501.BB Palestine/1–1149

President Chaim Weizmann of the Provisional Government of Israel to President Truman 1

I have been informed by the Provisional Government of Israel of a communication addressed to them by your Special Envoy and of an official assurance given by them that the presence on Egyptian territory of Israeli forces which crossed the frontier in the course of hot pursuit of the Egyptian invaders signified no political or territorial claims by Israel at Egypt’s expense and that these forces would be speedily withdrawn.

I feel impelled to address you personally concerning certain basic aspects of this incident. The Egyptian army invaded Palestine with a view to destroying the State of Israel. Israeli forces which accidentally crossed the Egyptian frontier had no intention of destroying the Kingdom of Egypt. The presence of our forces in the Negev conforms to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947.2 On the other hand, the presence of the Egyptian forces in the Negev represents a deliberate defiance of that resolution by the use of force. The Egyptian army on the 15th of May invaded Palestine, bombarded the civilian population of Tel Aviv, and destroyed Jewish villages and water installations in the Negev though the Jews had not touched a single Egyptian. Egyptian forces occupied and held positions in flagrant defiance of successive cease-fire orders of the Security Council at the end of May and in the middle of July. These indisputable facts clearly reveal which side started and consistently maintained a policy of aggression.

I feel deeply disturbed at the unequal reaction of a great power to Egyptian aggression and Jewish defense respectively. When your Government attempted to secure action by the Security Council for stopping the Egyptian and other Arab invasions, these resolutions were defeated by Great Britain which supplied practically all arms used by Egypt in its war of aggression against us. But when Jewish countermeasures repel the invaders, Great Britain comes to the aid of the aggressor in order to prevent Egyptian invaders from being ejected from territory where they had no right to be.

I deeply appreciate the great constructive contributions which you, Mr. President, made to the solution of this problem, indicating your [Page 601] refusal to follow British calculations and ill-advised policies. But I am unable to square the United States’ warning that they would review their support of Israel’s application for membership to the United Nations if our forces remained on Egyptian territory, with United States’ sponsorship of Egyptian election to the Security Council while Egyptian forces were actually invading and attacking Israel. As a result of such sponsorship, Egypt, which defied the authority of the United Nations and broke the peace in the Middle East, is now a member of the very Council whose function it is to suppress aggression and maintain international peace.

Finally, I should point out that Egypt, in addition to defying the resolution of November, 1947, also failed to comply with the Security Council’s resolution of November 163 and the Assembly’s resolution of December 11, 1948,4 which ordered both parties to enter into negotiations for armistice and peaceful settlement. I trust that the above sub missions may assist you in determining where the initiative, responsibilty, and guilt for the present unhappy situation properly lie.

I should reiterate that the Provisional Government of Israel is ready at any time to enter into negotiations toward the speediest possible attainment of peace.

Chaim Weizmann
  1. Sent by the Israeli Mission in the United States to the White House, which transmitted the message to the Department of State by January 11 for preparation of a reply (memorandum of January 11 by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to Mr. Lovett).
  2. See telegram 1271, November 29, 1947, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, p. 1291.
  3. See telegram Delga 746, November 14, 1948, from Paris; footnote 2 to Delga 746; and editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582, 1583, and 1597.
  4. See editorial note, ibid., p. 1661.