Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/2–349: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Tel Aviv, February 3, 1949—11 a. m.

88. ReMistel 80, February 2 [1] and additional thereto. Morning February 2 at residence Sassoon, chief PGI negotiator with Arabs (Herlitz¹ Foreign Office also present) reported on “frank and friendly” secret conference he had with Abdullah in Amman January 31 as follows:

1. Abdullah anxious speedy peace negotiations which should follow immediately after arrangement armistice which in his opinion should involve slight difficulty. Favors public peace negotiations in Jerusalem between Transjordan and Israel, initial meeting preferably in Amman. Has notified all Arab Governments this plan and has received assent from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Egypt and Syria not pleased but “must follow since I (Abdullah) have decided”. Has been assured by two Iraqi high officials and expects soon receive similar from Regent that Transjordan difficulties with Iraq will disappear.

2. Abdullah attributes his hurry to fear that delay will involve loss. Britain he says is using delay in Israel–Transjordan negotiations to gain concessions from other Arab states, notably Syria. King quoted this alleged British argument: “If Abdullah is blocked, what will Syria pay?”

3. Abdullah declined indicate reservations which Britain had imposed on his negotiations with Israel. Will reveal them only after armistice and during peace talks. Inferentially he permitted conclusion that Aqaba and southern Negev were involved. Transjordan he said not interested in Negev, “has enough desert land”. Gaza, however, as outlet to sea now that Haifa has been lost is vital to Transjordan.

4. Abdullah is opposed to the internationalization of whole or part Jerusalem, favors partition, with old and portion of new city assigned Transjordan and rest to Israel, both portions remaining under some form United Nations supervision. No details such partition were discussed.

5. Arab refugees, Abdullah said, were now no important problem and after peace will solve itself.

6. Had accepted Bunche’s invitation armistice negotiations at Rhodes because all other Arab states had agreed. He is opposed, however, to pooled discussions and reiterated preference direct negotiations with Israel.

7. Abdullah thinks Conciliation Commission will waste time and delay settlement. Says peace should be possible before Commission has opportunity acquaint itself with problem and before it could report assembly in September.

8. Israel’s elections pleased Abdullah because disclosed such slight Communist strength. Transjordan he said does not need elections. He rules and Parliament carries out his will.

9. Interrupting his report of Abdullah’s views, Sassoon emphasized that from PGI’s viewpoint, armistice should suffice for many months with all the Arab states except Transjordan. With latter, peace necessary because partition of Palestine involved and many questions other than purely military ones that must be settled by formal treaty.

10. In answer my questions, Sassoon insisted that only “ultimatum” to Transjordan which might have been referred to in report to Department from Transjordan end December (Deptel 281, December 30²) was his open telegram from Paris end November Transjordan Prime Minister asking that convoy be allowed, as previously agreed, to go Mount Scopus in order “to avoid incidents”. Reply within 24 hours was friendly and Amman issued orders to Jerusalem to permit convoy. Subsequent exchanges all friendly.

11. According Sassoon, Abdullah denied categorically knowing in advance or having been asked about sending British troops to Aqaba early January. After their arrival he was presented with paper asking for troops, for his signature.

12. King told Sassoon he deeply appreciative recognition as sign US friendship, adding that he hoped American Government would increasingly interest itself in Transjordan–Israel relations, intimated desire lessen degree British tutelage.

McDonald

1. Miss Esther Herlitz, Acting Director of the American Division of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
2. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.