Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/1–2849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

top secret

Washington, January 28, 1949—6 p. m.

us urgent

niact

107. Epstein on instructions Shertok informed Dept Jan 28 PGI seriously disturbed by deadlock Rhodes and likelihood failure negos. Epstein said PGI sincerely desired reach agreement with Egyptians but that latter uncompromising, unwilling admit defeat, and encouraged in intransigent attitude by Bevin’s speech in Commons Jan 26.

Epstein said main stumbling block appeared to be El Auja which Egyptians stated was menace to Egypt as long as in Israeli hands. They desired Israelis withdraw from El Auja but for security reasons PGI unable effect complete withdrawal as long as prospects final peace negos not immed. Israeli reps Rhodes had informed Egyptians that PGI willing withdraw main body Israeli troops back from El Auja leaving only “military outpost” under UN supervision. Such outpost would in no way be strong enough to menace Egypt and yet would afford measure of protection to Israeli settlements in area.

Epstein said he saw no reason why PGI would not agree to sign armistice with Egyptians on basis this arrangement El Auja and that he certain that if agreement concerning El Auja could be reached PGI would release Faluja brigade.

Epstein reiterated PGI position that armistice should be based on present military lines with exception above arrangement El Auja and Faluja, Egypt to remain in occupation Gaza-Rafah coastal strip.

Epstein said proposal concerning El Auja had been decided in PGI Cabinet meeting and that Cabinet had also decided formally request USG’s good offices to attempt persuade Egyptians come to agreement this basis. Said despite deadlock PGI would not withdraw negotiators from Rhodes.

Pls call immed upon FonMin and give him above info. Add that USG earnestly hopes Egypt will see way clear to reaching armistice agreement with PGI. Point out that proposed UN supervision Israeli outpost El Auja seems offer assurance El Auja will not be menace Egypt nor Egyptian lines communication. Add that fact that Israeli proposal is result Cabinet decision and that PGI has formally requested US good offices seems indicate proposal sincere. State USG believes substantial progress already made toward Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement and hopes both sides will make every effort remove final obstacles now standing in way.

Dept made representation Egypt Amb Jan 28 along same lines. Amb pointed out PGI made no mention of compliance with SC resolution Nov 4. Made personal suggestion that Egyptian observers might be stationed at proposed Israeli outpost El Auja in addition UN reps. Dept stated opinion this suggestion merited serious consideration Rhodes but pointed out proposed Israeli-Egyptian armistice comm would be in position to maintain surveillance El Auja outpost. Amb reporting Dept’s representation to Cairo.

For your info only Dept this morning also recd request from SYG requesting it endeavor persuade both Govts break deadlock.¹

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission and to Jerusalem. It was transmitted separately to Acting Mediator Bunche, at Rhodes, in an unnumbered telegram of January 28 and to London in telegram 321 the same day (501.BB Palestine/1–2849). The message to London requested the Embassy to “Pls immed convey sense above to FonOff and state USG hopes UKG will make particular effort Cairo attempt persuade Egyptians reach compromise With Israelis at Rhodes. Add USG believes Israeli proposal could serve as effective basis for armistice without reference to dispositions final peace settlement, and that fact that proposal is result PGI Cabinet decision and that PGI has formally requested US good offices this basis seems indicate proposal sincere.”

   Chargé Patterson called on Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi on January 29 and gave him the substance of the Department’s telegram. At the conclusion of the presentation, Hadi Pasha “expressed inability consider El Auja suggestion or other points raised by Israeli pending demonstration of Israeli good faith through prior unconditional release Faluja garrison…” The Prime Minister left the impression with the Chargé that the “Egyptians anxious continue Rhodes conversations but felt that token evidence of good faith by Israelis and face-saving device represented by unconditional release of Faluja garrison must be insisted upon as prerequisite to renewal of serious conversations at Rhodes.” (telegram 116, January 29, 4 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/1–2949)