Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

883.20/4–2849: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, April 28, 1949—5 p. m.

1636. Department’s instruction 186, April 18.¹ Following Embassy’s comments re US–UK staff talks Fayid Egypt:

1. We believe, and Admiral Conolly concurs, that UK has genuine problem in bringing Anglo-Egyptian defense cooperation to comprehensive and effective level without arousing in minds King Farouk and Egyptian Government suspicion Egypt distrusted element in defense Middle East against Soviet aggression. We feel that UK genuinely on the spot to say something to King and government re US–UK cooperation since impossible keep secret visits US personnel Fayid and combined meetings Malta, Tobruk, etc. According Michael Wright April 27 Egyptians are still considering UK paper (Embassy’s 1536, April 20²) but Egyptian Ambassador here recently told Wright there is “real desire” in Egypt to reach agreement with UK and that General Slim and he himself may be asked to return to Egypt soon to carry on conversations begun as reported Embassy’s A–561, March 22. Wright said that if Slim goes out and favorable progress made it is going to be increasingly difficult to keep up pretence to Egyptians that Egypt is blank spot in US and UK defense consultations. Wright said also that communications left with Department March 21 and April 13 by British Embassy Washington represented about bare minimum which could be said in circumstances of hoped-for extensive Anglo-Egyptian defense collaboration although he did not believe wording these communications “sacrosanct” (see paragraph 4 below).

2. We believe, and Admiral Conolly concurs, that consideration might be given at this time to some slight recession from rigid position expressed in Department’s letter of April 7 to the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Conolly took a firm stand initially because Atlantic Pact was still in the making, Egyptians were at war fever re Israel and because at that time UK had not made progress it has now achieved in initiating closer Anglo-Egyptian cooperation re defense matters. The Admiral now feels that favorable developments have occurred on all three points, and in addition US–UK planning teams working under him have made great progress in achieving understanding and cooperation. Consequently Admiral now considers it wise and expedient to modify his initial position to extent of permitting UK to admit to Farouk that US and UK are in close touch re global defense measures. The Admiral does not object to substance of liaison formula (paragraph (f), British Embassy communication March 21).

3. Admiral states that while alternative places for talks are possible and are being employed (e.g. London, Tobruk and Malta) there are certain definite advantages to use Fayid in some instances. British technicians and files are there and as planning progresses down to details handled by lower echelons possibility of using Fayid to a moderate degree may become increasingly important. CINCMELF attaches even more importance to use Fayid than US side.

4. Embassy has good reason to believe that Foreign Office, subject to views CINCMELF and British Ambassador Cairo, would accept following rewording paragraphs (e) and (f) of British Embassy March 21 communication designed more clearly to separate Anglo-”Egyptian planning from US–UK’s cooperation re global defense:

“e. The Suez Canal and Delta areas would be key objectives of Soviet aggression, and, as the defence of Egypt is therefore a matter of special concern, it is suggested that the British and Egyptian Governments should discuss measures for its defence. Therefore we hope that King Farouk will agree to start technical defence discussions between the British Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and the Egyptian defence authorities on a basis of absolute secrecy.

f. To facilitate consultation between the US Government and the British Government on global defence measures it will be important for the British Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, to have liaison arrangements with the US defence authorities. We hope, therefore, that King Farouk will be able to agree to a small number of American officers visiting Fayid from time to time in order to maintain liaison.”

5. Remainder of March 21 communication seems acceptable as drafted but Admiral Conolly agrees with us that it would be preferable to delete specific reference to French and members Brussels treaty from first sentence paragraph (d) and to substitute “other countries”. It seems to us there are advantages in not being too specific in this context.

6. There will probably always be tendency on part of British officials dealing with Egyptians to make all they are permitted to do of very high degree of US–UK cooperation since British status would thereby be enhanced. On other hand, Foreign Office appreciates fully US problem and, we believe, can be trusted not to press US beyond point fully acceptable to us. Risk situation appears to lie largely in Egyptian security but it is hard to see how much could be made of secret UK communications along line of alternative wording quoted paragraph 4 above.³

7. Admiral Conolly has approved this telegram.

Douglas

1. Not printed; it transmitted copies of Secretary Acheson’s letter of April 7 to the Secretary of Defense, p. 203, and of the British Embassy memorandum received on April 13, and requested comment (883.20/4–1149). The British Embassy memorandum is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 204.
2. Not printed.
3. Cairo, on April 30, reported the belief of Mr. Hare, who was visiting Egypt at the time, that “the British, with a view to fortifying their position in Egypt, were endeavoring to bring the Americans into the local picture, having heard that the Egyptians were somewhat reluctant to renew or revise their bipartite treaty of 1936 with the British and that they would be more amenable to bringing the document up-to-date were Americans included in it or in other negotiations among the three powers.” (airgram 508, 883.20/4–3049)