Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

IO Files

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the United Nations ¹

secret

[Washington,] September 9, 1949.

SD/A/C.1/272

United States Position on the Greek Case at the Fourth General Assembly

the problem

The problem is to determine what position the United States Delegation should adopt when the General Assembly considers the regular and supplementary reports of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) and further United Nations action on the problem of Greece.

recommendations

A. Procedural

1. On the procedural issue of the manner and extent of participation by Albania and Bulgaria in Committee 1 discussions, the United States should favor the same arrangement provided for those governments at the 1947 and 1948 Assemblies. (The Committee decided last October “to hear the statements of the Bulgarian and Albanian delegations” and requested them “to place themselves at the disposal of the Committee in order to reply to any questions which may be put to them”.)

2. In the event of any effort to obtain a hearing at the Assembly for representatives of the Greek guerrilla regime, the Delegation should oppose such hearing and should point to Committee 1’s rejection of a similar proposal on October 25, 1948 as a clear precedent.

B. Substantive

The following course of action is recommended in the expectation that the forthcoming UNSCOB supplementary report to the General Assembly will contain recommendations substantially along the lines of those which the United States Representative on the Balkan Committee has been instructed to support. It will be necessary to coordinate the proposed course of action carefully with the British and French, and, so far as the conciliation effort is concerned, with the Greeks.

1. When Committee 1 first takes up the UNSCOB reports, the United States should propose that separate, initial treatment be given to the (expected) UNSCOB recommendation for consultations among members with a view to achieving a settlement of the dispute between Greece and her northern neighbors.

2. The United States should then propose, or support a proposal, that the President of the Assembly, and the Chairman of Committee 1, arrange and guide consultations among the United Kingdom, United States, France and the USSR, with appropriate participation for representatives of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in an effort to bring about an agreement ensuring the restoration of peaceful conditions along the northern frontiers of Greece. The United States should endeavor to obtain terms of reference for the consultative mechanism which will be simple and flexible and which in their context will reflect our assurances to the Greeks that they would be protected from discussion of their internal affairs in the conciliation proceedings.

Provision should be made for a report to Committee 1 on the results of the consultations within a specified period so as to ensure that there will be adequate time for later Assembly action based on the outcome of such consultations. (A separate paper will be furnished the Delegation on the subject of the United States negotiating position in such projected consultations. That paper will also include a draft resolution suitable for adoption by Committee 1 on the projected consultations, together with suggested points for inclusion in a United States statement before Committee 1 when the Greek item is first considered.)

3. In the event that the conciliation effort results in an acceptable agreement for settlement, the United States should join in an agreed report to that effect to Committee 1. The subsequent course of action by the Delegation in Committee 1 would depend upon the extent to which the plan of settlement envisages a role for the United Nations and would have to be determined at a later date.

4. If the conciliation effort proves fruitless, the Delegation should endeavor to bring about a report to Committee 1, formulated so as to demonstrate the insincerity of the Soviet professions of a desire for peaceful settlement in the Balkans. The report to Committee 1 should also explain clearly the bases of the United States position during the consultations, and should be designed so as to reinforce the UNSCOB recommendations for further action.

5. The United States should then move, in conjunction with the British and French, to have Committee 1, and the Assembly, adopt a resolution along the following lines:

(a) The General Assembly again to find that the continued aid to the guerrillas given by Albania and Bulgaria endangers peace in the Balkans and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter;

(b) The General Assembly to consider that, since Albania is the principal source of material assistance to the Greek guerrillas, the Government of Albania is principally responsible for the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece;

(c) The General Assembly to renew its call upon the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to cease forthwith their aid to the guerrillas and for their cooperation with Greece and the United Nations toward a peaceful settlement of their differences with Greece;

(d) The General Assembly to call upon the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to permit verification on the spot by United Nations representatives of the claims of those Governments that they are disarming and interning Greek guerrillas fleeing into their territories;

(e) The General Assembly to note with concern that increased support has been afforded the Greek guerrillas from certain states not bordering upon Greece, particularly Rumania, and to remind such states that this is contrary to the Assembly’s Resolution 193 (III) A of November 27, 1948;²

(f) The General Assembly:

(i) to state that world opinion has been profoundly disturbed to learn that, in violation of humanitarian principles, some children of adolescent age from among those previously removed from Greece have been sent back to Greece as guerrilla fighters.

(ii) to deplore failure on the part of those countries to which Greek children have been removed to comply with the unanimous Assembly Resolution 193 (III) C of November 27, 1948;

(iii) to call upon such states to render wholehearted and early compliance with that Resolution;

[(g) The General Assembly to find that the shipment of arms or other materials of war by other states to Albania and Bulgaria, so long as those Governments continue to furnish aid and assistance to the Greek guerrillas, is inconsistent with paragraph 9 of Resolution 193 (III) A of November 27, 1948; the General Assembly to request all Members to report periodically to the Secretary-General whether in fact they are acting in accordance with that resolution.]³

(h) The General Assembly to reaffirm the underlying principles contained in its Resolutions of 1947 and 1948 as providing a sound basis for settlement of the Balkan problem;

(i) The General Assembly to continue United Nations machinery with adequate powers of conciliation and observation for the purpose of furthering a settlement between Greece and its northern neighbors and of restoring peaceful conditions along the northern frontiers of Greece.

Depending upon the outcome of the projected conciliation effort, and after consultation with the Department and with other delegations, the Delegation should be prepared to develop proposals drawn from one or more of the following alternatives:

(1) The continuance of UNSCOB in its existing form and with its existing functions;

(2) Transformation of UNSCOB into a commission composed of states represented on the Security Council with the same, or possibly expanded, terms of reference, and with an appropriate new name;

(3) Maintenance of the unified observation organization of UNSCOB for the entire northern frontier region, with separate conciliation commissions for Greek-Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian affairs and possibly one for Greek-Yugoslav affairs. Alternatively, there might be a commission directed to devote its attention to conciliation between Greece on the one hand and Albania and Bulgaria on the other, leaving political problems between Greece and Yugoslavia to be worked out bilaterally, if conditions are favorable.

discussion

The Greek Case will appear for the third time on the Assembly’s agenda. The problem has entered a new phase internationally despite the fact that assistance is still being furnished the Greek guerrillas by Albania and Bulgaria, and though increased support from Rumania has been evident. The Greek Army is making outstanding progress in destroying the guerrilla forces, most of the remnants of which have fled northward, chiefly into Albania. The Greek Government is contemplating early announcement of a comprehensive, lenient program for the re-integration of ex-guerrillas into national life. Announcement of such a program should induce considerable numbers of guerrillas to abandon the movement.

With the intensification of her quarrel with the Cominform, Yugoslavia has greatly curtailed, if not completely stopped, aid to the guerrillas. The prospects for some degree of rapprochement between Greece and Yugoslavia have correspondingly improved. Cut off as she is by Greece and Yugoslavia from direct contact with the Cominform group, Albania becomes more vulnerable to western and United Nations pressure. Greece is no longer confronted by a solid bloc of equally hostile states at her northern frontiers. The Balkan situation seems to warrant a fresh effort, during the coming Assembly session, to promote a settlement of the Greek case under the auspices of the United Nations.

Various trends and developments of the past six months point to the advisability of making a new conciliation effort during the General Assembly. The conciliation efforts of the Evatt group during the Assembly meetings at Paris and New York at least pointed the way toward means of achieving peaceful relations between Greece and the three northern states. The Rusk-McNeil-Gromyko conversations on Greece last spring gave rise to public expectation that further great power contacts might find a basis for the pacification of the Balkan problem. The Soviet “peace proposals” regarding Greece, made during the Big Three conversations mentioned above, have not yet been fully answered by the western democratic powers, and will doubtless be put forward again by the USSR during the Assembly session.

In the light of the above considerations, the Department favors a procedure in Committee 1, at an early stage of the Assembly session, which will provide for a renewed conciliation effort under the auspices of that Committee along the lines outlined in recommendations B–1 and 2, above. The objective would be to bring about, on terms satisfactory to the United States and to the Greeks, a settlement or plan for settlement of the Balkan dispute which the Assembly can endorse. The President of the Assembly and the Chairman of Committee 1 can be directed to arrange such consultations, with flexible arrangements for the mode of consultation between representatives of the Big Four and those of the Balkan States directly involved. An important objective is to avoid placing the Yugoslavs in the position of having to take part in formal conciliation group meetings. Even if events prove that the Soviets are not ready to cooperate toward a genuine settlement, it is believed that the effort should be made in order further to highlight Soviet complicity in the plot against Greece and to ensure wide support in the Assembly for another firm but constructive resolution. If the conciliation effort is fruitless, the way would be open for the Assembly to develop such a resolution.

The desired resolution should be based as far as practicable on the recommendations which we expect UNSCOB to make to the Assembly. However, it is the Department’s belief that the way should be left open for the possible modification of UNSCOB or its replacement by new machinery, if such a course seems best calculated to achieve better results during the post-Assembly period. This can best be determined in the light of developments during the conciliation effort and of the prevailing atmosphere in the Assembly during discussion of the final resolution on this problem. If it becomes apparent that conciliation on terms acceptable to the West is impossible, the continuance of UNSCOB may prove the most definitive answer. On the other hand, it is recognized that a fresh psychological start could be obtained if a new commission, or commissions, were established with better prospect of obtaining recognition from the northern governments. There is some danger that UNSCOB, if continued without some change, is likely to stagnate at the sacrifice of forward motion in United Nations handling of the problem.

Admittedly Greek-Yugoslav relations are already in a very different status than those between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria, on the other. This may permit somewhat different treatment of Greek-Yugoslav affairs by the Assembly including the possibility of relieving the United Nations Commission of responsibility for political or conciliation work in that respect. However, it is considered probable that overall authority for United Nations observation of conditions along the Greek frontiers should remain broad enough to include observation of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier area.

1. This position paper was one of a series prepared in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs constituting the instructions from the Department of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations. The considerations and recommendations set forth here had been in the process of being formulated for some time prior to the date of this final paper. The substance of the recommendations of this paper were contained in telegram 1417, Balcom 296, August 29, to Athens, not printed (501.BB Balkan/8–2949). The text of Baicom 296 was in turn transmitted in telegram 3121, August 30, to London and in telegram 3218, August 30, to Paris, for discussion with appropriate British and French officials and was repeated in telegram 607, August 30, to Moscow, for information (501.BB/8–3049).
2. Regarding the resolutions on the Greek problem adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 27, 1948, see footnote 5 to telegram 308, Combal 368, February 19, from Athens, p. 254.
3. Brackets in the source text.