501.BB Palestine/5–2049: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

769. Palun 160. From Ethridge. Israel’s full territorial demands upon the Arab states were laid on the table today.1 Back from a day with Sharett in Geneva, Eytan sought me out and in three-hour conversation, told me what Israel has in mind when she gives her position to the Commission, perhaps on Friday.2 Far from having modified her position, Israel has stiffened her demands.

I opened the conversation by saying to Eytan that I thought the time had come for frankness and that I hoped he had new instructions from Sharett since the conference here was in a virtual stalemate. He answered that far from having new instructions, Sharett was shocked by the Commission’s reaction to Israel’s position and that Sharett had instructed him to come back to Lausanne so as to tell the PCC again what should be “self-evident truth” of Israel’s position.

That position is this:

On Lebanon, Israel will have no demands at the moment. She is ready to accept the Polish3 armistice lines, which coincide, with however a proviso that if in the future either state desired to open negotiations looking toward border rectification it might be done. Inquiry on my part developed that Israel wants a slice of Southeastern Lebanon which she considers necessary to her development scheme, but is willing in some way not made known to compensate her for it. For the time being, however, no demands would be made and Eytan felt a quick peace could be made.

As to Egypt, Israel’s first demand would be for the political boundary between Palestine and Egypt, which would put the Gaza strip in Israel. That demand, said Eytan, would at least force Egypt to talk about the Gaza strip. I gathered that if Egypt says no, the demand will not be pressed. However, Israel is more and more in favor of having the Gaza strip and is willing to take both the refugees and normal population, with, however, the proviso that Israel would have a right to screen out and deport terrorists or Mufti followers. Eytan said he had just been authorized by Sharett to make the demand for the Gaza strip.

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As to Syria, Eytan says Israel is not willing to negotiate and will have no demands until an armistice is signed. However, Israelis willing to accept the international frontier providing a second clause makes the same provision for later reopening for the rectification of the border.

As to Transjordan, Eytan repeated legal argument previously made to Commission, that no Arab state has a right to any territory in Palestine and that any Arab state that won territorial addition would be getting a bonus out of the war.

I told him that the Commission was not deluded at all by that argument; that we recognized it as an opening move with Abdullah to divide up the rest of Arab Palestine. Eytan said that of course Israel would have more demands as to territory in Arab Palestine and the new demands would not be based upon military considerations but upon the developmental scheme.

Engineers had been discontented with the Tulkarm triangle line because it still did not put Israel in position to bring water down from the north to the south without having to tunnel under mountains at prohibitive cost. The new demand would be directed toward shortening the waterline. Israel had in mind giving Abdullah a few villages around Latrun and in the south in return for the new strip in Samaria and in return for opening the Latrun road. He said there might be a few other minor concessions here and there on a “mutual” basis.

Eytan made clear that while intending to keep occupied areas such as Western Galilee, Israel has no intention of giving up any part of the Negev. He said that also there were many reasons for that position: (1) Israel was convinced that with water she could develop it: (2) there were psychological reasons and attachments which would make it impossible for any Israeli Government to give it up; (3) public opinion in no case would stand for what would obviously be a concession to the British, not to the Arabs; (4) there was no reason why the Arabs should have it when they could not develop it and put refugees there.

I asked Eytan about Israel’s intentions toward Lydda, Ramle and Jaffa. He said she had none except to keep them. Arabs in Jaffa beyond those already there were entirely out of the question and Lydda and Ramie had been filled up with immigrants and there was therefore no place for Arabs.

On the refugee question, I pointed out to Eytan that the Arabs still consider some concession on emergency measures as an evidence of Israel’s good faith. He answered that Israel had made concessions already beyond what she should have because Arab Governments are not interested in refugees so much as in exploiting their own interests, which in this case takes the form of forcing Israel into a bad negotiating [Page 1038] position. Therefore Israel would do nothing more about refugees now.

Comment: Eytan told me that he recognizes the stalemate nature of negotiations here and is ready to make his position known to the full Commission. The Arabs are meeting today to determine whether they are willing to do that also. The US Delegation anticipates that when the Arabs know Israel’s position the conference is likely to break up. The Arabs feel that the Jews need peace more than they do and are willing to wait it out until September apparently.

Neither side seems to be ready for peace, despite protestations to the contrary. Certainly unless Israel modifies her demands, there is no possibility of peace on any basis heretofore envisioned by the State Department. There seems little likelihood that Israel’s demands will be modified. On the contrary, Eytan told me today that Israel is basing her policy upon the knowledge that Egypt and Syria are buying arms in Europe. He professes to know from whom and in what quantity.

Department’s comments will be welcome. [Ethridge.]

Vincent
  1. The date referred to as “today” may be May 19, inasmuch as telegram 769 was presumably drafted on that day. Note that the Department referred to the date as May 19 in its telegram 682 to Mr. Ethridge on May 24, p. 1051.
  2. Mr. Ethridge, on May 23, advised from Lausanne that Mr. Eytan on May 20 had informed the PCC of the Israeli position along lines similar to those expounded by him as reported in Palun 160 (telegram Palun 162, 501.BB Palestine/5–2349).
  3. An obvious garble; perhaps the words “Palestine–Lebanon frontier lines as” were intended.