501.BB Palestine/3–2349: Telegram
The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State
niact
us urgent
126. Legtel 123 and 124, March 22.1 King requested me come down to Shuneh this morning in order inform me of developments of last night’s meeting between Transjordan and Israeli representatives.
Meetings had taken place in Jerusalem instead of Shuneh and was attended by Fellah Pasha Medadha, Abdullah Tel and Hussein Bey [Page 860] Sirraj (Under Secretary Foreign Office) for Transjordan and by Walter Eytan, [garble] Colonel Yigal Yadin and Moshe Dayan for Israel.
Israelis presented detailed demands for territorial adjustments on Iraqi front which in some instances represented Arab withdrawals up to 10 miles from present front lines. After many hours conference lasting to 1300 hours this morning Israelis modified demands to points beyond which further modification out of question. They informed Transjordan representatives that Transjordan must agree to these proposals and sign formal agreement within 24 hours or Israel would withdraw its agreement to Arab Legion taking over from Iraqis. Another meeting at which Israelis expect final answer is arranged for tonight at Shuneh.
In brief Israeli finalized demands are as follows:
- 1.
- Line in north front to be redrawn south of Ummelfahm (MR 165213) and Arara (MR 159211) to permit free use by Israelis of main road to Afula.
- 2.
- Line in east which now runs slightly west of Baqa (MR 155202)–Tulkarm–Qalqiliya road to be redrawn eastwards, not including Israeli possession of Tulkarm or Qalqiliya but including Taiyiba (MR 151186) and Qfarqasim (ME 148169). Line would end at Rantis (MR 152159), now junction between Iraqis and Arab Legion.
- 3.
- Line in west which now runs through Qaun (MR 194201) to be redrawn slightly west.
Israelis proposed that this agreement remain secret but that as soon as armistice agreement signed at Rhodes, secret agreement (although still remaining secret) would immediately be regarded as agreed in mutual revision of armistice terms. Implementation of secret agreement would take place in three stages:
- (a)
- Within three to four weeks—adjustment eastern lines;
- (b)
- Within six to eight weeks—adjustment northern lines; and
- (c)
- Within three to four months from date of signature full implementation secret agreement.
Israelis also proposed that with number of days yet to be specified all Iraqi forces would be withdrawn from area of former mandated territory of Palestine.
In return Israel would agree to Legion taking over Iraqi front as soon as armistice agreement signed and would authorize Israeli delegation Rhodes sign armistice at once on basis positions held at time cease-fire agreement signed.
Transjordan representatives pointed out to Israelis adverse effect on Arab public opinion when this agreement became public unless [Page 861] Transjordan received compensations. It was suggested Israelis withdraw from area close to Road Latrun to Beitsira (MR 154144) or withdraw from Ummburj (MR 147126) area and agree to Legion use of road running north from Beitjibrin. Israelis refused and said they would not agree any compensation.
Transjordan representatives at meeting, with whom I talked at Shuneh, indicated atmosphere of meeting not friendly and that Israelis had taken very strong line. They had impression that if agreement not signed Israelis might take offensive action to make adjustments demanded. (It is understood Dayan told member Consulate General Jerusalem on March 18 that if rectification not made by agreement, Israel would make them anyway.)
King indicated to me he felt that if he refused to sign agreement, Israel would recommence hostilities and whole area might be lost. It would in fact be better to sacrifice another fifteen villages with additional estimated 15,000 refugees than to lose what little left of Arab Palestine. On other hand if he did sign agreement and then armistice signed, it might be more difficult for Israelis to make further excessive demands. He not entirely decided what his attitude would be and it would depend on circumstances of tonight’s meeting at Shuneh. If he could be certain that US would take action prevent Israel from reopening hostilities, he would try postpone decision for another day or two and endeavor negotiate more reasonable adjustments. However, in absence this certainty, he felt he almost forced into signing agreement tonight. We only wished it were possible to believe that Israel would present no further demands.
I offered no comment to HM beyond thanking him for keeping USG informed of developments.
Sent Department 126, repeated Baghdad 25, Beirut 22 for USDel PCC. Pouched Jerusalem.
- Neither printed.↩