Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/5–749: Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Amman, May 7, 1949—2 p. m.

199. Legtel 194, May 4.¹ King gave me following account this morning of his talk with Sharett May 5:

Meeting had taken place at Shuneh in presence of Transjordan Prime Minister. King began meeting by expressing pleasure that Sharett and Prime Minister had met and hoped agreement could be worked out.

Sharett said he gratified by appointment new Transjordan delegates to special committee as Israeli public opinion had been “shocked” to learn that committee talks suspended after meeting April 20. (Understood Transjordan representatives now Abdullah Tel and Hamad Farhan² with Ahmad Khalil as advisor.)

Prime Minister expressed hope that outlines for peace settlement could be reached here to be implemented by delegates at Lausanne but said it appeared that Israelis proposed that only those points of interest to Israel be discussed this stage and that all Transjordan points be deferred to Lausanne. Sharett replied that on contrary Israel wished discuss and settle all points.

Sharett then stated particular concern of Israel over resumption work at potash plant and Rutenberg.³ Prime Minister countered by stating that Israel would have to agree to certain Transjordan demands before agreement could be reached on potash and Rutenberg.

Prime Minister then inquired whether Israel would agree to partition lines as basis for final settlement. Sharett stated that Arabs had never accepted partition and therefore it was now part of history.

At this point Prime Minister, who seemed to think Sharett had adopted somewhat “superior attitude” pointed out that he had never wanted war but that Jews through breach truce in Jerusalem, Deir Yassin and other incidents had forced him into it. Consequently Sharett had no right to talk to him as he would to Egyptians or others. Transjordan was entirely willing to agree to most of Israeli demands such as Latrun and Mt. Scopus but could only do so if Israel would agree to Transjordan demands. He said that most important thing was to arrive at peace settlement which was acceptable to people rather than to official bodies and which would guarantee future relationships. He did not want war and way to avoid it was firm and reasonable settlement. He pointed out Transjordan desire for outlet to sea and its concern re refugees. He was willing consider Latrun and Scopus situation if Israel would consider such matters as return Arab quarters Jerusalem.

Sharett replied that Israel was in agreement re peace and was also in agreement with Transjordan on other matters. Said that Israel agreed with Transjordan re undesirability internationalization Jerusalem and also agreed to Transjordan having outlet to sea. Re latter point stated Israel would give Transjordan free port at Haifa.

He indicated that Transjordan could not accept Haifa proposal and wanted outlet at Gaza through Beersheba. Sharett replied this not possible as it would cut Israeli territory. King then suggested Israelis should return Ramie and Lydda immediately so Transjordan could have outlet at Majdal or Ascalon.

King said meeting ended on friendly note but felt that no progress had been made. When I inquired whether he was hopeful that talks would lead to early and acceptable settlement he replied “I cannot answer yes or no—it depends on support I receive from US and others”. He indicated he would like to meet again with Sharett or Ben-Gurion.

Sent Department 199; repeated Jerusalem 99, Geneva for USDel PCC 10, London 34, Tel Aviv 8.⁴

Stabler

1. Not printed.
2. Secretary in the Transjordanian Government.
3. The Rutenberg Hydro-Electric Works were located at Naharim at the junction of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. Chargé Stabler, on July 11, advised the Department of his recent visit to the Works, stating “It is understood that prior to the hostilities in May 1948, the Jordan Government and the Jewish Agency reached some form of agreement concerning the protection of the Hydro-Electric works. It is possible that the Jordan Government would have been able to observe this agreement if it had not been for the arrival of the Iraqi forces. When the Iraqi forces came into the area, the Israelis departed, but only after blowing up certain of the dynamos in the main dynamo building. Later the Iraqi finished the job, even removing numerous machines. … The area has been under the control of the Arab Legion since the departure of the Iraqi troops three months ago. All looting and damage has been stopped by the Legion and the area is under guard. … It is quite obvious that the Rutenberg Hydro-Electric works can only be operated again by an agreement between Jordan and Israel. Jordan, on its part, is incapable of operating such a works by itself and, moreover, the Israelis can control the flow of the Jordan. Israel, on the other hand, cannot commence operations of the works as all the buildings are in Jordan territory. In addition, Jordan can control the flow of the Yarmuk River. It would appear that it would take some time yet to reach an agreement on the operation of the Rutenberg Hydro-Electric Works as it remains, along with the Dead Sea Potash Works, an important bargaining point for Jordan.” (Despatch 65 from Amman, 890i.6463/7–1149)
4. Tel Aviv reported, on May 10, that the Foreign Office had confirmed the meeting of Mr. Sharett with King Abdullah on May 5 and had “informally indicated no progress had resulted from discussion which was described as ‘friendly but fruitless.’” (telegram 348, 867N.01/5–1049)