Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Balkan/6–349: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris¹

secret

Washington, June 3, 1949—7 p. m.

Telac 51. Embtel 2204 May 31. Answers to questions raised by Bevin in conversation with Secy May 31 have been made clear by reports from Grady in Athens, based on conversations with Grks, and by Grk public statements.

1) Grks intend grant amnesty on large scale following cessation of rebellion to all who renounce communism and who did not occupy key positions or commit serious crimes in connection with rebellion. Question of internatl supervision of amnesty has not been broached, but believe Grks wld strenuously resist any USSR involvement in such supervision and wld regard any other type of supervision, such as Danish, as unwarranted intervention Grk internal affairs and serious reflection on Grk justice. Possibly they wld be willing themselves invite some informal observation or advice, for example by member ICJ or by reps national bar assocs, if US and UK strongly urged this as desirable from propaganda viewpoint or as necessary bargaining concession to Russians. More immediate problem is present substantive Grk position which appears somewhat ill-defined and intransigent in public statements. We feel therefore that Grks shld clarify at once exactly what leniency measures they propose apply after rebellion, and that these shld be as generous as compatible with safety of Grk State.

2) Elections desired by almost everyone in Greece and will be held soon as possible. Grks do not desire fon supervision and wld strongly resist Russ participation any observer body. They do not intend request fon supervision but might consent if we insisted. If question of UN supervision of elections raised, Grks will counter with suggestion for similar supervision satellite countries. Guerrillas wld not participate as group in elections, but Grady has been assured full and free opportunity wld be given all Grks express their opinions. Believe Grk position basically sound this issue and that absence peacetime travel or censorship restrictions in Greece shld provide adequate check on irregularities and assure world opinion of essential honesty of elections.

3) Communist and associated parties were outlawed Greece Dec. 1947 fol their open espousal of rebellion and Grks are adamantly opposed their relegalization in any form, believing this wld merely provide opportunity for Communists to prepare another uprising when conditions more propitious. We agree and understood Brit did likewise. Overt activities of even small legalized Communist minority wld be constantly disturbing factor Grk polit life. More serious, re-legalization wld provide cover for rebuilding communist underground which now disrupted by police measures. On other hand we believe Grks shld devise formula whereby votes of communist sympathizers cld be recorded in elections in order comply democratic principles and clearly demonstrate small percentage of electorate involved.

In general, primary Grk concern is timing of any peace talks with Russians. They feel mil tide now running their favor and that Russ objective is to undermine Grk Army morale by pressing for immediate “peace talks” and obtaining promise of premature withdrawal fon troops from Greece. On this point we feel Grks are overconfident and unduly intransigent, since Sovs have capability of maintaining disturbances indefinitely in border region even if rest of country substantially cleared”, as hoped, of organized guerrilla forces. They also have capability of exacerbating situation by introducing fon elements or new weapons into guerrilla ranks. Any demoralizing influence of peace discussions cld be corrected by appropriate public info program and morale wld probably be more seriously affected in any case if Grk soldiers felt we were neglecting real opportunity for peace and that they faced only endless fighting. We accordingly agree with Bevin, particularly in light Pravda editorial May 30,² that Grk situation shld not be allowed to drift and that we shld further explore, together with Grks and without premature commitments our part, whether Russians may be genuinely seeking face-saving formula for withdrawal from Greece.

As to procedure, we are now thinking of having UNSCOB request SYG to urge Russians and Poles to take their seats on UNSCOB in view renewed public expression of Russ interest in Grk pacification and fact that UNSCOB has again resumed responsibility for conciliation function undertaken temporarily by Evatt. Shld Russians and Poles persist in refusal take seats, SYG might be asked to call upon four major powers and the four other interested govts to designate reps to discuss means of conciliating differences between Greece and her northern neighbors in order to promote restoration peace in Greece. Such request cld be addressed to SYG by UNSCOB itself under authority para 10(c) of main GA Res on Greece of Nov 27, 1948.³

We propose to discuss this procedure with Drew, US Rep UNSCOB, who arrives Washington next week. Meanwhile wld appreciate any indication prelim Brit reactions.⁴

Webb

1. This telegram was repeated to London as 1930, to Athens as 831, and to Moscow as 400.
2. On May 30 the Soviet newspaper Pravda carried a lead editorial entitled “The Greek Problem Can and Must be Solved” which indicated that a solution of the Greek problem ought to be based upon the proposals made earlier by Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko. A condensation of the editorial appears in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. i, No. 22, June 28, 1949, p. 51. In his telegram 1443, June 3, from Moscow, not printed, Chargé Kohler observed that the majority of his diplomatic colleagues in Moscow, with whom he agreed, regarded the editorial as simply an answer to the American and British statements to the press of May 20 (see the editorial note, p. 329). Kohler pointed out that some diplomats in Moscow felt, however, that the editorial indicated Soviet eagerness to reach an early settlement of the Greek problem entirely independent of the Council of Foreign Ministers (740.00119 Council/6–349).
3. Regarding the U.N. General Assembly resolution under reference here, see footnote 5 to telegram 308, February 19, from Athens, p. 254.
4. A memorandum, closely following the text of this telegram, but attributing the views and proposals contained here to Secretary of State Acheson, was conveyed to Roderick E. Barclay, Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Bevin, in Paris on June 7. Telegram 2371, June 20, from London, not printed, reported that Bevin had decided not to discuss with Secretary Acheson the British Foreign Office comments in the June 7 memorandum. Bevin had instead instructed the Foreign Office to take up the matter with the Department of State through the usual diplomatic channels (501.BB Balkan/6–2049). Regarding those British comments, see Cromie’s memorandum of conversation of June 17, p. 356.