Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

761.91/3–1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] March 14, 1949.

Mr. Ala stated that his Government was very apprehensive over the recent increase of Soviet press and radio propaganda accusing Iran of unfriendly acts. As evidence of the apparent Soviet intention to undermine the Government of Iran, Mr. Ala referred to the recent attempt upon the life of the Shah as part of a larger Soviet plan, through the Tudeh Party in Iran, to create confusion within the country. He referred also to Soviet complicity in clandestine publications in Tehran which stated that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR were conferring in order to determine the future status of Iran. Mr. Ala added that he was certain no such conferences were in progress and would not take place without the knowledge of the Iranian Government. I assured Mr. Ala that his views were correct.

Mr. Ala stated that on February 19 the Foreign Minister of Iran had handed the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran a memorandum pro testing Soviet press and radio allegations which the Iranian Government felt constituted interference in the internal affairs of Iran. He handed me a copy of the memorandum,² stating that it had been released to the press in Tehran on March 3. The Iranian memorandum had not previously been brought officially to the attention of this Government.

Mr. Ala stated that he had been instructed by Foreign Minister Hekmat to see me and to request the support of the United States Government in refuting fallacious Soviet charges against Iran which were, in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, also charges against the United States. Mr. Ala said his instructions were, more specifically, to request that we send a note to the Soviet Government rejecting the Soviet charges of United States activities in Iran hostile to the USSR and reminding the Soviet Government that the United Nations Charter prevails in situations where one member state feels threatened by another.

I told Mr. Ala that officers of the Department directly concerned with Iranian affairs seemed to feel that a note to the Soviet Government or some statement on the subject in question might be made by the United States more appropriately as a commentary upon a communication which the Iranian Government might address to the United Nations for its information. I asked why the Iranian Government did not, as is apparently the case, wish to communicate the pertinent facts to the United Nations.

Mr. Ala replied that, on his part, he had been urging his Government for more than a year to make such a communication to the United Nations in which reference should be made not only to the unfounded nature of Soviet charges but also to the fact that the United Nations Charter prevails over any prior agreement with which it might be in conflict, in this case, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. Mr. Ala stated that his Government had hesitated to send such a communication for two reasons: (1) it would be provocative to the Soviet Government in that it would bring to the attention of the world a situation which the Soviet Government would prefer to remain bilateral; and (2) Iranian refutations, of which a communication to the United Nations would be merely a reiteration, have proved to be ineffective in their object of stopping unfounded Soviet charges against Iran.

I asked the Ambassador what was the nature of Article VI of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty. He replied that Article VI stated that, should a third party introduce into Iran a considerable force with the purpose of making Iran into a base of military operations against the Soviet Union and should the Iranian Government upon notification by the Soviet Government prove unable to correct the situation, the Soviet Government would have the right to introduce troops into Iran for the purpose of removing the threat to the Soviet Union, He added that in 1941 the Soviet Government claimed that presence of German agents in Iran constituted a situation contemplated by Article VI and, on that basis, introduced troops into northern Iran.³ He continued by saying that Soviet press and radio propaganda is re minding Iran of the events of 1941 with the clear implication that the present situation of American advisers in Iran is analogous.

I told Ambassador Ala that we would consider what we could do to show our support for Iran in the present circumstances and would consider whether a note to the Soviet Government was the most effective means. Mr. Ala referred to the North Atlantic Pact and said he appreciated information which had been given him by the Department⁴ to the effect that some statement would be made, at the time of the publication of the text of the Pact, which would make clear that our interest in the North Atlantic area should not be interpreted as any lessening of our interest in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. I told Ambassador Ala that we are trying to do what we can to make clear our interest in Iran.

Before leaving, Mr. Ala raised the subject of railway spare parts which Iran had bought and paid for before the War and which have been held by our military authorities since the capitulation of Germany. He said that the equipment in question was essential to the maintenance of the Iranian railways, which were now in a depreciated condition, and were necessary to permit, among other things, the delivery of surplus military equipment purchased from the United States and now stored in Iranian ports. I told Mr. Ala that there had been certain differences of opinion between agencies of our Government about release of such material in Germany. I promised that we would look into the matter and try to have the Iranian equipment released.

(After leaving my office, Mr. Ala was greeted by several members of the press who inquired as to the nature of his appointment with me. Mr. Ala replied that his visit was principally a courtesy call but that he had discussed with me the general situation in Iran. Replying to a question pursuing the subject, Mr. Ala stated that the situation in Iran was one of apprehension caused by Soviet press and radio propaganda against the Iranian Government. He added that his Government had taken notice of the situation in a memorandum handed the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran on February 19, copies of which he handed to the representatives of the press. When Ambassador Ala was asked whether the memorandum had been made public by his Government, he replied that it had not been made public immediately but had susequently been released (on March 3) to the press in Tehran.)

1. Drafted by Mr. Dunn, who was present at the conversation.
2. Not found in Department of State files. The Department, on February 24, notified Tehran that the memorandum strongly protested Soviet propaganda on the following points: “(a) Allegation ‘Amer advisers intend transform Iran into mil base to be used against Soviet Union’; (b) Accusation IranGov employees are ‘fon agents’; (c) Criticism IranGov action re illegal polit parties.” The memorandum was said to refute charges of foreign interference and to state that the control of political parties was an internal Iranian affair. (Telegram 168, 761.91/2–2449)

   Tehran, on March 19, reported the intensification of Soviet diplomatic and propaganda pressures on Iran. Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov had “again called on Foreign Minister to complain about Iranian attitude re Soviet Union and specifically against statements made by Army Prosecutor-General in trial of Tudeh Party leaders linking Tudeh Party with USSR.” Foreign Minister Hekmat’s reply to the Soviet Ambassador was said to be firm (telegram 332, 761.91/3–1949).

3. For documentation on the occupation of Iran in 1941 by troops of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 388 ff.
4. See final paragraph of footnote 3, p. 473.