Editorial Note
James Somerville, the Chargé d’Affaires in Iran, and Evan M. Wilson, the First Secretary of Embassy, had an audience with the Shah on January 20. The Iranian monarch cited recent conversations in Washington by Iranian Ambassador Hussein Ala and Brigadier General Mohammad Mazhari, the Iranian Military Attaché, with a Department of the Army official. During the conversations, the Iranian representatives were said to have “advanced three alternative proposals for the defense of this country in the event of Russian aggression: (a) the first, which would involve holding Azerbaijan and Khorassaii as well as the rest of the country, would require an army of at least 500,000 men; (b) the second, which would involve holding certain mountain areas in the western and southwestern portion of the country in order to permit the defense of the oil fields, would require an army of 300,000 men including two armored divisions; while (c) the third, which was what could be accomplished by the present Iranian Army of about 100,000, with the American equipment it is now receiving, would permit only a small force in the same mountains to carry out guerrilla operations and try to defend the oil fields as much as possible.”
The Shah stressed the second alternative and expressed confidence that the Iranian Army as augmented along those lines would hold the indicated area. He stated “that if it were not possible for the United States to give Iran any more equipment than that coming in under the present arms credit, or for Iran to expand its Army beyond the present figure of roughly 100,000 men, the Iranian Army would have to confine its role to guerrilla and harrassing operations centering in the area around Hamadan, Kermansáh and Khurramabad.” He “stressed most earnestly the need for the United States giving Iran some indication of its strategic plans as regards this country.”
[Page 472]The Shah “concluded the audience by saying that in any case the Iranian Army would resist any aggression, and reiterating his re quest for more information as to the extent of aid which could be expected from the United States in such a contingency.” (Memo randum of conversation, presumably by Messrs. Somerville and Wilson; copy transmitted to John D. Jernegan, Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, by Mr. Somerville in his letter of January 21, 891.24/1–2149)
For the statement released to the press by the Department of State on July 29, 1948, detailing the credits extended to the Iranian Government for the purchase of American surplus military equipment, see Foreign Relations, 1948, volume V, Part 1, page 166.