Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/6–849

The Government of Israel to the Government of the United States ¹

top secret

[Tel Aviv,] June 8, 1949.

The Government of Israel has given very careful and serious study to the note delivered by the American Ambassador in Tel Aviv on May 29, 1949. While deeply appreciating the keen personal interest taken by the President of the United States in the fortunes of Israel and the Middle East, the Government of Israel regrets that the terms of the note appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the position adopted by the Government of Israel and by its delegation at Lausanne.

The Government of Israel cannot possibly accept the contention that its line has been “to reject the basic principles set forth by the Resolution of the GA of December 11, 1948”. The cardinal injunction of that resolution is the call made in Article 5 upon the governments concerned “to seek agreement by negotiations, conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.” This course the Government of Israel has consistently pursued. It has continually and on its own initiative made direct approaches, before and during the Lausanne Conference, to representatives of Arab states with a view to exploring the possibility of peace negotiations. It has given its full cooperation to the Conciliation Commission for the purpose of effecting a comprehensive peace settlement. The Government of Israel is satisfied that Mr. Eytan and his colleagues have actively and unswervingly followed this line.

If today the position at Lausanne is one of virtual stalemate, this is due entirely to the attitude adopted in concert by the Arab states concerned. Their delegations have persistently refused even to meet the delegation of Israel under the Commission’s auspices. None of them has declared itself willing to discuss outstanding problems in the context of a lasting peace settlement. All the concrete suggestions and the offers made by the Israeli Delegation through the Commission have so far remained unanswered. In these circumstances the Government and people of Israel would deeply resent any suggestion that a rupture in the conversations, if it should occur, would be due to Israel’s “rigid attitude”. In the face of this contrast between Israel’s continued readiness to negotiate peace and the Arab states’ obstinate refusal to do so, the Government of Israel is perplexed by the expression of concern on the part of the United States Government “lest Israel now endanger the possibility” of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

As for the general attitude of the Government of Israel to the provisions of the GA Resolution of December 11, 1948, it may be pointed out that it was to elucidate this very subject that the representative of Israel was invited to appear before the Ad Hoc Political Commission [Committee] on May 5, 1949.² The Government of Israel had instructed Mr. Eban to set forth fully its views on all points at issue and it may be deduced from Israel’s subsequent admission to the membership of the UN that his explanation—all of them strictly in relation to the December Resolution—were considered satisfactory by the GA.

The US Government is criticizing the attitude of Israel on two specific counts: (1) The final territorial settlement; (2) the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

On the first count, what appears to be a factual misconception should first be eliminated. The Government of Israel is at a loss to understand the reference in the note to the alleged contemplation by Mr. Eytan of “an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine”. The only suggestion for any such extension of Israel territory—viz. for the incorporation within it of the Gaza-Rafa area with all its present Arab population, including the refugees—came not from the delegation of Israel but from Mr. Ethridge, the US member of the Conciliation Commission.

On the main issue of Israel’s boundaries, the Government of Israel is fully aware of the view expressed by the US representatives in the UN and at Lausanne that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any areas acquired by it beyond the boundaries laid down in the GA Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Government of Israel must respectfully point out that this view does not represent a UN policy. It forms no part of the Resolution of December 11, 1948. On the contrary, a proposal to introduce into that Resolution a provision for the giving-up by Israel of an area in the Negev in return for Western Galilee was rejected by the Assembly. Paragraph 5 of the Resolution, quoted above, left the field open for a territorial settlement between the parties completely unprejudiced by any a priori principle.

The principle of territorial compensation, related to the 1947 award, is one which the Government of Israel cannot accept. That territorial award was based on a series of assumptions which failed to materialize. The hopes of peaceful implementation were erased by the Arab revolt from within and the Arab invasion from without. The Arab state of Palestine and the economic union did not come into being. The Resolution of November 1947 was indeed a source of tremendous encouragement to the Jewish people, and the part played by the US in promoting its acceptance by the Assembly will never be forgotten. Yet in the decisive struggle which preceded and followed the termination of the British mandate, the Resolution itself proved of little avail. The state of Israel evolved out of chaos and bloodshed. It had to uphold its integrity and independence alone and unaided, fighting against overwhelming odds. Nothing has occurred to invalidate the justice of the assignment to Israel of the areas included in the Jewish state by the 1947 Resolution. On the other hand, the war has proved the indispensability to the survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in the share of the Jewish state. In his report to the GA, the late UN Mediator as long ago as last September stated: “The constant question—is not whether it may be advisable to review and revise the Resolution of November 29, 1947. It has already been outrun and irrevocably revised by the actual facts of recent Palestine history”. In any case, the Government of Israel cannot agree that the act of aggression committed by the Arab states in defiance of the Charter and of the GA calls for a territorial reward.

On the question of Arab refugees, the Government of Israel feels bound to restate the basic facts of the situation. It was never part of the Jewish design to force Arabs out of the country. The Jewish authorities accepted the plan of November 29, 1947, in full knowledge that it entailed the presence within the Jewish state of a very considerable Arab population. They were ready to mold the administrative structure and economic policy of the state accordingly. What produced the Arab exodus was the war on Israel. The exodus was partly spontaneous, partly decreed from above by Arab leaders and commanders. The population which fled was that from the midst of which the first murderous attacks on the Jews were launched. The alleged menace to its future was invoked by the aggressors in justification of their invasion of Palestine from outside. The refugees are thus members of an aggressor group defeated in a war of its own making. History does not record any case of large-scale repatriation after such experience.

Moreover, the exodus has wrought a profound change in the ethnic pattern and economic structure of Israel. What was to have been started as an almost equally balanced Jewish-Arab country has become an overwhelmingly Jewish society. The Arab economy lies in ruins. All the energies of Israel are focused on the absorption of the large-scale immigration now in progress, the task which so largely motivated the UN Resolution on Palestine and in particular its support by the UN. New social and economic processes are gathering momentum in Israel, and the wheel of history cannot be turned back. It is inconceivable that the Government of Israel should find itself able to undertake in one and the same breath the absorption of mass Jewish immigration and the reintegration of returning Arab refugees. Both are problems of resettlement involving stupendous efforts on the part of the state and the double burden is far more than Israel can bear. Nor are the returning Arab refugees likely to feel, in the long run, happy and secure in the new setting.

Israel is by no means unmindful of the humanitarian aspect of the problem. It has gone much further than many other nations when faced with a similar situation. It has declared itself ready to pay compensation for land abandoned, to reunite families separated by the war, and generally to make its contribution to the solution of the problem by resettlement. Such a contribution must needs be limited by two compelling considerations; first, national security, and second, economic feasibility. Israel cannot in the name of humanitarianism be driven to commit suicide. Nor can Israel be forced to adopt methods of rehabilitation which would be economically ruinous and self-defeating.

In its earnest desire to approximate its policy on Arab refugees as closely as possible to the terms of the Resolution of December 11, 1948, the Government of Israel has gone as far as the self-preservation of the state of Israel would permit. That trend has been given full expression in the statements of Mr. Eban to the Ad Hoc Political Commission [Committee] and of Mr. Eytan to the Conciliation Commission. May it be recalled that the December Resolution does not provide for repatriation in absolute terms. It states in paragraph 11 that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date”. It is submitted that practicability must primarily be tested by the touchstones of security and economic realism.

Certain limited, though not negligible measures of repatriation have actually been carried through in recent months and others are under urgent consideration. Anything more substantial, if it should at all prove feasible on economic grounds, must await the restoration of peace. The security consideration is here paramount. Israel received no armed assistance from the UN when it fought for its very existence and it would be idle for it to rely on such help in the future.

The Government of Israel earnestly trusts that on further consideration of the problem the US Government will agree that the Arab states cannot have it both ways by explicitly declaring, on the one hand, that it is not part of their purpose to conclude peace with Israel, and demanding, on the other hand, an immediate solution of the refugee problem at the expense of Israel. The exodus is a direct consequence of their criminal invasion. They should not be allowed to shirk their crucial responsibility and to represent the plight of the refugees as an isolated phenomenon, artificially torn out of its real context. The Government of Israel observes with deep satisfaction that the US Government shares its view “that the final settlement of the problem of refugees must await a definitive peace settlement”. But as long as the Arab states do not evince any readiness even to discuss peace, any significant measure of repatriation is clearly impracticable. The Government of Israel is conscious of no conflict between this attitude and the principles of the Charter, which seeks to guarantee a secure existence to all peace-loving nations.

The Government of Israel regards the friendship of the Government and people of the US as an asset of Israel’s foreign relations than which none is higher in value. It hopes that the consideration of the present reply will restore the sympathetic understanding of the US Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel.

1. Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 441, June 8, midnight, which began as follows: “ReDeptel 322 May 28. Foreign Minister handed me following reply, dated June 8, to President’s note at residence at 9 p. m. today:

   “Excellency, I am directed by the Prime Minister to request you to transmit the following communication to the President of the United States:”

   Telegram 441 ended with: “Signed Moshe Sharett, Minister Foreign Affairs.”

2. See footnote 2, p. 979.