I delivered to the President the original of the attached memorandum
with respect to the recent U.S. approach to Transjordan. The
President read the pertinent sections and kept it. He indicated
approval of the action taken in the Department.
[Annex]
Memorandum
Subject: Department’s Message to Transjordan
concerning Separate Negotiations with Israel.
The following is the pertinent section of a message sent by the
Department on June 1 to the American Legation at Amman,
Transjordan:
[Here follows first paragraph of telegram 72 to Amman, except
that the last sentence is omitted.]
The background of this matter is as follows:
In the latter part of May, at a time when the discussions being
conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne
were approaching a crucial point, Elias Sassoon, a
representative of the Israeli Government, sent from Paris a
message to King Abdullah of Transjordan asserting that the
Lausanne talks were a complete failure and requesting
Transjordan to enter into separate talks, parallel to the
Lausanne discussions, in Jerusalem. King Abdullah, who had
placed great hopes in the Lausanne talks and had instructed his
representatives to make every effort to reach agreement with the
Israelis there, reacted strongly against this proposal and
confided his concern to the United States Chargé d’Affaires. He
was not inclined to accede to the Israeli request, since the
talks were progressing at Lausanne and in view of what had
happened when separate talks last took place between Israel and
Transjordan without the presence of a third party.
This occurred in March, while Dr. Bunche was conducting
negotiations for an armistice between Transjordan and Israel
with representatives of the two countries at Rhodes. Without Dr.
Bundle’s knowledge Israel proposed a secret meeting with
Transjordan, to take place in Jerusalem while the Rhodes talks
were going on. Transjordan agreed, and during the meeting the
Israeli representatives stated that Israel would not sign an
armistice at Rhodes unless Transjordan agreed in Jerusalem to
turn over to Israel certain areas in central Palestine then
occupied by Iraqi forces. Upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army,
Transjordan was scheduled to take over the areas occupied by
Iraq, but in Jerusalem the representatives of Israel warned that
if Transjordan attempted to do so without agreeing to turn over
the areas in question, Israel, in addition to not signing the
armistice, would not be responsible for the consequences. The
Israeli representatives gave those of Transjordan 24 hours to
agree. Abdullah appealed to the United States, but when no help
came he signed the forced agreement on the theory that when this
was done and the armistice signed at Rhodes, it might be more
difficult for the Israelis to make more territorial demands. As
a result, some of the richest land in Palestine
[Page 1146]
passed to Israeli control and
the number of Arab refugees was considerably increased.
Although no agreement had been reached at Lausanne, largely
because of the rigidity of the Israeli position, the Department
felt that Sassoon was totally incorrect in stating that the
talks were a complete failure. The Department also believed that
it was essential to give the strongest support to the
Conciliation Commission, which was attempting to reach an
equitable agreement between the parties and offered all the
necessary facilities to the parties for reaching such an
agreement. Under the circumstances, separate talks seemed
totally unnecessary, and likely to lead to circumstances similar
to those under which Transjordan was forced to give up
considerable territory in order to achieve an armistice with
Israel. Accordingly, the Department, in the interests of a just
settlement, suggested to King Abdullah that he not enter the
separate talks with Israel.
An additional motive for the Department’s approach to King
Abdullah was the possibility that Israel and Transjordan, by
negotiating together on the question of Jerusalem without the
presence of the Conciliation Commission, might reach an
agreement concerning the City which would disregard the
international and Christian interests in Jerusalem and in the
Holy Places.
