Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/4–2249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran ¹

secret

Washington, April 22, 1949—7 p. m.

370. Background requested urtel 530, Apr. 21² for meeting PriMin Apr. 23: [Here follows paragraph numbered one dealing with the Ala-Entezam proposals.]

2. While Hekmat may be correct in stating neither Sov notes nor radio attacks make specific ref Art 6³ and Sov Govt has never specifically threatened (urtel 537, Apr. 21²) recourse 1921 Treaty, possibility invocation Art 6 is clearly implied in Sov representations and propaganda re US activity in Iran. IranGov note of Mar. 24, 1948 to Sov Govt⁴ refers explicitly to Art 6, stating Sov Govt had improperly used that Art as pretext for introduction troops 1941.

3. We note ur apparent concern over Hekmat’s seeming satisfaction with friendly termination recent representations by Sov Amb.⁵ We recognize, of course, fundamental danger inherent in Iran officials accepting at face value such indications of change in Sov attitude. Yet, as long as Iran officials uniformly pursue determined policy stand up for Iran’s independence and refuse concessions to USSR, they shld have tactical flexibility in dealing with such Sov maneuvers in order to avoid any pretext which Sovs cld successfully exploit.

4. Dept adheres to position consistently taken over past year that it wld be desirable for Iran at appropriate time communicate SC along lines proposed by Amb Ala and so often discussed by you and Dept, and for US to make public its support of Iran’s position. We also continue to maintain view that IranGov decision to make such communication shld be, in fact and for the record, entirely independent one (Deptel 47, Jan. 24²). This we regard as absolutely essential if we are to avoid (1) making Iran, in world opinion, appear pawn in big-power politics and (2) causing Iran shift responsibility to US for consequences its fon policy. We are somewhat concerned lest emphasis upon Iran’s strategic plight, which has been used to move IranGov to communicate with SC, might, in part at least, have occasioned increasing Iran concern with mil defense and requests for US guarantee its security which we are unable to give. In the premises, wo feel constrained to avoid appearance of positively encouraging at this time specific Iran action vis-à-vis USSR.

5. Foregoing shld not be interpreted as any lessening of our interest in Iran or of our support of Iran’s determination to stand up for its independence. To evidence that support, we are prepared to demon strate US interest in Iran by continued words and increased deeds of every feasible, effective sort. In addition Iran profit from direct US support and assistance, Iran shares security benefits accruing from broad US policies, such as Truman Doctrine and principles of North Atlantic Pact, and is in position to participate in social and economic contributions Fulbright, Smith-Mundt, and Point Four. In development US global policy and relations with countries having interests similar to those of Iran, we keep constantly in mind intimate connection of Iran security and advancement with overall US fon policy objectives.

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as 1385, Moscow as 252.
2. Not printed.
3. As reported in telegram 530 from Tehran.
2. Not printed.
4. The editors are unaware of a note of March 24, 1948, sent by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government. Presumably, the reference is to the note of April 1, 1948, sent by the then Iranian Prime Minister Hakimi to Ambassador Sadehikov; see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 127.
5. In telegram 530, Ambassador Wiley had advised of information from Foreign Minister Hekmat that the Soviet Ambassador “had always initiated meetings with long face and ‘harsh reproaches’. Invariably, though, interviews had terminated [in] friendly atmosphere.”
2. Not printed.