Subject: United States Strategic Interests in
Israel.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff position with respect to Palestine,
formulated at a time when conditions therein were highly unsettled,
was developed principally around the possibility of a United
Nations’ decision to introduce military forces into that country
with consequent possible involvement of United States and/or USSR
troops. This policy has been overtaken by events in that the United
States recognized the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel
on 14 May 1948 and fully recognized the State of Israel on 29
January 1949.
In view of the foregoing developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
prepared a brief study, from the military point of view, of United
States strategic objectives in Israel in the light of the current
situation, and I enclosed a copy3 thereof herewith. It seems to me appropriate, in
the light of developments over the course of the last twelve months
and in view of the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that the National Security Council re-examine and develop an
up-to-date policy on the question of the United States position with
respect to Israel. If the Council agrees, I further suggest that the
preparation of an initial report on this subject be requested from
the Secretary of State.
Enclosure
Study of United States Strategic Objectives
in Israel4
1. Such strategic importance as Israel possesses is due to its
central location in the Eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area.
The
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direct land
routes (road and rail) between Turkey and the Cairo–Suez area
pass through Israeli territory. In addition, the main land
routes from the Caspian area of the USSR and from Iraq, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia to Egypt and the Levant pass through or near
Israel’s territory, as do the pipelines from the Middle East oil
areas to the Mediterranean. Israel controls the land approaches
to the Cairo–Suez area from the east, the border between Israel
and Egypt being about one hundred and fifty miles east of the
Suez Canal.
2. There is little possibility now or in the immediate future of
Israel becoming an important base area since the country lacks
the facilities to accommodate large forces or installations.
Furthermore, there is little reason for major base development
by the Western Democracies in Israel because of the more highly
developed and more accessible Cairo–Suez area some two hundred
miles to the West. However, the Israeli area does contain a
fine, but small, artificial harbor at Haifa, and an excellent,
although limited, system of well-developed airfields and air
bases. In our hands, these air installations would be most
useful in the interdiction of the lines of communication from
the USSR to the Middle East oil resources with medium and
short-range aircraft. In the hands of the Soviets, these fields
would provide bases from which the Soviets could seriously
interfere with our operations in that area.
3. From the viewpoint of tactical operations, Israel’s territory
and its indigenous military forces, which have had some battle
experience, would be of importance to either the Western
Democracies or the USSR in any contest for control of the
Eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area. It is estimated that in
such a contest the USSR has the capability, and would probably
attempt to secure or neutralize the oil facilities of the Middle
East and to operate against the Cairo–Suez base area. The final
line of strong defensive possibilities for the defense of the
Cairo–Suez area is at the Jordan rift. Should Israel ally
herself with the Western Democracies in the event of war with
the USSR, full advantage could be taken of defensive positions
in that country and of Israel’s forces for the defense of the
Cairo–Suez area and for land operations to defend or to
recapture the Middle East oil facilities. The cooperation of
Israel would be of considerable assistance to the Western
Democracies in meeting maximum Soviet capabilities in the
Palestine area. Israel, as an ally or as a friendly neutral,
would enable the United States to use the Cairo–Alexandretta
railway for a limited time for the shipment of supplies to
Turkey. Israel as an unfriendly neutral would deny us these
advantages.
4. Communist domination of Israel would permit the USSR to
control the Haifa terminus of one of the oil pipelines from the
Middle
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East. It
would interfere with our support of Turkey by land routes from
the Cairo–Suez area. It would enable the USSR to infiltrate the
Cairo–Suez area and would facilitate a Soviet land-offensive
against that area.
5. The United States and Great Britain have practically the same
strategic interests in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean
area. However, the international reactions to the Palestine
question have produced a complex, entangled political and
psychological situation.
6. Israel, after a bitter conflict with the neighboring Arab
states, has recently emerged as an independent Jewish nation. In
general, the attitude of the of the United States in regard to
this development can be considered as favorable to Israel. The
United States and the USSR were the first to recognize Israel as
a sovereign state. On the other hand, due primarily to her
special relations with the Arab states, the United Kingdom has
been slow to establish normal relations with Israel.
7. The new State of Israel has close ties with the United States
because of our large and influential Jewish minority and is
geographically well separated from Soviet-dominated countries.
However, there is an opportunity for Communist penetration
through Jewish immigration into the new nations from eastern
Europe, the Balkans, and China. There are indications that
significant numbers of immigrants who have passed through
Communist indoctrination courses have already entered Israel.
Israel’s foreign policy can at present be considered pro-Western
although not necessarily anti-Soviet. However, Israel’s
announced policy is one of neutrality in the “cold war.”
Israel’s leaders have stated privately that their sympathies lie
with the West but that for the present it is necessary for
Israel publicly to assume a “neutral” position since the new
state still needs Soviet support in the United Nations, and
desires to facilitate the emigration to Israel of Jews now in
the “Iron Curtain” countries.
8. There is considerable agitation for a Mediterranean
counterpart of the North Atlantic Pact. Greece, Turkey, and the
Arab states have been mentioned as possible members. In spite of
Arab opposition to Israel, the strategic location and military
strength of the latter make it almost mandatory that Israel be a
member, providing the participation of Saudi Arabia and Iran is
not precluded by such action, if the pact is aimed to resist
Soviet aggression.
9. Israel is surrounded by her defeated foes who are still
unfriendly. The United Kingdom has been and still is the
proponent of the Arab states. As an expedient in the
international field, Israel may accept friendly overtures from
other great powers, including the USSR.
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Thus, Israel may become a danger or an
asset depending upon the nature of her future relations with the
Soviets and with the Western Democracies.
10. The British have governed Palestine under mandate and have
close ties with some of the neighboring Arab countries. They
have military personnel, together with treaty rights, in Egypt,
Transjordan, and Iraq. In the event of global war, the United
States would probably wish to use facilities in the Cairo–Suez
area in conjunction with the British. Hence, any negotiations or
arrangements having strategic implications with regard to Israel
should be coordinated with the British.
11. Certain expressions of views by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
relating to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have
bearing on United States strategic interests in the new State of
Israel. These views are stated below for ready reference:
-
a.
- From the point of view of the military considerations,
the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
East is of critical importance to the future security of
the United States; and
-
b.
- The stability of the Middle East, including assurance
that the peoples of this area will not turn to the USSR
and against the United States, is a vital element in
United States security.
conclusions
12. a. In the light of the foregoing, it
is concluded that United States security interests with respect
to the new State of Israel are:
- (1)
- That Israel should be oriented towards the Western
Democracies and away from the USSR;
- (2)
- That Communist infiltration should be blocked and
domination of Israel by the USSR should be
prevented;
- (3)
- That the differences between the new Israeli state and
the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at
least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states
would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression;
and
- (4)
- That from the United States military point of view it
would be advantageous if British relations with Israel
were such that a common approach could be taken by the
United States and the United Kingdom in achieving mutual
objectives with respect to Israel.
b. In view of the interests of the United
Kingdom in the Cairo–Suez area, her over-all position in the
Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area, and the general
similarity of United Kingdom and United States security
interests there, and regardless of the political attitude of the
United Kingdom toward Israel, any steps taken by the United
States to protect our security interests in Israel should be
coordinated with the British.
