867N.48/3–149
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Necessity for early liquidation of Arab refugee problem.
Discussion:
It is the considered opinion of this office that measures for the solution of the Arab refugee problem must be well advanced prior to the termination of the United Nations relief program on August 31, 1949, if a political crisis in the Near East is to be averted. In view of the difficult economic position of the Arab states, and the impossibility of launching large-scale development projects in the near future as a means of assimilating large numbers of refugees, there are only two means of beginning to liquidate the problem during the coming months.
The first is the stimulation of “sample” development projects, limited in scope and in financing, which would provide work for some of the refugees and, in some cases, facilitate their gradual assimilation into the countries now harboring them. This approach is regarded as [Page 782] an interim measure, pending the realization of larger scale development projects. NEA, in conjunction with other interested offices, is engaged in drawing up plans for such limited projects.
The second means of liquidating the refugee problem is, of course, that of repatriation. Although Israel has made it clear that it will not take back the majority of the refugees, every effort should be made to persuade Israel, in the interests of its long range relations with the Arab states, to accept the return of a substantial number. (It will be recalled that the Arab population of the Jewish state as envisaged under the partition plan of November 29, 1947 was 500,000.)
In view of the expected return of peaceful conditions in Palestine in the near future, it is felt that every effort should be made to convince Israel of the necessity of contributing to the solution of the refugee problem by initiating a gradual repatriation program now. Attempts by Israel to defer action this problem pending the achievement of a formal peace will result in a fait accompli, since the present accelerated Jewish immigration into Israel will have totally preempted the lands and housing on which Arab repatriation depends.
We believe that failure to commence the liquidation of the refugee problem prior to termination of the relief program will have the gravest consequences upon the political and economic structure of the Arab states. The Arab states presently represent a highly vulnerable area for Soviet exploitation, and the presence of 700,000 destitute, idle refugees provides the likeliest channel for such exploitation. In addition, their continued presence will further undermine the weakened economy of the Arab states, and may well provide the motivation for the overthrow of certain of the Arab Governments. Moreover, unless Israel demonstrates its willingness to assist by repatriation in settling the refugee question, both the possibility of a permanent settlement in Palestine and the establishment of any basis for cooperative relations between Israel and the Arabs will be adversely affected. It is felt that the relative absence of agitation and disorders up to the present arising from the refugee situation can be explained only because the majority of the refugees confidently expected to be returned to their homes.
In the opinion of this office, there is little likelihood that the Conciliation Commission will succeed in implementing its instructions with respect to refugees under the December 11 resolution unless it has the strongest support from this Government from the very outset of its negotiations. (Tab A)1 Mr. Ethridge has expressed his concern over Israel’s attitude towards the refugee problem, and has indicated [Page 783] that he would welcome this Government’s support in carrying out his task. Such support will, moreover, have a favorable effect upon our relations with the Arab states, which strongly desire our assistance in this matter. (Tab B.) It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached draft telegram (Tab C), which is designed as a preliminary and exploratory approach to this question.