501.BB Palestine/1–1349: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
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149. Brit Amb called yesterday under personal instructions of Bevin and asked Acting Secy to read two telegrams, first of which bore obvious imprint of Foreign Secys drafting.
Gist this tel was that Bevin desired clearcut statement US views on Palestine territorial settlement in light mutual and highly important strategic interests UK and US in Middle East. He referred to UK–US understanding as to strategic objectives and joint action in this area1 “subject to Israel”. Lovett confirmed to Sir Oliver Franks that Middle East understanding so far as this Govt is concerned is still very much in effect.
Bevin’s tel was couched in a series of questions. His next point was to ascertain precisely what US attitude was with respect to strategic land line of communications bet Egypt and other Arab States, specifically road from Gaza, Beersheba and Jericho, to Transjordan. Bevin referred to Douglas’ luncheon in Dec. with himself and Brit Chiefs of Staff.2
Lovett replied that importance this particular strategic road had been mentioned very late in the day. Attitude of US Govt had been clear since autumn 1947 and had been frequently reiterated by President and other officials; namely that Israel was entitled to boundaries (including all of Negev) assigned it by GA resolution Nov 29, 1947. However if Israel insisted on retaining Arab areas of Palestine such as Jaffa and western Galilee it should be expected to relinquish other territory, such as part of Negev, in compensation. Our most recent [Page 659] exposition of this policy had been Jessup’s speech before Committee 1 of GA Nov. 20, 1948.
Brit Amb in endeavoring explain his Govt’s overall concept from which its concern for specific strategic lines derived said he thought UK did not feel that for immediate future it could regard attitude of Israel with any confidence. It was therefore vitally necessary that southern boundaries of Israel should be north of Gaza, Beersheba, Jericho Road. To this Lovett said he thought real strategic security lay in encouraging development in Israel of a westward outlook. Confining Israel in a strait jacket and surrounding this new nation with a circle of a weak Arab enemies kept in ring only by Brit armed assistance, would inevitably result in creation of a hostile state which would turn almost automatically toward USSR. Experience had proved that it was far more difficult to deal with a state after it had turned Communist or pro-Soviet than to keep it friendly to the west before the capture took place. Real security therefore lay not in any particular road in Negev but in attitude of Israel, which would be conditioned by attitude of Great Powers.
Bevin’s next query was whether US backed SC resolutions and specifically those Nov. 4 and 16 and that of Dec. 29. We pointed out to Brit. Amb that apparently Foreign Secy was visualizing technical truce lines such as those provided for in Nov. 4 resolution as terms of a final political settlement. While SC resolutions certainly were valid in their limited application to momentary military situation and to problem of transferring truce into an armistice they did not seek to delineate final political settlement. This in fact had been left under GA res of Dec. 11 to Palestine Conciliation Comm. Our views on this final settlement were clear, since we had favored giving all Negev to Jewish State under res. Nov. 29, 1947 but now under formula expressed above contemplated that Israel might have to relinquish part of Negev if it desired to retain western Galilee and Jaffa. It therefore seemed difficult to comprehend why Foreign Secy displayed such excitement since Israel under this definition might get less territory in Negev than in Nov. 1947 when Brit. Govt. remained silent.
Next point in Bevin message was in effect “What is US prepared to do about Palestine situation?”. Message added that two govts ought to get together and “do something”. Acting Secy replied we had been doing a great deal and that perhaps UK had been doing too much in a non-constructive sense. For example, its sending of troops to Aqaba, the RAF incident, and threatening naval movements in Mediterranean certainly did not encourage Israelis at least to think UK was moving for peace. US for its part, as Brit. Govt. well knew, had worked with energy and no small degree of success in getting PGI to cease its campaign against Egypt and in influencing Egypt to offer [Page 660] cease-fire and negotiations to Israel under UN auspices. At this juncture when Israelis and Egyptians were on point of sitting down to peace talks on Rhodes, and when we had word of favorable conversations bet Israel and Lebanon and bet Israel and Transjordan looking toward permanent settlement, it would be in highest degree unfortunate if any action should prevent these developments from coming to fruition. Lovett added parenthetically that Israeli Rep had called that same afternoon and stated his Govt believed Brit. agents were seeking to dissuade Egyptian Govt from participating in Rhodes peace talks. Acting Secy told Israeli Rep. he thought there was no basis for this report. However, if Israel should bring its charges against UK before SC it could present eloquent case which would do neither US nor UK any good. Lovett told Brit. Amb he had used utmost endeavor with Israeli Rep. to persuade his Govt. not to bring its differences with Brit before SC.
Bevin’s tel was emotional in tone. It concluded with a challenge for US to choose bet supporting SC resolutions or Sov Union. Both Sir Oliver and Lovett disregarded this dramatic peroration.
Second Brit. note resumed threat to regain UK liberty of action (despite SC res. of May 29) to send arms and war material to Arab states. Lovett told Brit. Amb this would have instantaneous results of further exciting popular feeling in Israel, of placing Britain in position of violating SC res (despite Bevin’s protestation that these resolutions must be complied with) and also immediately raise question of causing this Govt to lift its scrupulous arms embargo. This would in turn result in sorry spectacle of Britain arming one side in Palestine conflict and US the other, with Russians sole permanent beneficiaries.
Basic difference in point of view UK and US Govts is that Brit are demanding rigid compliance with SC resolutions Nov. 4 and 16 because they wish to use these resolutions as means of enforcing a political settlement. Brit. Amb admitted as much when he said that lines of truce or armistice would undoubtedly foreshadow final territorial dispositions. We already know from McNeil’s3 blunt comment to Rep. of PGI in Paris last autumn that UK is frankly seeking to use SC action to oust Israelis from Negev. This Govt however has repeatedly been on record as stating that neither SC nor GA has constitutional power under UN Charter to enforce a political settlement. Efforts of SC are restricted to maintaining international peace and security. We feel that proper means for achievement of final political settlement in Palestine is by negotiations bet the parties either directly or through UN auspices. These negotiations are now in progress and Conciliation Comm is on point of undertaking its responsibilities [Page 661] under GA res. Dec. 11. We feel it would be useful in your conversations with high FonOff officials to make clear this basic difference in approach and to emphasize our view that Brit will be starting along path whose end is far from being in sight if they seek to use SC resolutions designed solely to meet specific threats to international security as a means of accomplishing political advantage. In fact Bevin’s heated admonition to this Govt to back up SC resolutions sounds queer in light his simultaneous willingness to violate SC res. May 29 by proceeding forthwith to arm Arab allies.4
Rptd USUN, eyes only, for Jessup.
- The understanding was attained at the “Pentagon Talks of 1947”; for documentation on these talks, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.↩
- The luncheon took place on December 20: see airgram 2377, December 22, 1948, from London, ibid., 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1680.↩
- Hector McNeil, British Minister of State.↩
- A marginal notation indicates that this telegram was cleared with the White House.↩