891.00/2–1449: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran ( Somerville ) to the Secretary of State
161. During audience which I had yesterday with Shah he commented at some length on crisis precipitated by attempt on his life and gave evidence of determination meet situation. He said, “We have some problems here which we must resolve and finish.” He continued [Page 479] that once a struggle against a fifth column was started it must be completed. Half measures were dangerous. This, of course, did not mean that there should be any excesses.
Shah said most important thing was that there must be a decent standard of living in this country and a new sense of social justice. He characterized Seven Year Plan as the most important means of achieving this and said it must be executed. There were other important social measures such as tax bill and land reforms.
His Majesty continued, course of events in last two years had shown that in order to carry out social reforms in this country it is necessary to have “a sane political force based on completely democratic forms as in the western European monarchies”. A strong government, he said, was necessary. Social reforms in Iran were not possible without political reforms, otherwise they were a waste of time. He said present moment was very important for the reason that the Iranian people had been greatly disturbed by attempted assassination. They now realized more keenly danger in which country stood. They could, however, forget in two or three months.
Shah said situation in Iran as it existed just prior to the attempt provided best possible opportunity for communism to make headway. Pie asserted, “For the sake of the country I cannot permit this situation to recur.” He went on to say he hoped he had sympathy of US as a great nation struggling for freedom and independence of world. In this struggle, he added, Iran was a most important element as it was gateway to greatest oil resources in world.
I referred to message which I had on instructions, sent Shah about ten days ago, prior to assassination attempt, urging that the present time was not propitious for constitutional reform (Deptels 84 and 85, February 1 and Embtels 112, February 3,1 and 113, February 3). Shah replied he understood our position but whole situation had changed.
Foregoing remarks of Shah correspond very closely to account given me by British Ambassador of audience he had two days previously. He also has definite impression Shah is planning drastic action of some sort in near future. While Shah did not disclose to me what he has in mind, from conversations with Le Rougetel, Bank Governor Ebtehaj, and others who have spoken with Shah in last few days, I gather Shah intends call a constituent assembly to deal with reform of constitution and at same time immediately to dissolve present Majlis, although it is not clear he has constitutional authority to do so. The royal decree calling for the constituent assembly [Page 480] and dissolving the Majlis would apparently be issued in place of the decree which Shah would have had to issue in any event within next two weeks calling for elections before July. Under the new program, Shah apparently hopes have constituent assembly meet by middle of April, following which new elections would be called so the new Majlis would be in session by July. In order to carry out these plans, Shah evidently feels a strong government will be necessary and is said to be thinking of Hakimi, Seyid Mohammad, Sadeq Tabatabai, and Ali Mansur, in that order, for Prime Minister. These points are covered more fully in Le Rougetel’s telegram to FonOff which should be presumably available to Department and Embassy London.
In his talk with Shah, Le Rougetel said he had been instructed to urge Shah proceed cautiously in this entire matter and that he knew this attitude was shared by Department of State and Ambassador Wiley as well as his FonOff. Shah, however, just as in his conversation with me, took position that whole situation had changed and that now was time to act. If he waited, opportunity for effective action might pass.2
Sent Department; repeated London as 28.
- Telegram 112 is not printed.↩
- London reported, on February 14, that Ambassador Le Rougetel had had an audience with the Shah on the twelfth and had advised the Foreign Office of the Shah’s determination not to heed American and British advice and of his decision to dissolve the Majlis in a fortnight and order a Constituent Assembly (telegram 561, 891.00/2–1449). No. 561 also transmitted Ambassador Le Rougetel’s comment, presumably to the Foreign Office, that he agreed the time was ripe for the Shah to act and that failure to take decisive action would probably entail the overthrow of the regime in the next few months.↩