891.00/4–1249: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
488. Lunched alone with Shah today and spent three hours with him. He covered widest range Iranian affairs. Shah was in a very complaining mood and full of reproaches for what America was not doing for Iran and what America was doing for other countries, …Iran, he stated, remained in darkest shadow of doubt with regard to American intentions. Until US clarified its position as regard to military and economic aid to Iran, it was impossible for him and his government to formulate any policy whatsoever. I recalled his attention to your two recent statements1 and to the recent speech of the [Page 502] President;2 the fact that we offered two and one-half times what Iran accepted under the arms credit program and inquired what Iran has requested that the US had refused or what the US had obligated itself to fulfill that had not been fulfilled. I then put on the biggest act since Sarah Bernhardt played “L’Aiglon”.
He asked me, “What are the American military missions doing in Iran?” I replied, “They are here to advise Your Majesty as head of Iranian army. When did you seek their advice last?”
Shah changed subject and said it was essential that Iran know precisely what its destiny was. I answered, “Iran will learn this quickest by keeping on right side of fence.”
On military subjects, Shah was most anxious to work out some effective line of defense in Iran involving extensive training of Persian personnel in US and supplying of modern weapons of war. He stated, reverting throughout whole conversation constantly to Turkey, that we are inviting Soviet aggression against Iran, explaining that by our making Turkey impregnable we were definitely inviting attack against Iran. I outlined to him the relationship of US to the problems of Greece and Turkey and recalled again that Iran had never re quested direct aid from the US. I added that the US was a completely loyal member of UN and that the US would view aggression on Iran by Turkey just as seriously as aggression on Iran by any other power. He was not convinced.… The only solution for the situation for Iran would be in the course of the next two years to build up an efficient army of 300,000. He told me that the US General Staff had acquiesced in this figure.
I endeavored to calm his anxiety with regard to Turkey and suggested it might be well to cultivate if possible relations of real understanding with the Turks. Between the two, I added, collaboration could be most fruitful.
With regard to his military plans, I warned him that with new equipment now in production anything that might be given to Iran would be a painful subtraction from what was urgently needed elsewhere and that I was convinced that the US Army would not consent to provide Iran with such equipment without being convinced of Iran’s capacity for its effective utilization. This of course would depend on training and if he would submit his plans in this respect, the Embassy would be glad to submit them through the State Department to American competent authorities.
[Page 503]He wanted detailed infomation on what the US was prepared to do for Iran in respect of direct aid. I assured him that if the question of direct aid for Iran should come up the Department would certainly take most sympathetic attitude but that the matter had not as yet been submitted to Congress.
He then spoke of reinforcing Saadabad pact.3 I replied that in his desire to fortify destiny of Iran he might be well advised to study the realities of the world situation but that if he thought a regional pact would be of any genuine value to the future security of Iran I should be happy to convey his views to my government.
He seems disinclined to go ahead at this time on the Ala-Entezam proposal. We discussed the matter in considerable detail and I conveyed to him the Department’s thinking re Deptel 328, April 8. Apparently he has abandoned any idea of proceeding with the “deal” re withdrawal Iran case in return for Soviet acknowledgement in validity article 6 treaty 1921.
Sent Department 488, repeated London 84, Ankara 17, Moscow 61.
- See telegram 272, March 23, to Tehran, p. 494.↩
- Presumably President Truman’s address of April 4 at the occasion of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. At one point, the President stated: “Under my ‘authority and instructions, the Secy of State has recently made it abundantly clear that the adherence of the US to this Pact does not signify a lessening of Amer concern for the security and welfare of other areas, such as the Near East.”; see editorial note, p. 500.↩
- Treaty of nonaggression signed on July 8, 1937, by Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey at the Saadabad Palace, Tehran.↩