Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/4–2249: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tehran, April 22, 1949—3 p. m.

543. I am of course fully conscious of the thought and care dedicated to drafting Deptel 348, April 18. I remain, however, deeply concerned over certain considerations which enter into the question:

1. Two steps which apparently have led to Department’s conclusion trouble me: (a) Department states categorically that Treaty of 1921 has not been superseded by subsequent treaty concluded by parties. Does this not sidestep question as to whether obligations assumed under UN Charter have superseded right to take unilateral aggressive action under Article 6? (b) Department states that none of conditions contemplated by Treaty exist at “present”. This implies that these conditions might present themselves again at any future time with possible right in USSR to determine whether or not they have arisen. It would seem to me that we would be justified in saying that conditions contemplated by Article 6 have gone forever.

2. Should there be a showdown with the USSR over Iran, we must be able to present situation in a manner which is not merely readily intelligible to American public opinion but to world opinion too. “In applicable validity” would be inexplicable no matter how clear it might be to the legal mind. The one thing the Russians desire is to provoke obfuscating juridical argumentation. Since there is no possibility that USSR would for one instant tolerate submitting the juridical questions involved, like Article 6 of the Treaty of 1921, to any impartial tribunal, I urge it is essential to avoid insofar as possible any suggestion that there are issues open to debate.

3. Indications I have received in the past from British Ambassador suggest that the “Inapplicable validity” formula may have originated with the legal experts in the British Foreign Office.¹ It is well known that certain British influences not remote from AIOC have in the past toyed with the idea of reverting to the techniques of 1907.² In other words, that it would be feasible to make a deal with the USSR whereby the Soviet demands for oil rights in north would be granted in return for an undertaking safeguarding the Great Britain petroleum interests in Khuzistan. This of course is in the Munich tradition and diametrically opposed to our conception of Iran sovereignty and independence. It would also, I fear, in the end be fatal to British interests in this country and possibly in the long-run to world peace. In other words: there is a risk that British legal experts have inspired a legalistic interpretation which might clearly facilitate the Soviet desires to build up a spurious juridical case for aggression.¹

Under no circumstances have the Soviets any juridical basis what-soever to occupy any part of this country. We should cleave to this in simplest and clearest-cut terms.³

Sent Department 543; repeated London 87; Moscow 69.

Wiley

1. Marginal notation by an unidentified Department officer: “No.”
2. The reference is to the division of Iran into spheres of influence by Great Britain and Russia in the convention signed by the two countries in St. Peters burg on August 31, 1907, concerning their interests in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The text of the agreement is printed in Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 1, p. 550.
1. Marginal notation by an unidentified Department officer: “No.”
3. Marginal notation by an unidentified Department officer: “OK.”