Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/6–849: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

niact
confidential
priority

Washington, June 8, 1949—7 p. m.

347. Fol is draft article on Israeli-Syrian armistice demarcation lines which Bunche has instructed Mohn and Vigier to deliver Tel Aviv and Damascus.

• “1. In view of the fact that the question of territorial settlement is one of the matters being dealt with in consultations with the UN Conciliation Commission now taking place at Lausanne, it is emphasized that the following arrangements for the armistice demarcation lines between the Israeli and Syrian Armed Forces are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this agreement.
• 2. The armistice demarcation line herein defined is in response to the request of the SC in its resolution of 16 November 1948, and without prejudice to the rights, positions, interests and claims of either party to this agreement. In pursuance of the spirit of the SC resolution, the armistice demarcation line has been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident.
• 3. The armistice demarcation line shall be delineated on the map attached to this agreement as annex (blank). Where the existing truce lines as certified by the UN truce supervision organization run along the recognized international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the armistice demarcation line shall follow the boundary line. Elsewhere, the armistice demarcation line shall follow a line midway between the certified truce lines for the Israeli and Syrian forces.
• 4. The armed forces of the two parties shall nowhere advance beyond the armistice demarcation line.

• 5. A. Where the armistice demarcation line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the armistice demarcation line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the parties, shall be established as a demilitarized zone from which the armed forces of both parties shall be totally excluded, it being understood that the Ein Gev and Dadara sectors shall also be included in the demilitarized zone.

  B. The purpose of the demilitarized zone shall be to safeguard the territorial claims, positions and interests of both parties pending final territorial settlement and to separate widely the armed forces, while providing for the gradual restoration or normal civilian life in the area of the zone without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

  C. Any advance by the armed forces of either party into any part of the demilitarized zone, when confirmed by the UN representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this agreement.

  D. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article (blank) of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

  E. The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the demilitarized zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this agreement and in any case shall be completed within ten weeks from the date on which this agreement is signed.

  F. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (E) of this article.

• 6. On each side of the demilitarized zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex (blank) to this agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex (blank) to this agreement.”¹

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1. This telegram was repeated to Damascus. The Department of State, in telegram 238, June 8, 6 p. m., to Damascus, expressed its belief that the Bunche “proposal is most practical solution current difficulties and desires you take earliest opportunity strongly urge FonMin or PrimMin in your discretion to accept proposal. You shld state USG has instructed you make this approach in sincere belief proposal is real contribution to lasting peace in Pal and will remove one major obstacle in way of final settlement.” (501.BB Palestine/6–849)

   Telegram 238 was repeated as No. 346 to Tel Aviv for action. Minister Keeley, on June 15, conveyed the sense of telegram 238 to Prime Minister Zaim. The latter stressed “Syrian willingness continue armistice negotiations and said he had instructed Syrian delegation to show greatest possible compromising spirit since … he is sincerely anxious to reach satisfactory modus Vivendi with Israeli at earliest possible date.” Mr. Keeley cautioned, however, that “stalemate likely unless some means can be found to restore Syrian faith in UN ability to control Israeli without which Syrian Government will understandably be reluctant to make concessions that could have domestic repercussions embarrassing to it but which may be necessary to reach agreement with Israel.” (telegram 327, June 16, 8 a.m., from Damascus, 767N.90D/6–4649)