501.BB Palestine/2–449
Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Secretary of State 1
The Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Negotiations
On January 31 the Acting Palestine Mediator proposed a compromise solution to the Israeli and Egyptian Governments to serve as the basis for a possible armistice between the two countries. In essence, the Israeli striking forces would be withdrawn toward the North and the Egyptian forces would remain entirely outside of Palestine with the exception of a small coastal strip from Gaza southwest to the Egyptian frontier and minor forces in the vicinity of Hebron. Beer sheba, which is now held by the Israeli Government and a desert point in the Negev called Asluj, together with an important communications [Page 724] point near the Egyptian frontier called El Auja, would be the head quarters of the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Commission under UN supervision.
The Israeli Government would keep defensive forces in the Jewish settlements in the Negev.
The Israeli Government has stressed to this Government that, from its point of view, the main stumbling block is who remains in force at El Auja, which is a stone’s throw from the Egyptian border. Countering this, the Egyptians have complained that an unconditional written agreement was entered into on Rhodes between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations providing for the evacuation from Faluja of an encircled Egyptian garrison numbering some 3,000 people.
It appears to us that if the Israeli Government can be persuaded to the demilitarization of El Auja, Beersheba and Asluj, and at least a token withdrawal of its striking forces northward in the Negev, there is a strong possibility of concluding an armistice agreement with Egypt. This is the keystone of a rather considerable arch. If an armistice is signed with Egypt, the Government of Israel will be in a position rapidly to conclude similar agreements with its other enemies, including Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq. In fact, the Acting Palestine Mediator has officially extended invitations to the Governments of these four countries to come to Rhodes to participate in armistice conversations.
Solution, therefore, hinges upon a successful conclusion of the present Israeli-Egyptian talks and it would seem useful if this Government would express to the Government of Israel its profound hope that the Israeli Government will find its way clear to making certain states manlike concessions, without which it seems inevitable that the conversations will fail.
The Egyptian Government, with considerable reluctance, has informed the Acting Mediator that it will accept his proposals and the Mediator has informally requested us to do our utmost to persuade the Israeli Government to make those concessions which are essential to a final agreement.2
Dr. Jessup, in New York, has suggested the advisability of your seeing Mr. Epstein, the Representative in Washington of Israel. If the armistice negotiations break down Dr. Bunche will refer the entire matter to the Security Council, where the reasons for the breakdown will be publicly aired.
- This memorandum was typewritten on
the stationery of the Under Secretary of State. Mr. McClintock
wrote, on February 7, that he had dictated the memorandum “for
Mr. Webb in his office” and that it was the basis for the
intervention by the Secretary, with the “President’s backing,”
as evidenced in the telegram sent to Tel Aviv on February 5 (Mr.
McClintock’s letter to G. Lewis Jones, First Secretary of
Embassy in the United Kingdom, 501.BB Palestine/2–749).
Regarding the telegram, see p.
730.
James E. Webb was appointed Under Secretary of State on January 27.
↩ - Mr. Ethridge, on February 5, advised the Department that he “planned see McDonald February 6 and Shertok February 7 and would point out urgent necessity for favorable conclusion Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at early date in order make it possible for Commission to get on with its task of settling all outstanding problems re Palestine soonest.” (telegram 114 (Palun 27) from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/2–549)↩