace and impossibility of it as long as he stays in office.

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The other flaw was more serious. In a sense he has made concessions but in doing so has not gone far enough. His stubborn pride, his anger over Communist war criminal list which he heads, influence of T. V. Soong4 and other irreconcilables led him to retract his forthright decision made earlier in week to resign and leave Vice President5 free to adopt any policy that might seem to him to be for national welfare. Yet the pressure was too strong and his original intention too definite for him to avoid any reference to his own willingness to retire. This will destroy whatever is left of will to fight among his troops. There was at once division of opinion among military officers. Position taken seems to be result of compromise among various groups in Kmt.6 Each of Generalissimo’s five conditions may be taken to represent emphasis of one of these factions. In attempting to reconcile them all he may further intensify internal disagreements. Communist reaction can be easily surmised. Their attitude will doubtless be uncompromising. Flushed with success and with victory in sight they want to complete task of eradicating once for all the evil influence of Kmt, precisely as Chen Li-fu7 and his supporters have consistently argued regarding Communists. Whether by this Communists mean only present leadership and structural organization of Kmt or everything that stands in way their absolute control can only be learned from their future behavior. But it will seem that Kmt at any rate must succumb to dynamic purpose of Communists and because of its own shortcomings. Once Communists have eliminated this source of opposition they may propose some inclusive form of coalition and attempt political settlement with political resistance groups in outlying provinces.

In any event a movement was started on New Year’s Day which would seem to be beginning of end of military conflict on national scale. Present indications are that Generalissimo looks forward to withdrawing when necessary to Taiwan and making that his base for continuing resistance.

Stuart
  1. Governor of Kwangtung and former President of the Chinese Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance; brother-in-law of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
  2. Marshal Li Tsung-jen.
  3. Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).
  4. Chinese Minister without Portfolio and coleader of the so-called C–C clique in the Kuomintang.