891.24/6–2249
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 1
official
informal
Dear Dean: As you know, the question of direct military aid to Iran is now actively on the agenda. I have been giving much thought to the matter. I outline below some of the basic considerations which strike me as applicable in arriving at a workable solution here.
- (1)
- There should be an effective and substantial training program for Iranian officers in American military and, so far as is feasible, in [Page 530] technical schools as well. Visual and tangible education of Iranian Army personnel in the United States could have great impact not only on the Iranian Army but on Iran itself.
- (2)
- Whatever direct aid we do give must be something more than merely provocative (to the neighbor on the northern frontier); it must be fruitful. There are many chinks in the Iranian military establishment that can usefully be filled in.
- (3)
- In giving direct military aid to Iran, nothing should be handed out. Everything should be doled out and we in Tehran should control the eyedropper.2
- (4)
- We must not give the Iranian Army equipment which it cannot absorb.
- (5)
- We should not give aid that can be procured locally.
- (6)
- After considerable thought I have come to the conclusion that direct military aid to Iran should come to between $32,000,000 and and $38,000,000 for the first year. General Evans is presently exploring this field. In addition to the cost of procurement one must calculate something like 20 per cent or more for transportation. Certain other military expenses should be met by the Iranian Government out of the American direct aid credit in the same manner as is the case in Turkey.
There are here two American Military Missions, advisory in character, one to the Army and the other to the Gendarmerie. The first is headed by Major General Vernon Evans and the second by Colonel James R. Pierce. Both are outstanding officers and professionally most competent. As things stand today, our Military Missions are very seldom consulted by the Iranians in the planning stage of anything of real importance. On the other hand, matters of a “five and dime” character are frequently referred to the Missions. Past experience has been that when an important decision has been reached by the Iranians without American advice the Americans are usually called in to advise on implementation. Even this advice is often ignored unless it coincides with the already established Iranian viewpoint. If there is to be direct military aid to Iran, these conditions must be firmly corrected. The faultlies with the Shah and with the Chief of Staff, General Razmara.
It will be possible to correct this situation only if in direct military aid we can control everything all the time. I may add with satisfaction that the two Military Missions and the Embassy work together as a very close-knit team. We must be permitted, in the event of direct aid, to maintain at all times one foot on the throttle and the other on the brake.
In our dealings with the Medes and the Persians we must always recall that we have to do with a people for whom the intrigues of the day suffice. They are not without talent or ability, but they disdain the past and ignore the future.
Yours sincerely,