Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Balkan/6–849: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
priority

Athens, June 8, 1949—1 p. m.

1121. Telac 51 Paris, repeated Athens 831, June 3. In any attempt to explore whether USSR genuinely seeking face-saving formula regarding Greece US should exercise utmost vigilance in maintaining sharpest distinction between external and internal aspects Greek problem. Cessation material and moral aid by USSR and Satellites to Greek guerrillas and related matters such as return Greek children, establishment normal diplomatic relations between Greece and northern neighbors and conclusion frontier agreements are proper subjects international discussion and matters appropriate for action by UNSCOB or some other body under UN auspices. On other hand, questions such as elections, amnesty and status KKE are internal Greek affairs and by Charter definition, outside competence UN. It would appear negation our entire post-war policy in Greece and Balkans to participate at this date in any discussion such internal Greek matters with USSR, let alone with Albania and Bulgaria whose mockery of democratic processes through single list elections, treatment of non-Communist parties and personalities and flagrant flaunting of elementary human rights have been subject our repeated official protests and severe censure.

Under extreme provocation, Greece has maintained essentials of democratic state deserving our continued moral as well as material support. In the event of any further démarches by USSR on the subject of Greece, we should hammer home the point that we find it utterly inconceivable that Greeks should be expected to accord treacherous and brutal rebels degree of leniency and freedom that USSR and Satellites refuse as a matter of principle and doctrine to even their mildest critics.

There follows comment re several specific points Deptel 831, June 3:

(1) Avowed Greek resolve to keep Russians and Satellites out of Greek internal affairs, and to force rebellious Communists to lay down arms is in our opinion neither well defined nor intransigent. If Greeks are overconfident, we have contributed to this. Alternative to confidence, which in these emotional people is pessimism approaching despair, we have found by bitter experience results in defeatism;

(2) While it is difficult for Greeks to cope with imponderables involved in leniency measures to be applied after rebellion, I have pressed and will continue to press on appropriate Greek officials the need of developing comprehensive plans for all phases connected with surrender of rebels;

(3) My preliminary view is that adoption any device permitting votes of Communist sympathizers to be recorded in elections en bloc would be impractical and more totalitarian than democratic. However, suggestion will be given further study;

(4) I agree in principle with Department and Bevin that Greek situation should not be allowed to “drift,” but do not see that this can be said to be the case. We are making decided progress on the military front, peace offensives can only retard that progress;

(5) While we agree that Russians have capability of exacerbating situation, to take this as guiding principle would be to adopt doctrine of despair. We should rather pin our hopes on probability that Greek National Army victory will bring change in Russian tactics and cause them to abandon their venture in Greece. In this connection, the generally unexpected Soviet abandonment of Azerbaijan might well serve as a guiding precedent;

(6) Clearly neither we nor Greeks should refuse to meet Russians half way if they should show real desire to find formula to justify abandonment Greek guerrillas. However, it would be unmistakable sign of weakness for US to appear too eager to assist them in seeking face-saver. I repeat that President put matter in clear perspective when he said that if Russians really desire peace, they can most readily demonstrate it in Greece.

British Ambassador here has advised London that in his opinion, further talks with Russians on Greece—no matter how informal—would have ill effect on Greek Army morale and might well cause fall of Greek Government. Hence opposes such talks and I fully subscribe this view. Incidentally, British are much more optimistic than heretofore over military situation.

Last night, Papagos showed me disturbing telegram from General Tsakalotos regarding harm already done by recent reports of Big Four efforts to settle Greek question. Papagos then expressed fervent hope that we would not let Greece down.¹ As one prominent Greek politician expressed it, Greeks still believe that at least one of Big Four will see them through their hour of peril. They have no confidence in Russians, little in French and are afraid that Bevin may be influenced by Left-wing in Commons.

In my opinion, we will be courting disaster if we give impression that we are temporizing or weakening, which could have far-reaching disastrous effects here in Greece.

Sent Department 1121, repeated Paris 55 for Telac.

Grady

1. A copy of Ambassador Grady’s conversation with General Papagos was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 430, June 13, from Athens, neither printed (501.BB Balkan/6–1349).