501.BB Palestine/6–1249: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
priority
920. Palun 197 from Hare. On July 11 Eytan again appeared before PCC for further discussion of matters mentioned Palun 192.1
Boisanger opened meeting by criticizing certain of Eytan’s June 8. statements including unwarranted comparison Bundle’s success with that of PCC, Eytan’s allegation that PCC had opposed direct negotiations as well as unjustified Jewish press attacks on PCC.
Hare put 3 questions to Eytan regarding June 8 statement:
- 1.
-
Did Israelis anticipate action on Arab memos (Palun 165 and 1662 which might help break ice for further negotiations)?
Eytan replied memo mentioned Palun 166 under sympathetic study but sidestepped memo mentioned Palun 165;
- 2.
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How did Israelis reconcile position regarding minorities in light paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11?
Eytan replied Israel did not interpret GA resolution as “categorical imperative.” GA debate November 1948 indicated “point of view close to that of Israeli Govt.” Israel believed paragraph 11 linked return refugees with peace settlement. Some clauses of paragraph 11 are not “practical of implementation”;
- 3.
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Did Israel distinguish regarding territory allotted Jewish state November 29 and territory subsequently occupied for purpose of final territorial adjustment and is latter subject to relinquishment or exchange?
Eytan replied evasively reiterating “mathematical approach does not commend itself to my govt.”
Yalcin expressed belief these questions important and he personally not satisfied with replies.
Eytan then made 4 suggestions:
- (1)
- Conference work retarded by limited authority of Arab delegations which appear able discuss only refugees. Could not PCC send member or high official of secretariat to Arab capitals and for appearance sake to Tel Aviv to explain situation and attempt remedy this deficiency;
- (2)
- GA resolution December 11 clearly established authority for direct contact between parties. As 6 months have passed PCC entitled speak with vigor to Arab delegation or Arab Govts regarding direct contact;
- (3)
- PCC should establish 5 subcommittees: general terms of peace, frontiers, refugees, Jerusalem, economic and allied matters, all of which should meet jointly with Israeli and Arabs.
- (4)
- Eytan pointed out present discussions based on May 12 protocol but suggested as possible additional approach that armistice agreements conclude under November 16 resolution form common ground and might be made fruitful basis further talks.
Yalcin and Boisanger immediately replied rejecting practically all Eytan’s suggestions. Regarding first suggestion Arabs had full authority to negotiate and real difficulty lay in failure of Israelis to live up to December 11 resolution.
Regarding second direct contact useless until basic groundwork laid. Also resolution did not require them negotiate directly.
Regarding third no use establish subcommittees until substantial basic agreement.
Regarding fourth Yalcin did not understand Eytan’s suggestion and expressed opinion that May 12 protocol was in effect and might therefore be dangerous shift this agreed basis to armistice agreements.
Hare said his initial reaction essentially [similar?] to Yalcin’s and Boisanger’s. Eytan’s suggestions embodied thoughts which merited careful consideration. Hare hoped Eytan would be able express further ideas of constructive nature.
Eytan disappointed but said would endeavor develop further ideas.
Repeated Paris as 56 for immediate delivery to Mark Ethridge at Hotel Crillon. [Hare.]