Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/4–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret

New York, April 5, 1949.

[Subject:] Palestine Problem

Present:	The Secretary
	Mr. Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel
	Dean Rusk

I expressed appreciation for Mr. Sharett’s visit and stated that I wanted to congratulate him upon the armistice recently concluded between Israel and Transjordan. I then expressed the hope that the negotiation of an armistice with Syria could rapidly be brought to a conclusion.

I said that I had had an opportunity to discuss with the President the matters which had been discussed between Mr. Sharett and myself in Washington, and that I now wished to discuss with Mr. Sharett the President’s views on the general situation.

The President has been following the situation in the Near East with very close attention and deep personal concern.

On the question of the boundary settlement, to which attention would turn as soon as the armistice negotiations had been completed, the President wished to reaffirm his attitude which he has expressed on many occasions.

The President supports the settlement of the November 29 resolution and considers that Israel has a clear and unequivocal claim to the territories allotted to Israel in that resolution and that any changes in such territories adverse to Israel must have Israel’s consent. Insofar as Israel might itself wish a rectification of the November 29 frontiers—and we can understand that some rectification will be desired—we believe that these changes must be brought about by agreement. Further, such agreement should result from negotiation and consent in the genuine meaning of those terms. The President believes that Israel must be prepared to offer territorial concessions in one part of its territory in exchange for increments of territory which it desires elsewhere. Actually, the President does not foresee that there should be any serious difficulty in reaching agreement on this basis.

With respect to Jerusalem, the President stands behind the concept of internationalization as set forth in the solution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948. It is recognized that the interest of the international community is primarily in the Holy Places and in the maintenance of orderly conditions around the Holy Places. International interest is not primarily concerned with regulating the day-to-day activity of the inhabitants as such. For that reason the President believes that it should be possible to work out arrangements, perhaps under the trusteeship system, under which Israeli and Arab authorities could accept responsibilities in Jerusalem, but which recognize international interest and authority for the Holy Places.

I then stated that the most serious difficulty and the source of greatest immediate concern to the President was the question of Palestine refugees. These refugees number some 800,000. They constitute a serious political problem disturbing to the good order and well-being of the Near East. The Assembly resolution of December 11 set up the principle of repatriation. While it can be understood that repatriation of all of these refugees is not a practical solution, nevertheless we anticipate that a considerable number must be repatriated if a solution is to be found.

The President is particularly anxious that an impasse not develop on this subject, with one side refusing to negotiate for a final settlement until a solution is found for refugees, and the other side refusing to take steps to solve the refugee question until there is a final political settlement. We must avoid the argument as to which is the horse and which is the cart, because in fact the political settlement and the refugee solution are part and parcel of the same problem and both are cart and both are horse.

The President believes that now is the time for Israel to make a real contribution to a political settlement by showing that it is prepared to make a beginning on the refugee problem. The Israeli Government could state that it considers this problem a necessary part of a final political settlement, but that it is prepared to move immediately to attempt repatriation of a portion, say a fourth, of the refugees eligible for repatriation. I stated that we hoped that Israel could accept immediately the repatriation of refugees coming from areas now under Israeli occupation, but not allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution and, in addition, a substantial number into Israel proper.

A statesmanlike move by Israel with respect to refugees would make it possible for the President to continue his strong and warm support for Israel and efforts being made by its Government to establish its new political and economic structure on a firm basis.

In reply, Mr. Sharett stated first that he was familiar with our views on boundary questions and that he was also hopeful that an agreed solution could be reached. He stated that he realized that mutual adjustments were involved but that he did not see any insurmountable difficulty.

Regarding Jerusalem, Mr. Sharett said that he personally found the suggestions about trusteeship reasonable and worthwhile suggestions for further study, and that his own attitude was that a solution might very well be found along those lines. He stated, however, that he did not wish to exclude at this time another kind of solution which might be reached by agreement between Israel and Transjordan—an agreement which would require the imprimatur of the General Assembly and which would, of course, take into account international interest in the Holy Places. He stated that in prior discussion with Transjordan on the subject of Jerusalem they had found Abdullah insistent upon the principle of annexation rather than of internationalization.

The impression left by Mr. Sharett was that the Israeli Government had not rejected the idea of a joint trusteeship of some sort for the city of Jerusalem, but that it still had in mind the possibility of a direct agreement between Israel and Transjordan which could be agreed to internationally.

On the question of the refugees Mr. Sharett stated that he first had a question about the numbers involved. Israeli experts thought that the number of legitimate refugees was in the number of 500,000 to 550,000, but that there were many local inhabitants who described themselves as refugees in order to obtain relief.

Apart from numbers, Mr. Sharett stated that he could not agree to a distinction between territory allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution and other territory now under Israel control. The primary reason is that security in Israel is indivisible, and he illustrated this by a detailed explanation of operations in the West Galilee area. He stated that Israel could not give up the minimum security which it had won with so much blood and expenditure by reintroducing large number of refugees into the very areas from which-Israel had been seriously threatened.

Mr. Sharett then restated the Israeli position that the refugee problem can only be solved in terms of final peace settlement and that basically resettlement is the proper solution for refugees. He stated that the question arose out of war and could only be settled in a peace. He said there would never have been a refugee problem had the Arabs not initiated the war; that Israel had been willing to accept the presence of a large Arab minority within its territory, but that the situation is now completely changed and that to return refugees who had once left the country created quite a new problem. He stated that their return would disturb the homogeneity of Israeli areas; they could settle themselves in neighboring Arab states, not only to their own benefit but to the benefit of the Arab states themselves and would increase the productive capacity and capital equipment of such states.

He stated that he would report fully my remarks to his Government and, indeed, that Mr. Ben Gurion would be discussing the refugee question with the Palestine Conciliation Commission on April 7.

I then continued by stating that I thought Israel should consider the refugee question in three phases.

As a first step I thought that the Israeli Government should find a way to state that it is prepared to accept a considerable number of refugees on a repatriation basis. Since there may be some difference of opinion as to the numbers involved, it may not be possible to talk about precise figures, but some quantitative indication of what Israel could do would be an important step. Such a step would permit Mr. Ethridge and the Palestine Conciliation Commission to proceed with an orderly consideration of the entire question, would set the framework for a discussion of a political settlement and would make it easier for us to get the assistance of Congress in dealing with the later aspects of the problem.

As a second phase, I thought that, as peace discussions continued, the Israeli Government might be able to say that since discussions would be going well and there would be a prospect of a settlement, the Israeli Government could then begin actual repatriation. Initially repatriation might be to less critical areas from a security point of view and could be worked out so that it would not jeopardize the Israeli military position.

The final step would be the final political settlement which would include whatever additional contribution Israel could make in terms of repatriation.

Mr. Sharett said that he felt that the two fully understood each other’s point of view and that he would report my statement fully to his Government and asked me to express his appreciation to the President for the President’s interest and concern in this question.

Mr. Rusk raised with Mr. Sharett the difficulty being caused by certain administrative action by local authorities by which Israel would unnecessarily complicate and prejudice forthcoming negotiations. He cited the recent requirements that visitors to Jerusalem have civilian visas. Mr. Sharett thought that the only visas involved were those required for transit through Israel itself, but that some question about permits may have arisen, in connection with direct entry into Jerusalem from Arab-held territories. He said he would get in touch with his Government immediately and try to clarify that situation.²

1. Drafted by Mr. Rusk; it is a redraft in the first person of a memorandum drafted originally in the third person, with no substantive changes. Both memoranda are filed under the same number. Secretary Acheson transmitted a copy to President Truman with his memorandum of April 7, which stated in part: “You will recall asking me to send you a copy of this memorandum so that you could use it in connection with your conversation with Dr. Weizmann when he arrives in this country.” (867N.01/4–749)

   The Acheson–Sharett conversation began at 11:15 a. m. on April 5 in Apartment 42–A, the Waldorf Towers (marginal notation on Mr. Acheson’s memorandum of March 31, p. 886).

2. The Department sent a lengthy summary of the Acheson–Sharett conversation to Ambassador McDonald and Mr. Ethridge at Tel Aviv on April 6. The telegram noted that the Israeli Foreign Minister saw the Secretary at the latter’s request. After its summary, the Department concluded as follows: “We do not feel that McDonald should associate himself with PCC in meeting with Ben Gurion, since he is not member of PCC. However, Dept desires he as Amb urgently give PriMin full account interview, stressing points made by President and Secy.

   “Both McDonald and Ethridge should express to BenGurion serious concern this Govt at reports from UN Mediator of reported Israeli incursion into Syrian territory Apr. 5. Dept understands McDonald has already received direct communications from Bunche and has seen text of urgent message from Bunche to Israeli Govt Apr 5 stating that if any Israeli forces are beyond Syrian frontier he must insist this is most flagrant and dangerous violation of SC truce and that such forces must be withdrawn immediately. McDonald should state that, coming on very day when Secy has in terms of friendly interest so fully explained to Israeli FonMin President’s deep concern for prompt peace in Palestine, this report if true would necessar[il]y cause most unfavorable impression here, particularly at a time when Israel membership UN on point being discussed GA.” (Telegram 208, 501.BB Palestine/4–649)

   The text of Mr. Bunche’s message to the Israeli Government was transmitted to the Department by Beirut in telegram 177, identified also as Palun 111, April 5, 11 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/4–549.