Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Director of the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, Greece (Van Fleet) to the Department of the Army

top secret

Athens, November 7, 1949.

L 4192. 1. Reurad WAE 95948.¹ JUSMAPG planners and senior officers service groups are not sufficiently familiar with current US world wide strategic policy to be sure their thinking and recommendations be in accord with that of the Joint Staff. However there are a few facts bearing directly upon our European strategic policy which appear to be obvious. These are:

a. Past major strategic concepts have been oriented towards stemming the Russian advance into Western Europe and Mediterranean area. These efforts have achieved an obvious measure of success.

b. Recent and future strategic concepts are oriented largely toward rolling the iron curtain back. Some results are already evident by the disaffection of Yugoslavia and its leanings toward the West. In addition, Albania is undergoing serious internal unrest; and should the present regime collapse, Albania will turn to the West. Bulgaria is having internal difficulties and these may lead to eventual revolution and alliance with the West. To strengthen our efforts to roll back the iron curtain in the Balkans the US and the British must maintain a strong combined posture in Greece.

c. To further its long range strategic concepts the US has established a solid belt around Western Europe and through Mediterranean area including Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran, and it appears that Yugoslavia is about to be absorbed into this belt.

2. The English speaking world must stand solidly together in support of these strategic concepts. Specifically the US and British Commonwealth must be solidly unified militarily and must pursue this common objective on a combined basis. However, the US is financing the program necessary to mold this belt of nations into a unified whole. Thus, the US must hold the predominant position on all fronts in the establishment of policy inasmuch as the US provides the funds and the equip for implementation.

[Here follow numbered sections 3, 4, and 5. In these sections Van Fleet observed that contacts between the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group and the British Military Mission in Greece had disclosed few if any differences of opinion as to overall strategy. Van Fleet further pointed out that the principal task remaining to be pursued in Greece by the missions, other than the delivery of supplies and equipment, was the field training of the Greek armed forces. These sections summarized some of the points made in message L 4124, October 17, to the Department of the Army, not printed, in which Van Fleet had presented in some detail his views on the future of American and British military missions in Greece (Department of Defense files).]

6. Current Greek situation:

a. The situation in Greece changed quickly. Less than a year ago the military, political and economic situations were discouraging, and the Greek Government was asking for a larger army. Now the Government has agreed to a reduction of the armed forces. Presently all large, organized Communist inspired groups of guerrs have been driven from Greece. Yugoslavia has ceased to furnish military aid to those guerrs remaining in Greece while Albania and Bulgaria continue to furnish active aid to guerrs remaining inside Greece and to those driven out. Small guerr groups still exist within Greece and are being harassed and pursued by Greek armed forces, these groups are now and can, until they are exterminated, spread terror and acts of sabotage and are cells for the Communists. It is not believed that large guerr groups can enter Greece this winter, however, individuals can infiltrate at will and in the spring large groups can reenter and live off the land. If this should happen, active military operations will again occur.

b. The military successes of 1949 were due to continued American aid, revitalized Greek armed forces and noninterference in military affairs by the Greek Government. These successes have raised the Greek prestige among its northern neighbors. The economic recovery is slow, standards of living are low, there is much unemployment, many refugees still must be given relief, and reconstruction except for engineering projects, is slow. Discontent must still exist among many Greeks.

c. The geo-political position and military strategic position of Greece remain unchanged from time “Truman” doctrine was announced. However, it appears here that the strategic control of the Mediterranean area by US has increased since that announcement.

d. Greece offers an important base for the collection of strategic intelligence.

e. Greece has appreciated US military aid and has made effective use of it. None of it willingly or scandalously got to the enemy. She has demonstrated clearly that she was a good ally in World War I, World War II, and post-World War II, and will continue to be in event of World War III. No other European nation has a better record and a stouter heart against aggression and Communism.

7. From the Russian point of view, the US-British-Greek victory in this area in 1949 may be considered extremely local and temporary. In fact, the balance sheet to date may be overwhelmingly in favor of Russia in that the guerr movement has cost them money only and possibly not more than the equivalent of ten million dollars. It has cost US and Great Britain in excess of a billion dollars plus many British lives and untold destruction, suffering and lives of Greece itself. It seems logical to conclude that Russia in time will renew attack. Any weakness in Greece—military, political, economic or social will be exploited by the Soviets whereas a strong position along these lines would be discouraging to the Soviets. It is believed that US and Great Britain should seize the initiative and exploit current successes to roll back the iron curtain still farther in the Balkans. The opportunity calls for strong and careful handling.

8. While US military policy to date in Greece has been internal security and on a year to year basis, it now should be accepted that we are here to stay. Greece today is the keystone of the defense line from Western Europe to Middle East. I strongly recommend that we revise our thinking “that Greece is not important militarily”. With Greece in possession of the Nazis the Allies lost control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The same would be true should Russia take it over. But Greece in allied hands is a secondary front of tremendous strategic value. Russia could not ignore it by concentrating against Western Europe. It is believed that we should play up prominently our part in Greece as propaganda to divert Russian forces in event of hostilities. This could easily be done without too much financial investment. For instance, believe there could be important visits to this area with reconnaissance at critical points in the north. As example, a party of 36 Marine Corps aviators passed through here recently on a world tour of orientation. They were oriented by JUSMAPG but unfortunately they could remain only one day. I believe a two-day inspection of critical areas in Northern Greece would not only have been good instruction for them but could have had tremendous effect upon the Soviets.

9. My conclusions are summarized as follows:

a. Greek victory local and temporary.

b. Russia, permitted, will renew attack.

c. Strong united stand by US and United Kingdom essential.

d. US year to year policy must be changed to a long term policy. The US is here to stay.

e. Greece can be secondary front for Soviet diversion in event of war. Also its strategic position has greatly increased.

f. Greeks will fight, are a good investment.

g. Soviets are in critical shape themselves, are unable to support a war and definitely would not declare one. We must eliminate fear of them.

h. Now is the time to win in the Balkans.

i. US and British Missions can be reduced and dove-tailed. More on this 10 November.

10. In this radio I have commented upon the current Greek situation and the US position. My thoughts on what the British position will be and what it should be will be conveyed to you in radio Thursday, 10 November. General Sir John Crocker, Commander British Forces Middle East, will be in Athens on 8 and 9 November and has requested audience with me to discuss our military missions and common interests. So far the subj matter has been classified “for American eyes only.” It is requested that I be given authority to fully discuss the subj with the Chiefs of the British Missions and Gen Crocker.²

1. Dated October 27, not printed. It requested Lieutenant General Van Fleet to give his views on the U.S. long-range position in Greece, the probable British position in Greece, and, from the U.S. military point of view, What the British position should be (Department of Defense files).
2. Message WAR 96278, November 8, from the Department of the Army to Lieutenant General Van Fleet, not printed, authorized Van Fleet to discuss with the British authorities on an exploratory basis the activities of the military missions and other allied matters pertaining to Greece (Department of Defense files). In his message L 4201, November 10 to the Department of the Army, not printed, Van Fleet reported that he had discussed with General Crocker and the heads of the British Military Missions in Greece such issues as the future size and composition of the Greek armed forces and of the U.S. and British military missions. Van Fleet found British views practically identical with American thinking, and the British appeared to be most willing to accept the American solution. Van Fleet concluded his message as follows:

   “It is my strong view that it is paramount that any solution adopted for Greece must be one which will present a solid US-British front in the Balkans. The strongest position that can be taken in the Eastern Mediterranean and specifically in Greece should be in US-British posture presenting a very obvious and incontestable united front which will insure an unbroken link in the present chain of US interests around Europe from Norway to the Middle East.” (Department of Defense files)