Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/1–1349: Airgram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, January 13, 1949.

A–35. In talks prior to his recent departure for home leave, Syrian Minister Farid Bey Zeineddine indicated that he had received further intimation from the Soviet authorities of a possible shift in Soviet policy toward Palestine and the Arab states, along lines reported in Embtel 2186, Sept. 29.¹ While he did not so indicate, it is possible that, on these latter occasions, he did receive something more specific, though we doubt that it went so far at this stage as “an offer to reverse Soviet Palestine policy in return for a demonstration on the part of Syria and other Arab countries that they are not ‘instruments of Anglo-American policy’”, as alleged by the Acting Director-General of the Syrian Foreign Office (Damascus A–387, Dec. 13).²

The central element in Soviet policy toward Palestine is the question of the status therein of non-Soviet power and influence. In this region, as in all other “dependent, semi-dependent, or colonial areas”, the constant first objective of the Kremlin is the removal of the authority or influence of any rival or hostile powers, which in practice means, principally, the authority or influence of the United States or the United Kingdom. Any means which serves this end is acceptable until the objective has been achieved. During this period Moscow supports and uses such disparate and ideologically inappropriate forces as the Zionists in Palestine, the feudal rulers of Egypt, or the “Trotskyites” in Indonesia, as well as real Communists, as in Indochina. Once the first objective is gained, the next objective becomes the fostering of Communist control. At this stage, uncontrolled and ideologically in appropriate agencies are likely to find themselves neglected, under mined, sabotaged, infiltrated or even abruptly disowned and attacked, depending on the Kremlin’s estimate of the shortest direction toward this next objective.

Moscow apparently considers the first objectives satisfactorily attained in Palestine, insofar as the territory presently or potentially under control of the Jews is concerned, and will be likely henceforth to concentrate on securing the establishment of a weak independent Arab state in the remainder of Palestine, free from non-Soviet outside influences. This suggests that the Soviet government will now:

(1) Decrease its support of the Israel government and revert to basic anti-Zionist policy it temporarily suspended but never abandoned (Embtel 1016, May 31).³ Signs of this reversion are already apparent in Ehrenburg’s⁴ attack, in Pravda Sept. 21, on the bourgeois nature of the government of Israel and subsequent less friendly tone Soviet propaganda, as well as in recent suppression of Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and Jewish press in Moscow, the only Jewish agencies possibly available to Israeli legation as point of contact with Soviet Jewish population.

(2) Extend increasing support to Communists of Israel, encouraging and aiding them to penetrate Government, at same time infiltrating Communist agents into Eastern European emigration, which Israel desires and Kremlin controls. The Embassy recently learned from usually reliable sources that some half-dozen Soviet citizens have been authorized to leave the Soviet Union for Palestine; since normal emigration from the USSR is forbidden, these persons could only be Soviet agents.

(3) Seek to limit territory of State of Israel to that foreseen by GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and generally to curb power of Israel Government. This is indicated by attitude of Soviet UN Delegation at Paris and by practical cessation of direct military aid to Israel Government via Czechoslovakia. It seems clear independent strength and ambition shown by young Israel Government was as unexpected by Soviet Government as by others and that its further rapid extension is not regarded as desirable.

(4) Oppose by every means extension of Abdullah’s control or influence, i.e., in Soviet eyes, British control and influence, to Arab Palestine.

At appropriate time and occasion, foregoing measures will certainly be portrayed to Arab Governments as a change in Soviet policy favor able to them, and exploited by every means in order to lay basis for achievement in Arab countries of first objective already gained in Jewish Palestine. However, we do not believe there will be any sudden public shift in Kremlin’s Palestine policy. We should rather expect that the new line will be implemented somewhat later and gradually, with direct approaches to the Arab Governments timed to take advantage of developments connected with UN effort to effect a Palestine settlement.

Department please pass copies to London, Paris, Prague, Cairo, Beirut, Jidda, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem.

Kohler

1. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1432.
2. Not printed.
3. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, page 1081.
4. Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a prominent Soviet author and journalist.