893.00/3–2349

The Consul General at Shanghai ( Cabot ) to the Ambassador in China ( Stuart )44

[Extracts]
No. 49

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following résumé of the more interesting observations made by Yeh Tu-yi and P’eng Wen-ying, members of the Democratic League group which has remained at Shanghai, in the course of general conversation with officers of the Consulate General at an informal dinner party on March 20:

. . . . . . .

[Page 196]

To explain why the Democratic Leaguers made common cause with the Communists, Mr. P’eng said that the former’s prime desideratum was the civil war’s speedy conclusion and the end of the Chinese people’s intolerable suffering. As the Nationalists’ consistent defeats show they cannot win the war, for the Democratic League to support them would serve only to help defer their inevitable defeat. On the other hand, in view of the Communists’ demonstrated military prowess, to join with them is to speed the conclusion of hostilities—in turn, releasing the Chinese lao pai hsing (common people) from their present agony and providing a basis for economic recovery. It was such reasoning which caused the Democratic League to commit its fortunes, for better or worse, to cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party.

P’eng also expressed his fervent hope that the United States would cease assisting the Kuomintang, not only because such continued support would needlessly prolong the war and intensify Communist hatred of the United States but also because it would tend to destroy the pro-American sentiment of Democratic Leaguers, who now must go along with the Communists. If America continues to supply the Communists’ enemies, he declared it would be impossible for Democratic Leaguers (and other pro-American elements in the Communist fold) to give a sympathetic interpretation of United States policy. Explaining that many of the Chinese Communists’ inexplicable actions are due to their ignorance, provincialism and suspicion, he averred that because so many Democratic League members are American-returned students and well-acquainted with Western thought and methods, they could do much to help improve relations between Americans and the Chinese Communists—if not estopped by the bitterness engendered by continuing United States assistance to the Kuomintang.

Repeating the general line of thought expressed by them in previous talks with an officer of the Consulate General, Yeh and P’eng deplored the press publicized speculation on the question of Mao Tse-tung’s becoming a second Tito;45 pointed out that this rendered it all the more difficult for Mao to make any conciliatory move toward the Western democracies; and said that, while Mao could of course not undertake at this stage any open or definite repudiation of Moscow, he might, granted favorable circumstances and a reasonable attitude on the part of the democracies, be willing and able to orient Chinese Communist policies unobstrusively toward a gradual improvement of relations with the latter.

It is the impression of the Consulate General—on the basis of the conversation under reference and previous once [ones]—that these [Page 197] Democratic League members, confronted with, a distasteful choice between the Nationalists and the Communists, chose the latter (not without misgivings)—as the lesser of two evils. Once having taken this irrevocable step, however, they are compelled to gloss over the mistakes and faults of the Chinese Communists—not necessarily at the cost of (but certainly with obvious strain on) their own intellectual integrity. The fact that many Democratic Leaguers were educated in the United States, sincerely like Americans and American ways, and eager for friendly relations between the United States and China and, at the same time, realize that the Chinese Communist attitude towards the West is, in many cases, ignorant, stupid, and suspicious, makes their role of Communist apologists an especially difficult one. Their anxious desire for unproved relations between America and the Chinese Communists cannot be disassociated from the assuagement such a development would give their intellectual conflicts.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Cabot
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department without covering despatch; received April 5.
  2. Marshal Josip Broz Tito, head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and State, who defected from Moscow leadership in June 1948.