845.00/12–2849: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
1609. Member UK office has shown us telegram reporting HiCom’s conversation with Nehru on 26th. Nehru gave him same explanation Government of India rejection McNaughton proposals as outlined my 1605 December 26th. It appears principal participants in GOI discussions leading up to rejection were Nehru, Governor General Patel and Bakshi (Kashmir Deputy Prime Minister).
In lengthy discussion which ensued Nye took line with Prime Minister that there were only four possibilities: war, continued stalemate, mediation and arbitration. As first two were unthinkable it remained to discuss latter two. Nehru was advocating mediation but he should remember McNaughton was in fact now acting as mediator. GOI’s out-of-hand rejection McNaughton’s proposals was hi itself evidence of not willing compromise or take conciliatory attitude necessary for successful mediation. Therefore GOI, which desired settlement, should accept arbitration.
Nehru apparently gave Nye no encouragement whatever.
[Page 1771]Nye’s evaluation of conversation was that Nehru was thinking in terms of partition although he did not mention it at this talk. Nye felt that although GOI rejection McNaughton proposals was based on sincere belief in merits Indian case nevertheless uncompromising position was in part at least tactical and designed to lead to consideration of partition. He concluded that if SC stood firm there was at least possibility GOI might soften its attitude somewhat towards arbitration of demilitarization issues and so make it possible proceed to overall plebiscite.
We feel UK office here has consistently been overoptimistic on likelihood GOI acceptance of arbitration and we see no basis for expecting GOI will modify its stand. We fear McNaughton’s proposals will encourage Pakistan to remain obdurate on overall plebiscite as will current British line. If GOI rejection McNaughton’s proposals made public it seems to us SC debate likely reveal strongly pro-Pakistan bias and difficulty of shift to other basis of settlement will be intensified. We remain convinced there will be no overall plebiscite unless it be one carried out on India’s own terms, i.e., prior withdrawal of Pakistan control over all Jammu-Kashmir and that India is prepared to thwart UN rather than give way. So far as we are aware Nehru gave not slightest reason in London, Washington or elsewhere which might afford grounds for optimism that GOI will modify its attitude. After all, India is now in possession of most of Kashmir and is convinced its legal position there is unassailable. We are inclined believe that if deadlock promises be long duration GOI may proceed further, absorbing all areas Jammu-Kashmir under its control into India—it may call Constituent Assembly Kashmir during 1950 and even begin to prepare for some expression of choice by population these areas.