501.BB Palestine/5–2849: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

secret

821. Palun 174. From Ethridge. Consult Rusk for distribution. In three hour closed meeting with Commission yesterday Eytan advanced idea that stalemate here could be broken to which his letter referred (reference Palun 1691) only by “imaginative broad plan” for resettlement of refugees, in which international responsibility as to finance would be chief factor. He suggested Commission advance proposal to both sides which would in effect lift refugee problem out of context of Lausanne meetings. He obviously had in mind program on which Department has been working.

I pointed out to him that in effect what he was proposing was that somebody else relieve Jews and Arabs of their responsibilities and pick up the check for it. He agreed that my remark was true if crude but said there was nothing reprehensible about it as it had happened a good many times before in world history. I replied that of course there was nothing reprehensible about it but any such aid should have proper base. I told him he knew very well US had been considering such aid but we felt there must be number of conditions attached to it.

First must be that Israel must satisfy US and other nations which might participate in such scheme that she had accepted her full responsibility as to number of refugees who would return as to civil [Page 1070] rights guarantees to them, as to assurance of fair and just compensation to those who did not return and even to those who did return but in much less favorable circumstances. I pointed out President must go to Congress to ask for appropriations if he decided to make commitment (at no time indicating that any had been made) and he would certainly not make any recommendation that was not based upon what he conceived to be fair and permanent settlement in Middle East.

Second point I made was that Arab delegates must agree in principle they would accept refugees left over and that the Arabs had made it clear they would not make any such commitment until Israel herself had made some commitment on refugee problem beyond any she has made. Therefore, Arab position was in Israel’s hands also.

Third condition must be that such plan would be workable and acceptable to UN. Israel could not expect member nations of UN to accept plan which they did not regard as having been based upon acceptance by Israel and Arabs of their full responsibility toward refugees and bona fide intention their part to make settlement of refugees material factor in peace settlement.

Fourth condition is that other nations must participate, including Israel. If Israel looked at that condition she must realize other nations likely to contribute would be Britain and perhaps France. Even if US brought itself to sponsoring plan without exacting from Israel fulfillment of its duty he could not expect Britain to look with favor upon it in view of her connection in Arab world. Certainly same consideration would apply to France and Turkey.

I pointed out further that whole key to peace had been in Israel’s lands since January and still was and that while UN nations might be willing to buy peace in Middle East as I had suggested they wanted to be sure it was peace. Israel had primary responsibility in proving that.

Eytan said he understood US viewpoint clearly, took notes on it and indicated he wanted to communicate it to his government. He also agreed to consider document for Arabs (reference Palun 1682) that would expound Israel’s full position on refugee question. He contended that in making proposal for Gaza strip Israel had agreed to accept all refugees there, all normal population, other Arabs in Palestine and members of broken families. Total would be about as many as Israel agreed to accept under partition. He felt Israel would have discharged its full obligation if she did that.

I agreed that quantitatively she would have accepted her full obligation, but pointed out that he had made proposals with two conditions: international help and acquisition of Gaza strip. What was [Page 1071] now lacking was statement to Commission as to how many refugees Israel would take if she did not get Gaza strip. He agreed to consult his government on alternative proposal.

Understand next Cabinet meeting in Tel Aviv is Tuesday. That meeting will probably determine in great measure whether Lausanne conference breaks up. Press reports we get from Palestine indicate that Foreign Office thinking there is that conference might as well break up and leave Israel free to make enforced peace with Transjordan. My own feeling is that Israel prefers that to accepting any responsibility for refugees or making any territorial concessions at all. [Ethridge.]

Vincent
  1. Identified also as telegram 819, May 28, from Bern, p. 1067.
  2. Identified also as telegram 818, May 28, from Bern, p. 1065.