Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/7–2849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)¹

confidential

[Washington ], July 28, 1949.

Participants:	Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
	Uriel Heyd, Israeli First Secretary
	G—Mr. Rusk
	NEA—Mr. McGhee
	NE—Mr. Wilkins

Problem

The extent to which Israel will be able to contribute to the Arab refugee problem in the Near East by permitting repatriation.

Action Required

To determine what reply the US Government will make to the Israeli Ambassador with regard to his remarks relating to the present attitude of Israel re repatriation.

Action Assigned to

NE

On July 28 the Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath, accompanied by his aide, Uriel Heyd, called on me at his request for the purpose of discussing Israel’s present attitude regarding the question of Arab refugees in the Near East.

The Ambassador said that his government had decided to permit the return of 100,000 Arab refugees for two reasons: (1) to demonstrate Israel’s cooperation with the US; and (2) to contribute what it could to a solution of the general Arab refugee question in the Near East. Ambassador Elath added that the Israeli proposal was based on the assumption that the Arab states would be willing to conclude peace at Lausanne, and that the present Security Council arms embargo under the Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15 would be maintained.

Ambassador Elath stated that his government had reached its decision for these two impelling reasons in spite of the fact that Israeli security and economic experts had considered the proposed decision as disastrous.

The Ambassador explained, in reply to questions, that the 100,000 Arab refugees would include returning members of separated families and Arab infiltrees into Israel.

The Ambassador said that Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett had been scheduled to present the foregoing information to American Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv on July 27th, and that Israeli Delegate Shiloah planned to inform the PCC at Lausanne similarly shortly. Ambassador Elath said the Israeli delegation hoped the PCC would establish a refugee committee to which the Israeli proposal would be submitted. Reference would not be made, however, to the necessity for a formal conclusion of peace or the question of the arms embargo.

I thanked Ambassador Elath for his statement regarding the admission of 100,000 refugees into Israel and said we would study it.

Mr. McGhee inquired whether the 100,000 refugees was a rigid maximum figure, pointing out that if the Israelis and the Arabs at Lausanne attempted to tackle the question of approximately 750,000 refugees in its entirety, it would be necessary to approach the question flexibly. It was our thinking that each of the parties should accept its responsibility and absorb its share of this common problem. For example, if Israel absorbed only approximately 250,000 refugees, i.e., the 100,000 to be admitted and the Israeli estimate of 150,000 already in Israel, and if the living spaces for refugees in the Arab states totaled only 300,000, there would be a gap of 200,000 refugees. What would happen to these refugees? Israel and the Arab states should solve the whole problem and not only a part of it. It could not be assumed that Israel and the Arab states could leave the balance to UN or some other undetermined authority.

Ambassador Elath replied that the 100,000 figure was the maximum. He appeared to be confining himself to the exact phraseology of his instructions because he was unable to reply with regard to responsibility for refugees that might not be absorbed by Israel and the Arab states.²

Ambassador Elath expressed his government’s view that the present arms embargo should be maintained in order to avoid an arms race in the Near East. I observed that the recent conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt separately would seem to remove the necessity for the maintenance of an arms embargo. I inquired whether Israel would be willing to give its assurance that it would not import arms, which would thus have the effect of removing one of the chief elements in Arab fears regarding Israel. Ambassador Elath replied that the armistice agreements were a step on the road to final peace and that he could assure me of Israel’s nonaggressive intentions. His government felt, however, that the arms embargo should be maintained at the present time.

Ambassador Elath remarked, during his discussion of military matters, that such groups as Palmach and Irgun, which had previously been highly autonomous, were now integrated into the Israeli Army. The Ambassador again referred to his government’s hope that the US Government would soon be in a position to provide a high-ranking US Army Officer for the purpose of assisting Israel in reorganizing its military establishment. I told the Ambassador that this matter was still under consideration within the Department.

The Ambassador added that he hoped to have a further discussion with me and Mr. McGhee regarding the foregoing matters and that he also hoped to call upon the Secretary in the near future. I told him that the Department would immediately take these matters under consideration and would communicate with him further concerning them. I also told him that an appointment would be arranged with the Secretary.

Ambassador Elath subsequently discussed details regarding the Gaza strip proposal with Mr. Wilkins. The Ambassador explained, in reply to a question, that if this proposal proved acceptable to the Arabs it would not be possible for Israel to absorb the 230,000 Arab refugees within the area of the Gaza strip. On the other hand, if the Gaza strip proposal should now prove acceptable Israel would not be able to maintain its proposal regarding the 100,000 refugees. The Ambassador said he had not been informed by his government whether the proposal regarding 100,000 refugees and possibly 130,000 refugees from the Gaza strip would simultaneously be acceptable to his government.

Mr. Wilkins inquired whether the Israeli Government had considered the possibility of enlarging this proposal to include territorial compensation along the Egyptian frontier within the area allocated to the Arab state in Palestine and now occupied by Israel. Mr. Wilkins observed that such addition would lift the Gaza strip proposal out of the context of a bargain of “refugees for real estate” and might therefore make it acceptable to Egypt. Ambassador Elath said he did not know and that he himself had never thought of this possibility. He remarked, in this connection, that Israel would never permit the blocking of access to the Gulf of Aqaba for Israel through the relinquishment of territory in the tip of southern Palestine, for the purpose of giving Transjordan direct access to Egypt.

Ambassador Elath subsequently informed Mr. Wilkins that his government had not indicated what form peace should take at Lausanne but conceded it need not necessarily be along the lines of a peace treaty but might assume the form of unilateral declarations by the states concerned, bound together under the title of “Act of Lausanne.”

1. Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
2. The Department summarized Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of conversation up to this point in Unpal 214, July 29, 8 p. m., to Lausanne, which was repeated to London, Arab capitals, and Tel Aviv (501.BB Palestine/7–2949). Unpal 214 stated, additionally, that “Elath was informed we do not consider it appropriate for Dept to advise as to adequacy or inadequacy of number of refugees permitted to return as Arab reaction and influence of Israeli proposals on Lausanne negots would determine this point. Arabs might not consider present Israeli figure as complying with GA Res Dec 11 and might not be able to resettle balance of refugees even if they so desire. It wld be difficult for US and other states to come forward with assistance plan in event all refugees not provided for under resettlement and repatriation plan.”