Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

125.3516/7–449: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, July 4, 1949—4 p. m.
[Received July 4—11:50 a. m.]

1431. We have racked our brains for solutions to problems of communications, supplies, personnel which beset our Consulate Dairen, but must confess we still find no answers. We doubt whether it would be possible to use Japanese repatriation vessel for purposes envisaged in Dairen telegram 190, June 29 to Department³⁴ because of time element, possibility Soviets may refuse clearance for passengers and pouches to land, and fact that replacement personnel for Dairen cannot now leave China.

1. Communications: Telegraphic communications with Dairen are still open, although there are of course no assurances that we will continue to enjoy this privilege indefinitely. As respects courier service, there seems little hope of reestablishing it in near future. Last year it was difficult, expensive operation to send couriers from Shanghai via Vladivostok but even that is no longer possible now that Soviet vessels have ceased run between Vladivostok and Chinese ports (Dairen telegram 173, June 16 [15] to Department³⁴).

2. Supplies: Apparently Consulate Dairen is running low on commissary official supplies (besides dollar exchange and fresh codes). Our only suggestion here is that Department in cooperation with Foreign Service establishments Japan, Manila, Hong Kong, Singapore might learn of sailing some foreign vessel to Dairen sufficiently in advance to arrange for purchases and shipment. Our Consul occasionally hears of presence of such foreign vessels in Dairen but he is never permitted visit them (Dairen telegram 183, June 23 to Department³⁴). In this connection we might also observe that Foreign Service establishments in Communist-occupied areas of China would have few supplies to spare even if direct shipping from Shanghai or Tientsin to Dairen were available. Whether such supplies would be allowed duty-free entry Dairen is moot question.

3. We can think of only four logical ways by which replacement personnel could travel to Dairen:

a. From Shanghai (Colling), Nanking (Bacon), and Peiping (Boorman) by Chinese vessel across Yellow Sea or by rail via Manchuria. Chinese Communists have already refused cooperation in this project on grounds they have no diplomatic relations with US and no inter-port travel regulations. In this connection we might add it is unlikely they will have diplomatic relation with US before next year.

b. From Hong Kong (or Shanghai when port reopens) on Soviet motorship Smolny to Vladivostok for transshipment to Dairen. Soviets have refused cooperation in this project by failure to act on Bacon’s visa application which was filed February 23 or on Colling’s filed April. Also no sailings of Soviet vessels from China to Vladivostok are now even scheduled as far as we can ascertain.

c. From Japan by unarmed LCI or other small US naval vessel, unarmed plane or chartered vessel. Soviets have already shown reluctance to assist in this project by issuing visas last December for courier travel via Vladivostok in preference to permitting carrier entry in Dairen. Presumably Chinese Communists, now that they have theoretically taken over responsibilities administration Dairen area, would also object to such entry on grounds they have no diplomatic relations with US.

d. Reassignment of entire new staff from USA or Europe and travel across USSR via Vladivostok and thence to Dairen by Soviet ship. This approach might seem more promising in view facts that Bacon, Boorman, Colling are now immobilized in China, Boorman has not yet even been assigned Dairen pending completion his language course and Colling has presumably acquired bad name with CCP result his persecution on trumped-up charges brutality toward disgruntled former Chinese employee Consulate General Shanghai (see Shanghai’s 2408, June 22 to Department³⁶). Probabilities, however, are that Soviets would also refuse transit visas for trans-Siberian travel new Foreign Service personnel.

We clearly perceive advantages retaining our last toe hold Manchuria, not least of which are that Dairen is open port in which we are fully entitled maintain Consulate office and that Dairen is only vantage point from which to observe day-to-day joint Soviet-CCP administration. However, we reluctantly conclude that under present circumstances these advantages are outweighed by struggle expense, humiliation, danger involved in keeping post open. Indefinite continuance of Consulate in present status is unfair to Paddock, Gleysteen who have already exceeded their anticipated tours of duty. American consular officers Dairen are now hardly more than hostages awaiting Soviet retaliation against such American moves as Gubitchev arrest.³⁷ Due solely to Soviet and CCP police measures, Consulate Dairen has for some time been more productive in administrative-personnel headaches than political-economic reporting. It is for these reasons that we find it difficult agree with theme expressed Moscow telegram’27, June 29, to Dairen,³⁸ repeated Nanking 72, Canton 37, Shanghai 13, that since Soviets apparently want US to close post we should endeavor keep it open. It seems to us rather that main issue is whether, under existing circumstances beyond control, we ourselves stand to gain more than we lose by maintaining post.

We fully endorse statements in Dairen telegram 187, June 27[26] to Department that “Soviets are still directly responsible for Dairen and for Consulate difficulties” and that “Soviet control of Dairen likely until Japanese treaty concluded”. In Dairen, at least as much as in Mukden, we are dealing with Soviets. We therefore recommend that if Department and Embassy Moscow are still not convinced of futility of continuing our efforts re Dairen, we should make one final approach to Soviet Foreign Office informing that (1) CCP authorities have no facilities or inter-port regulations for travel to Dairen (thus forestalling possibility of Soviets shifting onus onto CCP), and (2) we therefore request Soviets promptly either to issue transit visas to Bacon, Boorman, Colling for use on first available ship from China to Vladivostok or to authorize their entrance into Dairen on unarmed US Government carrier out of Japan as soon as they are able to leave China with simultaneous exit permits and visas for Paddock and Gleysteen. If this approach meets with no success by August 15, we believe Department should then proceed without further delay to close office, at same time giving maximum publicity to Soviet restrictions which forced us to take step. Principal theme of such publicity should be that, following closely on heels of Mukden closure, US Government experience in Dairen constitutes impressive evidence of Soviet domination Manchuria and CCP complaisance.

For our own guidance would appreciate brief statement re Department reaction to this telegram, previous Embassy and Dairen telegrams on same subject.

Sent Department 1431; repeated Shanghai 795, Embassy Canton 607, Moscow 46, Dairen 40.

Stuart

34. Not printed.
34. Not printed.
34. Not printed.
36. Post, p. 1174.
37. For documentation on the rejection of the claim to diplomatic immunity for Valentin Alexeyevich Gubichev, arrested and tried for espionage, 1949–50, see vol. v, pp. 776 ff.
38. Not printed; it reported that, since the Soviet Government would probably welcome the Consulate’s departure from Dairen, the Embassy in Moscow considered it preferable to hold on as long as possible.