501.BB Palestine/5–1649: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State
741. Palun 151. For the Secretary and McGhee from Ethridge. Your pouched letter of May 31 and proposed plan of action dated April 272 will be commented upon specifically in separate telegram and certain revisions suggested. Meantime here are what we regard as important elements of situation at moment:
- (1)
- It is important for political reasons here that French and Turks in Washington also be approached for clearance of plan. They understood at Beirut that conversations would be held in Washington, and Frenchman this morning raised point that nothing had been heard from his government about such conversations. In addition to importance in getting plan through PCC, possibility exists that France might give material help. In discussion Thursday night with Harriman,3 he indicated that under certain conditions ways might be found for French Government to help financially. Conversation at British Foreign Office also opened possibility that McCloy might be able to find way through consortium to underwrite help that is not now bankable. Urge quickest consultations with both French and Turkish representatives in Washington, even though such consultations produce little.
- (2)
- It seems to me still necessary to reconcile our position with British. While they have approved general plan, they apparently still do not want to go through UN. Believe all of us agree that it is preferable that help be given that way.
- (3)
- It is also highly desirable to provide some minor funds as soon as possible to put refugees to work. With small amount of capital new villages built by refugees could be started in Arab Palestine and light public works projects instituted with the idea that they would fit into major projects later. Commission is convinced that unrest among refugees growing and likely to explode if idleness continues. Very little money would be required to start employment and in any case, would be necessary to bridge gap between UNRPR and initiation of any large project. Could private organizations or individuals or oil companies be induced to put up some funds now? Specific projects could be recommended fairly quickly by technical committee which Commission is sending out and by refugee organizations which already have some projects in mind. Would of course need to be closely supervised.
- (4)
- My own idea of procedure would envision skipping one step you have in mind in the plan of action. Instead of creating a survey committee in advance of major board, my feeling is that after proper commitments [Page 1014] from Arabs and Jews, PCC should call for setting up of ME development board which could then set up its own survey committee, using such information as the PCC technical committee now in formation would have assembled in the meantime.
- (5)
- Agree heartily with paragraph 15 of conclusions, particularly first sentence, also with statement that maximum commitments from Israel to repatriate and agreement by Arabs to accept refugees should be forthcoming before major plan is advanced. Situation here is that we have almost arrived at point where both those commitments will be forthcoming. Am convinced that Israel, because of pressure applied by US and UN debate, is willing to take more refugees then she was two months ago. We are still pressing and will press for her to take 250,000 in addition to those already in Israel or final total of 400,000 which is less than number under 1947 partition plan. It is likely that if she agrees to that figure or anything approaching it, she will herself ask for help.
Arabs have already been told and have already admitted in private conversations that they will have to take refugees. My own attitude is that Israel should first take the maximum number possible; that, secondly, as many as possible, depending upon economic factors, should be settled in Arab Palestine and that balance must be distributed between Syria and Transjordan. Am convinced that both Syria and Transjordan are prepared between them to take somewhere rising 400,000, but they naturally do not want to commit themselves until Israel has given her final figure. Even then they will not want to commit until they are assured of outside help. I am unable to give that commitment as matters stand. However, I am sure a secret commitment can be secured from them if they know that in turn help will be forthcoming from the outside. It has therefore become most urgent and imperative for me to have a commitment from the State Department and the President somewhat along this general line:
In the spirit of the President’s statement of October 4, 1946,4 in accordance with US policy re Palestine as stated at the UN, and in the spirit of point 4 of his inaugural address, the President reaffirms his position that if a final settlement can be found for the Palestine question and a peace concluded between the nations which have recently been at war, he is willing to recommend to Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of the ME, and in the meantime to make available through UN and other sources such technical and financial assistance in the settlement of economic and refugee problems as may be possible.
If I could have that commitment, I could say to the Israelis that it is conditioned upon their absorbing at least 400,000, to the Arabs that it is conditioned upon their requesting help for resettlement of balance.
[Page 1015]Matters here have reached such a state of urgency that it is necessary for us to have some commitment as quickly as possible. It would greatly contribute to peace in the ME if we could have it. [Ethridge.]
- Copy not found in Department of State files. Possibly it was similar in content to Mr. McGhee’s letters of April 29; see footnote 3, p. 938.↩
- See annex 3, p. 939.↩
- W. Averell Harriman, United States Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration.↩
- See President Truman’s telegram of October 3 to British Prime Minister Attlee, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. iii, p. 701.↩