Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/7–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philip A. Mangano of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

secret

[Washington,] July 7, 1949.

Participants:	GTI—Mr. Clyde Dunn
	L/P—Mr. Meeker
	DRN—Mr. Upton
	UNP—Mr. Mangano
	Mr. Fawcett—UK Delegation
	Mr. Walker—Second Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. Bromley—First Secretary, British Embassy

On Thursday afternoon, June 30, a meeting was held in Mr. Dunn’s office (GTI) to permit an exchange of views between interested officers of the Department and the British Embassy officials in connection with the Soviet-Iranian situation, with particular reference to Article VI of the treaty between Iran and the USSR of 1921. Earlier discussions with the British had suggested a not complete meeting of minds on the interpretation of the conditions and manner in which a Soviet right (under the treaty) to send troops into northern Iran could be applied.

Mr. Dunn furnished the British representatives with a copy of a paper prepared in the Department¹ which outlined what the Department tentatively, at the operating level felt to be a desirable course of action for Iran in order to discourage the USSR from threatening or sending troops into Iran under the guise of the 1921 treaty. Inter alia, the paper proposed that the Iranian Government should communicate to the Security Council on developments, setting forth the position that the USSR does not possess a right under the 1921 treaty unilaterally to determine that conditions in northern Iran warrant the sending of troops. The US would then be prepared to issue a statement giving its views of the obligations of the parties under the UN Charter.

The discussion turned quickly to consideration of paragraph six in the Department’s tentative paper suggesting courses of action.

Mr. Fawcett observed that the British felt that subparagraph (a) would represent a sound position, but questioned the validity of sub paragraph (b) on absolute legal terms. He argued that it was important to know whether, at the time of signing the treaty in 1921, it was the clear intent of the Iranian Government to accord Soviet Russia the right of unilateral determination of the existence of conditions in northern Iran (threats to the Soviet frontier, the development of military bases by outside powers directed against the USSR, etc.) which would justify the introduction of Soviet troops. The British officials initially took the position that this appeared to be an absolute right, the enjoyment of which was not qualified by the signing of the UN Charter. The British officials also felt that if an emergency arose and the matter properly went to the Security Council, it would be better to avoid pressing detailed legal arguments on this point, resting the case almost entirely on the claim that conditions justifying the introduction of troops do not and cannot exist. In that connection, Mr. Fawcett observed that much of the dispute would then be between the USSR and the US, the former accusing this Government of trying to turn Iran into a military base for hostile purposes against the USSR, while the US would clearly refute such allegations.

In response to questions from the British as to how we felt that the exercise of the Soviet right under Article VI of the 1921 treaty was qualified by subsequent developments, including the signing of the Charter, Mr. Meeker outlined the following points:

1. The Treaty of 1921 specifies no procedure for determining whether or not the alleged conditions exist. However, in the treaty of guarantee and neutrality of October 1927, the two governments, under took “to settle by a specific procedure appropriate to the circumstances all disputes of any description which may arise between them and which it has not been possible to settle through ordinary channels.” Thus, if Iran were to claim that a dispute existed as to the interpretation of Article VI of the treaty of 1921, it would have a treaty right to call for special procedures of settlement, such as arbitration or adjudication—possibly by the International Court of Justice.

2. The UN Charter enjoins the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and enjoins all members to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Articles 33 and 37 of the Charter require the parties to a dispute involving the maintenance of international peace to seek, first, a solution by peaceful means of their own choice, and failing in that to refer it to the Security Council. Article 103 of the Charter establishes that where there is a conflict between the obligations of Members under the Charter and under any other international agreements to which they may be parties, the Charter shall prevail.

Mr. Meeker pointed out that it was clear that it was an obligation of the USSR not to use force, but to have recourse to any one of the various means of peaceful settlement known to international law, provided for in the Charter, or referred to in the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1927. He then outlined our understanding of the difference between defense pacts under Article 51 of the Charter and the possible assertion of a right by the USSR to arbitrarily send troops into northern Iran without having it established by proper methods that conditions existed justifying such action. He also observed we did not feel that the Soviet-Iranian treaty could be considered as a “regional arrangement” in terms of the Charter with the possibility that the USSR could claim that steps, such as the sending of troops, were justified in order to preserve the security of the whole area, Mr. Meeker and Mr. Mangano pointed out that it would be paradoxical, to say the least, to think of Iran as a party to the treaty of 1921, agreeing to steps against itself under guise of fulfilling obligations of a regional arrangement. It was further maintained that, where regional arrangements might conceivably be used for “enforcement measures” in terms of the Charter, they would usually be of a multilateral rather than a bilateral character.

Mr. Dunn queried the British representatives as to whether the above discussion had eased their uncertainties as to the inter-relationship of the Charter with possible application of Article VI of the 1921 treaty. He said we felt that the British need not consider their treaty positions in Egypt and Trans-Jordan as paralleling a Soviet attempt to put troops into Iran. In the former case (as demonstrated by the Egyptian case in the Security Council) there was a matter of maintaining troops already in a country by treaty right; in the latter case, the matter would be one of forcibly attempting to introduce troops, without the free consent of the Iranian Government, thereby endangering international peace. Mr. Mangano attempted to summarize the position in the following terms:

There was no question about the validity of the treaty of 1921, and particularly, of Article VI. Indeed, there should be no question about the validity of any continuing treaties antedating the Charter. However, the advent of the Charter meant that member states, in seeking to apply particular treaty rights, must do so in a manner consistent with the Charter and with their obligations as members. Mr. Meeker emphasized that the essential point, in resolving the Soviet-Iranian dispute, was that force should not be used.

It appeared that the British officials were able to agree with such a general formulation. They also concurred generally with Mr. Dunn’s suggestion that the proposed Iranian communication to the Security Council be couched in bland and not overly-legalistic terms, avoiding a provocative tone, and strengthening thereby their position before the Security Council. It was hoped that such a course of action would help restrain the USSR from proceeding to any drastic action which might require Security Council consideration under Chapter VI.

[Annex]

[Washington,] July 7, 1949.

Desirable Course of Action Relative to Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921

1. The Iranian Government should, as a party to a case of which the Security Council is seized, keep the Security Council informed of developments bearing upon the Iranian case, including the Soviet contention of a “right” to take action in Iran under the 1921 Treaty.

2. In communicating such developments to the Security Council for information only, the Iranian Government should take such occasion to state its position with respect to Soviet assertions of its “rights” under the 1921 Treaty, avoiding, however, legalistic, tendentious argument—the purposes being as follows:

a. To achieve agreement as to the Iranian position in advance of an emergency and, thus, avoid confusion and loss of time in the event of an emergency involving the 1921 Treaty;

b. The Iranian Government and people would understand that they are not under the shadow of any legal Soviet right to impair Iran’s territorial integrity and, therefore, might achieve a desirable degree of self-confidence in the face of a continuing Soviet war of nerves;

c. It would be made entirely clear that the Iranian Government does not acquiesce in the hitherto unrefuted Soviet assertions of unilateral Soviet “rights” under the 1921 Treaty and the USSR might be deterred from action which would evoke armed Iranian resistance and, therefore, pose a serious threat to the peace; and,

d. The peoples of the Western Democracies would be more ready to accord full support to Iran in the realization, contrary to wide spread press opinion, that no semblance of legality underlay Soviet military action against Iran.

3. The Iranian Government decision to communicate with the Security Council concerning the 1921 Treaty should be an entirely independent one, since the US desires to avoid:

a. Making Iran appear to world opinion as the pawn in Big-Power politics; and,

b. Causing Iran to evade responsibility for the consequences of its own foreign policy.

4. While the Iranian position in this connection should be an in dependent one, the US should be prepared to give advice, when requested by the Iranian Government, along the lines of 1. and 2. above.

5. Should the Iranian Government communicate to the Security Council its interpretation of Article 6 of the 1921 treaty along lines stated in the Conclusions embodied in this paper, the US should be prepared to issue a statement giving US views of the obligations of the parties under the UN Charter.

6. Should Article 6 become the subject of attention by the Security Council, the desirable approach by the US would be to state:

a. That the fact situation (conditions alleged by Soviet Government to exist in Iran) does not and cannot exist and that, therefore, the 1921 Treaty cannot be applied; and,

b. That under any circumstances, the signing of the UN Charter by Iran and the USSR prohibits either party from exercising any unilateral right to introduce troops into the other’s territory and that any Soviet claim to such a prerogative is clearly indefensible.

7. If the Soviet Union believes that, conditions exist which are envisaged in Article 6 and Annex 2 of the 1921 Treaty, and that it is entitled to send its troops on to Iranian soil, the appropriate course, in the absence of the free and present consent of Iran or solution of the dispute by pacific procedures under Article 33 of the UN Charter, is for the Soviet Union to refer the matter to the Security Council as a dispute likely to endanger international peace and to ask that body to recommend or apply remedies in order that international peace and security may be maintained.

8. If the Soviet Union, without the free and present consent of Iran, should attempt to introduce troops onto Iranian soil, Iran would be justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter in resisting with force this threat or use of force contrary to the principles of the UN, whether or not the conditions envisaged in Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty did in fact exist.

9. The Iranian Government would be ill-advised to denounce the 1921 Treaty in order to get rid of Article 6, for the following reasons:

a. The Treaty contains certain provisions advantageous to Iran;

b. Denunciation of the Treaty by Iran might, with some justification, be interpreted by world opinion, and particularly the Soviet Union, as an unfriendly act toward Russia; and,

c. Article 6 does not permit the USSR unilaterally to introduce forces into Iran.

10. In view of the sound legal position of Iran in contending that the USSR has no legal right, under the 1921 Treaty or otherwise, unilaterally to introduce troops into Iran, the Iranian Government would be unwise even to discuss any bargain with the USSR looking toward Soviet agreement with such Iranian interpretation of Article 6.

11. It is most desirable that the policy of the UK be coordinated closely with that of the US in this connection.

1. Printed as an annex to this document.