Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/1–2849: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret
urgent

New York, January 28, 1949—9:10 p. m.

107. SYG Lie handed USUN following telegram to him from Bunche dated Rhodes, 27 January. Lie stated he was giving us this confidentially and not to any other delegation although we assume he gave it to McNaughton as President SC. Lie hoped US could do something and surmised UK might be making more trouble.

Following verbatim text of telegram:

“Negotiations resumed afternoon 27th. Following separate talks with each delegation conclusion is inescapable that prospects for an armistice agreement are virtually nil. Each delegation is adamant on its previous position. Have exerted every possible effort to induce concessions from each side but to no avail.

Egyptian minimum demands are:

a. Israeli withdrawal to 14 October lines as defined in 13 November memorandum except for defence forces in settlements;

b. Egyptian civil administrators in Beersheba and Bir-Asluj; they have dropped their original demand that Egyptian forces be permitted to return to Bir-Asluj and along Rafah Bir-Asluj road;

c. They claim right to advance only at El Auja which Israelis captured in late December and advanced from there into Egypt.

Egyptians therefore taken 13 November lines as basis for armistice lines and insist advantages gained under the truce should not be confirmed by armistice agreement.

Israelis have modified their original demand that Egyptian forces withdraw altogether from Gaza-Rafah coastal strip now strongly held by them and will accept Egyptians remaining there with defence forces only on basis of a reciprocal reduction agreement. Israelis insist on retention of their forces in El Auja at minimum in defensive strength and regard as unrealistic Egyptian emphasis on 4 November resolution and demands concerning Beersheba and Bir-Asluj. They will not consider any general withdrawal to 14 October lines or evacuation of Beersheba and Bir-Asluj.

Israeli position is that any withdrawal arrangement must be on reciprocal basis and will be controlled by distance of Egyptian forces from Palestine frontier. Egyptians embittered about postponement of Al Faluja evacuation. Egyptians urge that they do not have to sign an armistice agreement with Israelis to stay where they are and hold what they have and will not sign one unless Israelis make important concessions in direction indicated. Egyptians do not wish to sign away in an armistice agreement any interests of their own in Negev or custodial claims on behalf of Palestine Arabs there. They realize that as soon as they sign most other Arab states will quickly follow.

We have been officially informed that Lebanese will sign an armistice agreement within half an hour after notification that Egyptians have signed. Abdullah has communicated to me his interest in an invitation if Egypt signs.

It has been made clear to me today that despite a complete impasse neither delegation will wish to take responsibility for walking out on the negotiations. They will wish me to take responsibility for closing the negotiations by declaring no hope for agreement exists. I will be cautious about that. At worst I will try to persuade them to adjourn indefinitely and then I will report fully to SC. Present prospect is that negotiations will be completely stalemated by Sunday if not before. Urgent Council intervention in some form might be helpful even if only a cable from President of Council.¹

If no agreement is signed here possibility of renewed fighting will be greatly increased.”

[Here follows final paragraph, dealing with a matter other than the armistice agreements.]

Austin

1. President McNaughton informed Acting Mediator Bunche that he could not “intervene officially in the Rhodes conversations unless he has a specific reason or specific point on which to comment. He advised Bunche in any event not to break off the discussions but, if necessary, adjourn them. If necessary to call adjournment, Bunche should request both parties to issue statements setting forth reasons therefor. McNaughton’s thought was that the SC could use such statements as a basis for intervention.” (telegram 110, January 29, 3:50 p. m. from New York, 501.BB Palestine/1–2949)