Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440, SD/A/C.1/273

¹

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

confidential

[Washington,] September 14, 1949.

Jerusalem

the problem

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take on the question of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area pursuant to Resolution 194 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on December 11, 1948.

recommendations

1. The United States should strongly support the proposals of the Commission. (Annex 1 contains the plan proposed by the Commission and comments for the guidance of the Delegation.³

2. If the PCC proposals are rejected by either the Arabs or by Israel either before or during the debate, the United States should continue to support the proposals as being the best chance of achieving an international regime and in the hope that the parties will acquiesce in a United Nations decision. This position might be changed in the light of developments.

3. Any amendments to the Statute submitted during the course of the debate should be considered by the Delegation and the Department in the light of the existing situation.

4. If the PCC proposals are defeated by vote of the General Assembly, the United States should wait and see what alternatives are advanced. At this stage the Delegation should consult the Department as to the future course of action.

discussion

[Here follow sections marked “Background of Problem”; the “Israeli Position,” which stated in part that “Representatives of Israel made it clear from the outset of the Commission’s work that the New City of Jerusalem was regarded as part of Israel and would not be relinquished to an international regime. The inhabitants of Jewish Jerursalem were Israeli citizens and it was, they asserted, inconceivable that Israel would take part in a plan which would oblige these citizens to live under another administration against their will”; and the “Arab Position,” which stated in part that the Arab States “have recently indicated their acquiescence in an international regime for the City. This position is believed entirely due to their present unfavorably [unfavorable] military position and that it expresses a wish for an international bulwark against further Israeli expansion.… The Arabs have been unanimous in making their principal demand that there should be an absolute United Nations guarantee that the international character of the City shall be preserved. The Commission proposals undertake to meet this demand by means of the provisions for demilitarization. The Arabs have also insisted, as part of the demand for safeguards, that there should be no corridor linking the City with the State of Israel. The corridor nevertheless exists and there is no prospect that it will be relinquished by Israel.”]

Position of the International Community.—The strongest element of interest in the Jerusalem settlement among the membership of the United Nations, apart from the Arab States and Israel, is found in the Catholic countries. While no great interest was manifested during the first half of the year, there have recently been evidences of increasing interest in the problem by the Vatican and various Catholic communities. This interest indicates a possibility of a strong demand for an international regime in the nature of a corpus separatum.

Basis for Recommendation 1.—The United States concurred in the opinion of its representative on the Commission that an international regime in the nature of a corpus separatum for Jerusalem would be rejected by Israel and that no useful purpose would be served by preparing one more plan which would share the fate of previous attempts of this kind by remaining a dead letter. The other two members of the Commission were at first inclined to favor proposals for a completely separate regime even though they agreed that such proposals could not be placed in operation. They were, however, persuaded by the United States Representative to attempt a practical approach which might be acceptable to the parties and at the same time fulfill the spirit and letter of the resolution calling for an international regime. Israel and the Arab states have both agreed to United Nations control of the Holy Places, which appears to be the focal point of international interest in the City. The proposals of the Commission call for a United Nations Authority with control over the Holy Places, including the provision of United Nations guards, and with supervisory powers over the other main subjects of international interest, namely, the observance of human rights and demilitarization. The United Nations Authority is also given power to participate with a Joint Board in the consideration of questions which relate to the efficient functioning of the City. These include such things as common services and utilities.

Subject to the restrictions of the international regime, the powers of Government would be entrusted to the adjacent states of Israel and, presumably, the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom. The details of the international regime would be incorporated in an instrument having the force of a treaty. The United Nations Authority, as well as the states concerned, is given the power to intervene diplomatically in case of alleged violations and, in case of a dispute, to submit the question for adjudication by an international tribunal especially created for the purpose.

In supporting this plan the United States considers that it fulfills the resolution of the General Assembly and makes adequate provision for those elements of the Jerusalem situation which are of particular interest to the International Community. It is believed that the provisions for international control are strong and can, if put into operation, ensure that the world interest in Jerusalem is safeguarded.

We feel that the establishment of a Jerusalem regime in the nature of a corpus separatum under the United Nations is entirely impractical. This is largely because it would be unacceptable to Israel but also because, even if accepted, it would call for United Nations commitments which the United Nations might be unwilling or unable to fulfill. In addition to heavy financial requirements such commitments would also include an obligation to maintain peace and order in a City which, if legally separated from the adjacent states, might very soon be faced with serious threats either internally or from outside.

It is believed that the United Nations should be willing to accept a genuine and substantial plan which has a good possibility of being accepted by the parties concerned and of being successfully placed in operation.

Demilitarization.—If the plan is attacked on the basis of details, rather than as a whole, a likely point of attack might be that of demilitarization. Israeli representatives have often said that after their experience of a year ago they could never again leave the Jewish population of the City unprotected. This is also a likely point of attack from the Arab side, particularly since they claim that the existence of the corridor gives Israel a strong military advantage which largely nullifies the effects of demilitarization. It is believed that we should not recede from the requirement that the City be completely demilitarized. This is an essential, and one of the strongest, elements of the proposed international regime without which it is doubtful that the plan would be accepted by the Members of the United Nations. The argument on the point of military advantage would be that both sides have direct access to the respective contiguous states and that the result is approximate equality.

The Corridor.—If the Arabs wish to reject the proposal they will undoubtedly make the existence of the corridor a basic argument. This will be linked with the question of demilitarization and the claim will be made that demilitarization is in effect non-existent on the Israeli side if there is a direct connection between Jerusalem and Israel. It is probable that the Arabs will only use this argument if they have decided to reject the plan, for there is no prospect that Israel will give up the corridor. It may, therefore, be useless to argue the matter except for the slight possibility that combined pressure may persuade the Arabs to change their position. The argument on this point would be that Jordan also has a direct link with Jerusalem and that the parties are, therefore, in a position of equality.

Basis for Recommendations 2 and 3.—In approaching the General Assembly debate on the Jerusalem question the United States has the general view that the PCC proposals represent virtually a last chance to achieve any substantial degree of internationalization going beyond international control of the Holy Places. This view may alter as a result of discussions during the Assembly period but appears well-founded in consideration of the widely divergent approaches to this question on the part of Israel, the Arabs, and the international community. The United Nations has adopted a procedure for bringing about a solution of the problem by appointing a Commission to consider all aspects and bring in proposals. The Commission has endeavored to take into account the conflicting views of the parties concerned and to present a plan calculated to reconcile their major claims. Meanwhile the conditions for achieving internationalization have been gradually deteriorating by reason of the progressive consolidation of the New City into the State of Israel, the filling up of former Arab quarters with new Israeli immigrants, the extension of Israeli civil administration and the movement of government bureaus to Jerusalem. Consequently, we feel that the United Nations should follow through strongly on the procedure it has adopted by making every effort to bring about acquiescence in the proposals of the Commission. If this fails the effort to achieve an international regime must start again from the beginning in circumstances that are even less favorable than when previous efforts were undertaken. Consequently, even if Israel or the Arab States reject the plan prior to a vote in the Assembly, we should nevertheless attempt to get a favorable Assembly vote on the chance that these parties may acquiesce in a United Nations decision.

If the proposals of the Commission fail in an Assembly vote there may reasonably be expected to be an effort on the part of the delegations of some Catholic countries to put up a plan of more far-reaching internationalization. Israel would be almost certain to oppose such proposals. The United States should cooperate in the search for a practical solution. Decisions will have to be made in the light of the proposals made, the attitude of the parties directly concerned, and possible strong developments in American Catholic and Jewish public opinion.

1. Lot 71 D 440 is the master file of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
2. In connection with the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly; the paper is marked “Subject to Final Clearance.”
3. Not found attached.