867N.48/6–1549

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee)

secret

Dear McGhee: Back of my telegram of today1 for your personal attention, copy of which is attached, lies the following reasoning.

Negatively, it is now indisputable that the PCC has shown such inherent organizational weaknesses that not even the super-energy and devotion of Mark Ethridge could galvanize it into life. Of course, its problems have been difficult and neither Arabs nor Jews have cooperated as they should; but the indictment that the PCC has shown itself “an inefficient postoffice” cannot be argued away.

Because the PCC is organically so weak, I think it a grave and unnecessary risk to contemplate using it as the base—no matter how indirectly—for the long term resettlement operations so wisely envisaged in your April 27 memorandum.2 To tie up those difficult and technical operations with an organization as political and as weak as the PCC would be to invite failure.

On the affirmative side, I urge in the strongest possible way that the basis for the resettlement operations should be a single individual with authority to give binding directions. At every stage in the development of these plans, there will arise prickly questions which unless grasped firmly by someone who has the power and the will to override nationalist and other obstructive tactics will cause the history of the refugees resettlement program to be a repetition of the old one—too little and too late.

Could not Griffis’s office have its mandate so broadened as to constitute a requisite base for the projected resettlement operations? The advantages of such a setup would be several:

1.
Single-headed direction in the formulation and execution of basic policies, thus avoiding the acknowledged and unacknowledged cross purposes in the PCC which have tended to paralyze its actions.
2.
The energy and devotion at the top which are essential and can be secured only through the driving leadership of an executive of the highest calibre.
3.
Just recognition of the leading role which the United States through its generous contribution is making to a refugee solution. Such recognition will never be adequate through any tripartite base such as the PCC.

I recognize that it may be difficult or possibly embarrassing for the Department to reconsider its organizational plans. Nonetheless, I feel [Page 1141] impelled to make the above suggestions in the conviction that such reconsideration is essential.3

Cordially yours,

James G. McDonald
  1. No. 452 from Tel Aviv, not printed; it expressed the Ambassador’s doubts that a “triple-headed PCC can be effective as base essential resettlement and related operations.” (867N.48/6–1549)
  2. This reference is presumably to the “Proposed Plan of Action,” p. 939.
  3. Mr. McGhee, in reply on July 1, advised Ambassador McDonald, in part, as follows:

    “Let me hasten to assure you that we have never contemplated utilizing the PCC as an operating agency. We have viewed the PCC as a body which could initiate studies and pave the way for the development of a resettlement program rather than one which would implement such a program with any funds which might be made available for that purpose. We have had in mind for some time the establishment by the PCC of an Economic Survey Group to be composed of outstanding individuals whose personal authority would carry great weight. It has not yet been possible to activate this Group, the principal ‘reason being that we have not been able to get a specific commitment from the Israeli or Arab Governments with regard to the number of refugees which they would undertake to repatriate or resettle. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to approach the problem in a somewhat different manner, but we are convinced that the PCC should have a carefully formulated program as a basis for its recommendations to the General Assembly which will need to take the necessary action to initiate the future program. … We fully agree with you that, whatever the form of the organization, its success will in large part depend upon the selection of a director who can give strong leadership to the program.” (867N.48/6–1549)