891.00/1–2949: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1
68. Following is substance oral statement made [to] Iranian Ambassador Jan 25 reply Shah’s inquiry as to whether US would give favorable consideration to Iran Gov request for military assistance on Greek-Turkish model:2
- 1.
- US desires help Iran. Extent of assistance is necessarily limited by (a) availability funds and equipment; (b) capacity Iranian forces to receive and utilize equipment and (c) economic capacity Iranian Gov to maintain equipment and forces required to utilize it.
- 2.
- World-wide demands on us for military assistance are enormous. We do not yet know their total magnitude or relative urgency nor what funds and materials will be available to satisfy them.
- 3.
- We lack legal authority furnish further military assistance to Iran or any other countries except Greece, Turkey and China. Action by Congress would be required. We are working on problem but cannot tell what Congress will do either in granting authority or in appropriating funds to meet various requests for military aid.
- 4.
- Delivery surplus military equipment to Iran under current program is just beginning and will require full year to complete. We believe capacity Iranian ports and transportation facilities will be fully occupied with this material during current year. In case of Turkey, despite careful advance preparations and number of available ports, we found that deliveries of military equipment strained [Page 473] capacity to utmost. It has not been possible even yet to deliver all of first year’s program.3
- 5.
-
In light of foregoing we are unable at this time give definite reply Shah’s inquiry. We consider however that discussions of Ambassador and Military Attaché with State and Army officials have been very useful and we will bear carefully in mind considerations advanced by them in connection our continuing study and planning on problem military assistance programs.
It was emphasized this statement merely constituted progress report and not final answer either way.
All above is FYI to be used only in response to questions by Shah and Razmara,4 none other.
- This telegram was repeated to Moscow as 45 and London as 335.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 227 ff. and 1638 ff.↩
- In a
memorandum of January 10 to Under Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of
the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
discussed the problem of an “Iranian Inquiry re Possible
Military Aid Program for Iran.” The memorandum included
seven recommendations and Mr. Lovett approved them. The
first four recommendations are closely summarized in
paragraphs numbered 1 to 4 in telegram 68. The remaining
recommendations in the memorandum read as follows:
“5. For the reasons given in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above, we consider it premature to give any assurances at this time regarding our attitude toward a request for further military aid to Iran. At a later date we should know better what it may be in our power to do and should then be in a position to consider, along with the proper Iranian authorities, to what extent the Iranian forces could effectively utilize any additional aid we might be able to offer and the extent of the burden on the Iranian economy which would be imposed by such aid.
“6. The whole question raised by the Iranian Ambassador on the instructions of the Shah will be discussed with Ambassador Wiley during his stay in the United States, and Mr. Wiley will be instructed to discuss it with His Majesty immediately on his return to Iran.
“7. If the Ambassador should argue that Iran will be left in an especially exposed position as a result of our (anticipated) close association with Western Europe in the North Atlantic Pact, such an association implying a lack of determination to defend the security of other parts of the world, he should be told that we have no intention of lessening our support for Iran and that we are working on means to make this clear to the world. The provision of military equipment to a nation is not the only, or even necessarily the best, means of assuring its independence. The strengthening of the military power of Western Europe through the North Atlantic Pact and any military aid program which might accompany it would in itself constitute a major element of security for Iran by helping to restore the balance of forces which has so often protected Iran in the past.” (891.24/1–1049)
Ambassador Ala, on January 25, had inquired whether Iran had been considered for membership in the North Atlantic Pact. The Department informed him that “we recognized we must avoid giving false impression that, by apparently preemptive commitment to Western Europe, we are abandoning Iran to predatory Soviet designs. Iranian people must not be led to feel that increased US support of Western Europe means any lessening of support for Iran and correspondingly USSR must not be given impression that aggression against Iran would go unchallenged because of apparent US concentration on European security. There would be in fact no slackening in US support of Iran and we were studying ways and means of making this clear to world.” (Telegram 86, February 1, to Tehran, 840.20/2–149; for the full text of telegram 86, see vol. iv, p. 60.)
↩ - Maj. Gen. Ali Razmara, Iranian Chief of Staff.↩