501.BB Palestine/1–1849: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State
214. 1. I am most grateful to Department for its 149, January 13 reporting conversation between Acting Secretary and British Ambassador. I believe that this frank, firm and friendly talk followed by talk of same character with President constitute genuine contriburtion to US–UK understanding which already have gone far to put [Page 678] US thinking before British Cabinet in a light clearer than ever before. Fact that US has reasoned point of view on Middle East problems as whole has begun to make its appearance in thoughtful British publications and conversations for first time without the overworked, and tendentious implication that US views re Palestine slavishly follow dictates of American Zionist pressure groups. It is source of surprise to some that underlying US policy there is hardboiled appraisal of elements of Middle East power and prospects for making best use of them in US–UK defense planning.
2. Impact of Franks’ reports of his conversations has derived more from fact spokesmen were President and Acting Secretary than from nature views they expressed. This Embassy at every opportunity has consistently made clear to Foreign Office officials, members of Parliament, military, etc., the trend of US thought on all major points made by Acting Secretary. However, British officials have been obsessed with rightness of their own views and this tempted them to hope wish fully that US attitude as expressed by US Representative SC during US political campaign would change in calmer atmosphere following elections. Bevin and his officials wanted to know on a government to government basis, apart from speeches made in charged Paris atmosphere, what US views really were. Now Bevin has received from both President and Acting Secretary restatement US policy tied up in a single unequivocable and comprehensible package and UK “knows where it stands” vis-à-vis US re Palestine. Embassy is inclined to believe that Bevin has now made his final attempt to sell US on UK Palestine policy. He now can go to no higher US authority and his hopes for UK–US cooperation on UK terms re Palestine have now vanished.
3. Embassy Officer has been shown texts of Franks’ telegrams reporting conversations with both Acting Secretary and President. While Franks did not deal in same order or with exactly same emphasis re points made by Acting Secretary in Department’s reference telegram he did present US views in clear light and in a context revealing a measure of personal agreement with their substance. Franks stressed friendliness of his reception on both occasions and US concept that Israel is the “most dynamic, efficient and vigorous state in Middle East”. Re President’s remarks Franks reported that former spoke of good and friendly relations existing between US and UK and ex pressed regret that in this matter US and UK “are not quite in agreement”. Franks reported that President was most friendly throughout interview but that he was also very positive and definite in expression of his views. Since these reports were undoubtedly discussed in detail [Page 679] at yesterday’s meetings British Cabinet attended by defence chiefs, not only their content but friendly tenor of Franks’ presentation may be of significance in deciding effect of US views on British Palestine policy.
4. Despite spate of comment and rumor neither British Government nor opposition appears to have decided on manner in which Palestine will be handled before Parliament. While Bevin is fully aware that he is in for rough time it would be erroneous to suppose that he will be ridden out of office on Palestine rail. Labour Party on party grounds will support him strongly and even Conservatives feel that there is point beyond which they would gain nothing by pressing Bevin re Palestine. Time is slightly in favor Bevin whose good points seem to be marshalling themselves in popular consciousness in mitigation of his lapses over Palestine.
5. British Government obviously now has choice re Palestine of going ahead, drawing back or maintaining unaggressively its present attitude and as of this moment there is no clear indication re line which will be adopted. Embassy’s guess is that for immediate future UK will do as little as possible re Palestine and as events can be found to give public justification UK will progressively but quietly unbend towards PGI. An abrupt change in policy seems unlikely. It is Embassy’s guess also that Bevin will attempt to play down US influence on Palestine events, but it is not unlikely that if he is hard pressed in debate he may bring US role more prominently into discussion with special reference to Bernadotte proposals.1
- The Department, on
January 19, replied to the last sentence of telegram 214,
stating in part: “you should bear in mind in discussions with
Brit fact that Bernadotte plan was rejected in GA not because of lack of support by
UK and US but because both Arab and Israeli influences united to
deny necessary votes.… In view this voting situation inside
Assembly, it would be most unfortunate if Bevin or FonOff should imply that US had
forsaken its agreement to support Bernadotte plan.” (telegram
221, 501.BB Palestine/1–1949)
The concluding paragraph of telegram 219 to London (see footnote 5, p. 674) states that the British communication handed to the Department on January 18 “was drafted pursuant to tele which Brit. Amb said came from Cabinet itself. We believe in light your 214, Jan. 18 that Franks correctly interpreted changed situation by saying he thought Bevin has now abandoned views he expressed Jan. 12 through Amb here and that he is resolutely setting new course.” Regarding the conversation of January 12, see telegram 149, January 13, to London, p. 658.
London, on January 19, reported information from Mr. Burrows that a “circular message was sent to Arab capitals January 18 telling governments that advantage should be taken of present period comparative peace to make armistice agreements with PGI on all fronts and then to enter into final negotiations either through CC or directly.” (telegram 236, 867N.01/1–1949)
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