501.BB Palestine/2–2849: Telegram
The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State
173. Palun 58. For Acheson from Ethridge. I am in agreement with principle of second paragraph of Deptel 111, February 25.1
Have considered that Commission has mandate only as to presentation of plan for internationalization of Jerusalem but believe that even on that Israel and Arab states should come as close to agreement as possible and Commission should take any agreement into consideration in making its own plan. Internationalization is noble ideal but Jerusalem must be made a going concern as city in which people live and need water and lights and garbage collection.
Only other rigid principle enunciated by GA is on refugees, but I do not regard it as nearly so specific as instruction on Jerusalem. Otherwise my position has been exactly that set out in first sentence of your second paragraph.
Have been at pains to talk to British. In Cairo had meeting with Sir Ronald Campbell, Chapman Andrews and Sir John Troutbeck; in Transjordan with Kirkbride and Glubb; in Baghdad with Sir Henry Mack and John Richmond. In all talks except at Cairo, British emphasized that their main desire was to liquidate bad and expensive situation. Campbell and Andrews, stressing fact they were not speaking for their governments, said, nevertheless, primary British concern had been for land access from Egypt through Transjordan up to north, presumably to Iraq [oil?] fields. Andrews contended that road could not be built across southern Negev without great expense and indicated British wanted to hold on to GazA–BeershebA–Jericho–Amman road. I pointed out that Jews hold great part of road and world hardly in negotiations give it up. British conceivably might urge Arabs in negotiation to hold out either for road or for free use. However, we have not got to territorial questions.
[Page 781]In general, it would be most useful if Department would concert its policy with British so that they would be constructive rather than obstructionist. However, I have given no encouragement anywhere, although strongly pressed by Arabs, that there would be any unilateral guarantee by US or bilateral guarantee by US and UK of peace terms. It is true that Arabs profess to have no confidence in UN but I believe their concerted insistence upon two-power guarantee is political move to place them in position to say to their people that peace has been imposed upon them by Big Powers. Prime Minister of Egypt said almost that to me. Ben Gurion in stressing need for security did not go so far but spoke of guarantees. I strongly countered that since UN had been the mother of Israel and perhaps its savior by giving Israel time to arm after first truce, he would have to rely upon moral, sanctionable and military force of UN. He dropped argument and as set out in telegram 170, twenty-eighth, reacted affirmatively to deposit of treaties with UN.
Further along in negotiations, we will need all the help we can get. It is, however, too early for any joint action by US–UK except for conferences that make clear each government’s position to each other and to me. [Ethridge.]