Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/2–249: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

top secret
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Cairo, February 2, 1949—9 p. m.

131. On responding at 6 p. m., February 2 to urgent request by Foreign Minister I was informed by Abaza Pasha of receipt today word from Rhodes of rejection by Israelis of a proposition devised by Dr. Bunche as Palestine Mediator with view to Egyptian-Israeli Palestine settlement (Embtel 126, February 1).

Egyptians had steadily refused Israeli efforts to change basis of Rhodes talks from SC November 4 and 16 resolutions along lines more acceptable to Israelis. However, when Bunche stating that he had been in touch with his government proposed a new basis for a Palestine settlement Egyptians although unhappy to do so assented in the interests of accelerating conclusion of an agreement.

Bunche had proposed that Bersheba (Bir Saba), El Auja and Bir Asluj should be neutralized with the Mediator or his successor, the Palestine Conciliation Commission sitting in one of the three places above-named. The Egyptians under Bunche’s proposition would remain at Gaza.¹ (It was not clearly stated when Faluja garrison would be released.)

This proposal had been met by a refusal on the part Israelis or perhaps more precisely by counter-proposals which the Egyptians considered wholly unacceptable.

By such counter-proposals the Israelis stated:

1. Bersheba was necessary to them.

2. They required that an Israeli offensive and defensive force be stationed at Bersheba.

3. An Israeli defense force should be stationed at Bir Asluj.

4. On other hand Israeli would not occupy El Auja and would assent to the Egyptians fortifying that spot.

5. Israeli would assent to UN commission sitting at El Auja if desired.

Foreign Minister had learned that if this attitude were persisted in by the Israelis, Bunche, as acting Palestine Mediator, proposed to notify the SC of the attitude of Israeli’s delegates or their government.

Foreign Minister, who indicated a continuing belief in ability of US Government to influence PGI, expressed hope that I most urgently communicate foregoing to my government in order that it might use its influence with PGI to further progress of the Rhodes talks to a conclusion having some relationship to the foundation on which the conversations were built and initiated. Abaza Pasha pointed out that Egyptians had made every conceivable concession, having even departed from their insistence on the November 4 and 16 resolutions when Bunche informed them that his proposition above mentioned had been brought to the attention of the US Government.

I trust the Department may find its way clear to extend effective good offices in order to bring parties to an agreement since Abaza Pasha rather despairingly inquired if the only alternative might be another resort to arms. The Minister, despite my categoric assurances that to the best of my knowledge and belief my government was sincerely desirous that the parties to the Rhodes conversations might reach a prompt and just settlement, was inclined to hold that the US in extending de jure recognition to Israel² at a sensitive point of the Rhodes negotiations had rendered PGI more than ever intransigent and so had indirectly intervened in the negotiations in a sense injurious to Egypt.

Please telegraph urgently any statement which the Department may desire me to communicate to Foreign Minister or other representative Egyptian Government.

Patterson

1. According to a telegram of February 3, sent presumably to Secretary-General Lie, Mr. Bunche stated that his compromise draft agreement had been presented on January 31 and that the Egyptian Delegation had formally notified him on the morning of February 3 that Egypt accepted his draft, with minor modifications not affecting the substance. New York transmitted the text of Mr. Bundle’s telegram to the Department in telegram 125, February 3, 1:18 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/2–349).
2. In a note of February 4, Egyptian Ambassador Rahim expressed to the Secretary of State the very deep regret of his Government that “certain powers” had recognized the “so-called State of Israel,” despite the failure to find a solution for the problems of Palestine. The Ambassador pointed out that while such recognition was not to be interpreted “as a definite stand in favor of Zionists,” yet the Zionists had exploited it in this sense (501.BB Palestine/2–449).