Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/3–1649: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

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Tehran, March 16, 1949—11 a. m.

304. My concern over the position of Iran vis-à-vis Russia was first brought to Department’s attention in my 206 dated July 15, 1948 from Istanbul.¹ Since then the position of Iran has constantly worsened. The Russians have made their position entirely clear: “The dishonor of the repudiation of the northern oil agreement² must be effaced and the presence in Iran of American military missions is intolerable.” I think the (Deptel 234, March 14 and Embtel 303, March 16³) Russians may be genuinely worked up over what they suspect we are up to here. It is normal to judge others by yourself. Moreover it may be presumed that Soviet intelligence in and on Iran is based very largely on a Persian network and that the Soviets are doubtless being fed a lot of fantastic nonsense.

The situation should be appraised in the light of the Soviet notes of protest to Iranian Government, the strong oral representations made by the Soviet Ambassador to me,⁴ and the daily outburst by the Soviet radio and press. The Russians do not play for fun: they play for keeps. When they were erased out of Azerbaijan⁵ they departed with greatest reluctance and certainly with every determination to return.

Whether their arguments are valid or spurious they have established a juridical case for intervention in Iran. They have complied with the proviso of the treaty of 1921 in that they have given “warning.” Also, the treaty of 1927 between Russia and Iran strengthens the treaty of 1921. Protocol one of the former treaty specifies that neither party has any international obligation whatsoever “inconsistent with the said treaty”, and that, moreover, neither party will “assume any such obligations during the whole life of the treaty.” This may lead to the specious argument on the part of the Russians that Article 103 of the UN Charter does not override the 1921 treaty.

In my opinion the Soviet return to Iran is not a question of “if” but is solely a question of “when.” The Soviet build-up is so similar to what preceded the Red Anschluss of the Baltic States⁶ (of which Vishinsky⁷ was one of the principal artisans) as to be truly alarming. For the possibilities the Soviets may enter Iran in near future one may consider the following: Soviet policy in many areas has not been successful and in few, Soviets have suffered checks and even reverses. By now surely the Soviet Union has despaired of blocking the Atlantic Pact, perhaps the major point in Soviet planning. The successful organization of the Atlantic Pact will certainly incite Soviet reaction. That the USSR could take over Azerbaijan, and perhaps terrorize the Iranian Government into dismissing the American military missions, “effacing” the northern oil “disorder,” and removing itself from the western orbit, without risk of a shooting war, all this sounds fairly plausible. (The consensus is that in Azerbaijan there would not be an atmosphere particularly hostile to Russia and not more than token resistance). Such a move on the Russian part would regain the initiative, push the Atlantic Pact off the front page and make many smaller countries quake with apprehension. Also, it would disrupt Iranian economy (Azerbaijan accounts for more than 30 percent in food-stuffs and raw materials of Iran) and torpedo the Seven Year Plan.

The Soviet position is, I think greatly strengthened by the fact that we have permitted false and malicious charges against us to pass so long without effective refutation. (Please see Ambassador Smith’s telegram from Moscow No. 1366 of July 20, 1948.)⁸

In conclusion, the possibility of the Soviet Union occupying Azerbaijan at no remote date, thus reverting to the status quo and [ante,?] merits active and vigilant apprehension.

Sent Department 304, repeated London 63, Moscow 34, Ankara 10.

Wiley

1. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 160.
2. For the refusal of the Majlis to ratify the Iranian oil agreement with the Soviet Union, see telegram 1031, October 23, 1947, from Tehran, ibid., 1947, vol. v, p. 969.
3. Neither printed.
4. The editors have found no documentation on “the strong oral representations” made by Ambassador Sadchikov to Ambassador Wiley.
5. For documentation on the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 289 ff.
6. For documentation on the occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see ibid., 1940, vol. i, pp. 357 ff.
7. Audrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, at the time Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
8. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 164.