Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/8–349

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

confidential

[Washington,] August 3, 1949.

Subject: Consideration of Dr. Bundle’s last report to Security Council, including lifting of SC Arms Embargo NE.

During the past six months, separate armistice agreements have been concluded between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria on the other, under the guidance of Dr. Bunche as Acting UN Mediator. These agreements are of indefinite duration, incorporate “what amounts to a non-aggressive pact”, provide for the withdrawal and reduction of forces and establish machinery under General W. E. Riley, UN Chief of Staff, USMC, for the settlement of differences which may arise under the agreements.

On July 21 Dr. Bunche submitted a report (Tab A¹) to the SC relating to the present status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine. This report concludes that Dr. Bunche’s responsibilities under various SC resolutions including that of November 16, 1948 have now been discharged and suggests that such functions as remain might be terminated or transferred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission which was established under the GA resolution of December 11, paragraph 2c (Tab B). Dr. Bunche attached a suggested resolution as an annex² to his report. In neither the report nor in the resolution does Dr. Bunche make any specific references to the raising or the retention of the arms embargo imposed by the SC on May 29, 1948. Officers of the Department, however, have been advised of Dr. Bunche’s personal view that approval of his suggested resolution by the SC would in effect lift the arms embargo.

The principal question at issue is whether the United States representative in the SC should support the Bunche proposal for transferring his functions to the PCC and rescinding the earlier truce resolutions of the SC, despite the fact that by so doing the existing SC arms embargo would be lifted. The State Department considers that there is no difficulty about transferring Bunche’s functions to the Conciliation Commission and agrees that we should now proceed on the basis of armistice agreements rather than SC truce resolutions. A specific question is whether the existing UN arms embargo should be retained.

There appear to be three courses, discussed in detail in Tab E, which might be followed:

(1) The US might support postponement of consideration of Dr. Bunche’s report and annex.

(2) The US might support the adoption of Dr. Bunche’s report and annex, but call for the retention of the arms embargo.

(3) The US might support the adoption of Dr. Bunche’s report and annex including the cancellation of the arms embargo subject to such minor amendments as may be desirable.

The following are the principal points for consideration in connection with the arms embargo question:

1. While postponement of the issue would appear to be desirable, it might be difficult to obtain because the Bunche report has been submitted and it can be assumed that one of the parties or one of the members of the Security Council would raise the question in the Council. In fact, the Security Council is scheduled to meet on Thursday morning to consider the report.

2. The theory of the armistice agreements which have now been concluded between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors is that the military phase of the problem is over and that in the progression from truce to armistice to final settlement the completion of the task of the Palestine Conciliation Commission is all that remains.

3. In practice the effect of the arms embargo has been favorable to Israel in as much as Israel has been able to obtain substantial quantities of arms despite the embargo.

4. If the lifting of the arms embargo would in practice precipitate an arms race in the area it would seriously jeopardize a settlement and would add to the already heavy economic problems of the area.

5. Great Britain and France have already begun certain deliveries to the Arab countries, with the knowledge of Bunche, on the ground that these arms were needed for internal security. It is doubtful that the Arabs would continue to comply with an arms embargo, particularly if Israel continued to buy arms abroad. The retention of the arms embargo would probably mean that both Israel and the Arab States would seek arms from iron curtain countries.

6. Israel has asked that the arms embargo be continued until a final peace settlement has been reached at Lausanne. In talks with USUN in New York, Mr. Eban indicated, however, that they were principally interested in assurances against an arms race.

7. The retention of an arms embargo, if it is to be enforced, would require revisions and additions to truce enforcement machinery which has been used up to this point. Such additional machinery would probably involve commitments both of personnel and budget from the United States.

8. Some increase in arms appears to be required for legitimate internal security purposes in the Arab States, resulting from unrest arising from the Palestine question as well as from the presence of large numbers of refugees. Mr. Bevin has strongly emphasized this point in discussing U.S.–U.K. common security interests in the Middle East.

Conclusion

From consideration of the above items it is concluded that, on balance, the United States should support the Bunche proposal to eliminate the truce resolutions despite the arms embargo feature, but should use its influence in the Security Council and diplomatically to ensure that arms going to the Middle East are within the scope of legitimate internal security requirements.

Recommendations

1. That USUN be instructed informally to ascertain the attitude of other SC members in order to determine what position they are likely to take in the SC.

2. That, unless these informal soundings indicate a strong disposition toward postponement of SC action until a later stage in the PCC talks, the US support the lifting of the arms embargo and the adoption of Dr. Bundle’s resolution, and in so doing:

(a) Make a statement in the Council (and endeavor to get the British and if possible the Egyptians and Israelis to make similar statements) of a reassuring character to the effect that we have no intention of permitting, in so far as we are concerned, an arms race to get started;

(b) Through diplomatic channels, endeavor to assure that an arms race will not get started.³

1. Tabbed materials cited in this memorandum are not found attached. Regarding Mr. Bunche’s report of July 21, see editorial note, p. 1240.
2. See ibid .
3. In the “Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary” on August 3, Mr. Rusk is recorded as having “presented a paper on Palestine to the Secretary. The main issue in the paper was whether or not we should agree to lift the arms embargo in the Middle East. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the Israelis had changed their attitude on this question. He made a point, however, that he thought there should be complete understanding on this issue with the President. The Secretary said that he would meet with the President today and get a firm decision. The urgency of this matter was brought about because the Security Council of the United Nations is meeting with Dr. Bunche on this matter starting today.” (Secretary’s Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609)