811.2383/1–2449
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)
Subject: Proposed Visit of Naval Officers to Fayid, Egypt.
The following summarizes action taken to date on the above subject:
On January 21, 1949 the Department received a request from Admiral Conolly through the Navy Department to make arrangements for the clearance of up to a maximum of 12 officers of the Armed Services of his staff to enter Fayid via Farouk Field, Cairo for a period of from 3 to 4 weeks beginning January 27 in connection with Combined Planning. The officers would wear civilian clothes. It was requested that they should not be represented to the Egyptian authorities as members of the Admiral’s staff. Instead he suggested that it be stated that they were detailed from Washington in a program of exchange of officers for their instructions in staff methods on a large command staff. The telegram further stated that CINCMED had sent a similar despatch to the Admiralty urging that the British Ambassador in Egypt be instructed to assist our Chargé in any way possible. He further recommended that this be handled in Cairo only on the highest government level, preferably through the King in person. He emphasized that it was most important for these officers to spend the next three weeks in Fayid and later to have the Combined Planning team assembled at Tobruk for ten days intensive work.
This telegram was sent to Cairo1 with instructions to Mr. Patterson, the Chargé d’Affaires, to endeavor to comply with the Admiral’s request unless the Chargé perceived some serious objection. The Chargé immediately replied2 to the effect that if these 12 officers possessed valid Egyptian visas he perceived no occasion for employment of the unusual procedure suggested by Admiral Conolly, since such officers should encounter no difficulty or Egyptian objection to travel from Cairo to Fayid. The Chargé felt that to raise the subject with the King or Prime Minister in the absence of factors possibly not revealed to the Embassy might jeopardize the entry of the officers into Egypt and might prove embarrassing to the Egyptian authorities by obliging them to take a specific position. He further felt that it would be unnecessary to take up the matter with or to ask the cooperation of the British Embassy.
[Page 190]The above mentioned suggested procedure for the entry of the 12 officers into Egypt was relayed by the Navy to Admiral Conolly last night, January 24, after clearance with NEA. We concurred with our Chargé’s recommendations, particularly since no question of a permanent assignment of these officers to Fayid was indicated. No reply has as yet been received from Admiral Conolly. Should it develop, however, that this assignment is not as temporary as indicated (3 to 4 weeks), the Department might wish to suggest, because of Egyptian sensitivities and because a prolonged assignment might conflict with the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, the feasibility of holding the meetings with the British elsewhere than in Fayid, for example, in Malta, Cyprus or Cyrenaica.
In his telegram of January 243 our Chargé reported a conversation which he had with British Minister Chapman-Andrews who stated that King Farouk, during a recent call at the British Embassy, had expressed discontent over his understanding that the British and Americans in Egypt were consulting together regarding the role Egypt might play in case of hostilities. The King indicated his dissatisfaction over being thus by-passed. Mr. Chapman-Andrews expressed the belief that any prolonged talks lasting a number of weeks or months would differ essentially from individual conversations which had briefly taken place between the American and British officers in Egypt in the recent past. He accordingly felt that it would be well for the British and American Embassies in Egypt to consult with a view to determining the attitude which should be adopted towards the Egyptians, who would certainly be aware of the present purpose of a prolonged residence in the Canal Zone of a group of American naval personnel. Although he thought it might be unwise to approach the Egyptian Government, it would be desirable, in view of the King’s above mentioned feeling, to apprise him of the situation. Our Chargé replied that he had informed his Government of his belief that if these officers possessed Egyptian visas valid for entry into the country they could proceed without hindrance to the Canal Zone. He also stated that he would be glad to confer with the British Minister regarding American military or naval personnel who might come to Egypt for the purpose of having conversations with their British colleagues stationed in Egypt.
Recommendation: With specific reference to the request of the British Ambassador for advice whether such an assignment would be politically unobjectionable to this Government, I would suggest that [Page 191] the Ambassador be told that this question had been raised with the Department as a visit of only several weeks duration and that we had accordingly felt that it could be handled as a routine matter following the precedent of previous visits by American military personnel to Fayid for consultation purposes.
On the basis of the Ambassador’s remarks to Mr. Bohlen, however, it would appear that the assignment may be of a more formal nature and longer duration than we had contemplated, and in such event a serious question might be raised regarding the regularization of the status of American officers in a situation which is already complicated by Egyptian challenging of the position of British troops in the Canal area. If the Egyptians are sensitive regarding British troops despite the provisions of their 1936 Treaty with Great Britain, it is obvious that even greater difficulty might arise in the case of the stationing of American officers on Egyptian soil without benefit of specific agreement.
The Department of State is pursuing this matter with the Navy Department and will communicate with the Ambassador further when more complete information has been received.4
- January 21, as telegram 87, not printed.↩
- On January 22, in telegram 85, not printed.↩
- No. 92, not printed.↩
- Bromley K. Smith, Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat, sent Mr. Satterthwaite’s memorandum to Secretary Acheson on January 26. His transmitting memorandum endorsed Mr. Satterthwaite’s recommendation. Mr. Bohlen’s concurrence is indicated in a marginal notation on Mr. Smith’s memorandum (811.2383/1–2549).↩