Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Balkan/9–849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)

secret

[Washington,] September 8, 1949.

Participants:	The Greek Ambassador, H. E. Vassili Dendramis
	Mr. Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary
	Mr. John D. Jernegan, GTI

The Ambassador called at his request following his return from Paris where he had consulted with Greek Foreign Minister Tsaldaris. He said that after their consultation, Mr. Tsaldaris had returned to Athens and discussed the position with the Council of Coordination, composed of the leaders of the political parties in the coalition government, plus the Commander-in-Chief, General Papagos. The Ambassador had now received instructions approved by the Council. He then read the attached statement, which he said should be regarded purely as an oral exposition of the Greek Government’s views and not as a written communication.¹

There followed some discussion of the reiterated Greek proposal for an Assembly recommendation that the UN members hold consultations to remove the menace from Albania. Mr. Rusk again pointed out that it was difficult for the United States to support such a recommendation, since the principal responsibility for action under it would fall upon us. He said we would give this proposal renewed consideration but he could not hold out any encouragement that we would accept it. With respect to the apparent opposition of the Greek Government to any formal arrangement for conciliatory talks in the General Assembly, Mr. Rusk said that it seemed almost certain that something of this sort would be proposed and that it would be virtually impossible for the United States to reject it, so long as provision were made for the interested parties to participate. We could reject any proposal for direct negotiations between Russia and the United States or among any other group which excluded Greece and her northern neighbors, since this would be in accord with our frequently stated position that we could not dispose of the interests of third parties in their absence. However, we could not refuse to discuss questions like the Greek case if the parties at interest were to be represented. Mr. Jernegan suggested that in view of this, it might well be desirable for the United States to take the initiative in proposing conciliation rather than let the Soviets gain an advantage by being the first to advance the idea.

Mr. Jernegan said the Greek Government appeared to be rather more confident than we were regarding the liquidation of the guerrilla threat. Despite the victories which had been won by the Greek forces, it still seemed possible that Albania and Bulgaria could rehabilitate the guerrillas and arrange their re-entry into Greece to resume the fighting. We therefore thought it was worthwhile to attempt to reach a political settlement at the General Assembly. He pointed out that there were two ways of removing the Albanian menace. One would be the use of some sort of force, but this would require action on the part of the United States which we had been unable to see our way clear to take. The other would be to negotiate an agreement which would give Greece at least some assurance that Albania would refrain from further intervention. The latter approach was what we had in mind in our planning for the General Assembly. We have not, however, contemplated that such an approach need involve any unacceptable concessions on the part of Greece.

The Ambassador emphasized the belief of his government that the best procedure would be to approach the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments through diplomatic channels and discreetly urge the resumption of normal relations and the cessation of intervention in Greek affairs. He pointed to the success which appeared already to have been achieved in the case of Yugoslavia, partly as a result of Ambassador Cannon’s talks with the Yugoslav Government. He thought the American Minister in Sofia might profitably take similar action. This sort of approach would avoid the dangers of public discussion at the UN during which a wide range of subjects might be brought up, subjects which we would not desire to discuss.

Mr. Rusk asked whether the Greek Government had any special information to indicate that Bulgaria might be disposed to soften its position towards Greece. The Ambassador replied that he himself had no such information but he believed the government in Athens had received some indications to this effect.

Mr. Rusk asked how the Greek Government would react to a proposal that the present frontiers of Greece be considered as permanent. In other words, if the northern neighbors agreed to drop their agitation about Greek Macedonia, would Greece be prepared to do likewise with Northern-Epirus? The Ambassador replied that the two cases were not comparable. Many Albanians desired a closer relationship with Greece, perhaps even a form of federation. Although he did not directly answer the question, it was apparent that he did not think his government would accept a proposal of the sort mentioned by Mr. Rusk.

In the course of the discussion, Mr. Rusk asked what the Ambassador would think of taking the case of the Albanian threat to Greece to the Security Council. Ambassador Dendramis indicated that he might look with favor on this even though a Russian veto was to be expected. He thought that this matter followed naturally from the proposed Assembly resolution for consultation among the UN members regarding the Albanian menace. After holding such consultations, the UN members might recommend that the matter be presented to the Security Council.

It was agreed that the Department would give further study to the point of view expressed by the Greek Government and would inform the Ambassador of its conclusions.

In reply to a question, the Ambassador said that the Greek representatives in Paris and London had been given the same instructions as those he had just communicated to us.

1. The text of the oral statement made by Ambassador Dendramis is not printed. The principal points of the statement, which covered more than six typewritten pages in the source text, were as follows:

   1. Military operations had substantially liquidated the Greek guerrilla danger. Consequently, Greece’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet satellites had greatly improved.

   2. The Soviet Government would be likely to turn any consultations to propaganda advantage by insisting on the discussion of subjects which the United States and Greece would wish to avoid, such as amnesty, the restoration of “democratic elements” in Greece, measures for the protection of Slav minorities in Greece, and the recognition of the present Greek-Albanian border as permanent. This would place the Western Powers in the position of either having to make concessions detrimental to Greece or appearing to block a settlement by rejecting the Soviet proposals.

   3. Consultations at the General Assembly would not be the most favorable means of achieving a real adjustment in the relations of Greece with her northern neighbors. At the United Nations, the discussions would be public and would compel the Soviet Union to adopt a rigid attitude. Experience had shown that the only way to achieve any adjustments with the Soviet Union and its allies was by quiet negotiations through regular diplomatic channels. The Greek Government would therefore prefer to have the United States confine its efforts in this direction to discreet diplomatic conversations in Belgrade and Sofia and some form of diplomatic approach to Albania.